

# Evaluation of “Securing Accountability for GBV through Transitional Justice”

A project of ICTJ’s Gender Justice Unit, funded by the UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women

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Covering the grant period from November 2012 to October 2015, with research conducted in the United States, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Nepal, Tunisia, and Uganda

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# Final Evaluation of “Securing Accountability for GBV through Transitional Justice”

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APS	Administration Police Service (Kenya)
CBOs	Community-based organizations
CDI	Côte d’Ivoire
CDVR	Commission Dialogue, Vérité et Réconciliation (CDI)
CMSMP	Corporación Mujer Sigue Mis Pasos (Colombia)
CONARIV	Commission Nationale pour le réconciliation et l’indemnisation des victimes des Crises venues en Côte d’Ivoire
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GIFJT	Groupe d’Initiative des Femmes pour la Justice Transitionnelle (Côte d’Ivoire)
GJP	Gender Justice Program (ICTJ)
HRDP	Human Rights Documentation Project (Uganda)
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice
JLOS	Justice Law and Order Section (Uganda)
JRP	Justice and Reconciliation Project (Uganda)
KII	Key Informant Interview
NPSC	National Police Service Commission (Kenya)
TDC	Truth and Dignity Commission (Tunisia)
TJ	Transitional Justice
TJRC	Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (Kenya)
UNTF	UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women
WAN	Women’s Advocacy Network (Uganda)

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Overview of the project

Transitional justice (TJ) can contribute not only to combating impunity for violence against women, but also has profound potential to address the impact of gender-based violence during conflict and authoritarian rule. Understanding the differentiated ways that women and men experience conflict or authoritarian contexts is essential for TJ measures to provide accountability and appropriate redress for victims. Without such an understanding, truth commissions will only document a slice of the wide range of human rights violations that have impacted both men and women, and reparations programs may fail to provide appropriate benefits to meet victims' needs. By grappling with gendered legacies of abuse and the factors that made such abuse possible, TJ measures provide an opportunity to reduce gender-based violence (GBV), promote women's leadership, and enhance their access to justice.

The project "Securing Accountability for GBV Through Transitional Justice" has been undertaken by the Gender Justice program (GJP) of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) from November 1, 2012 through October 31, 2015. Its primary target beneficiaries were women's victims groups (women/girls survivors of violence) and government officials (i.e. decision-makers and policy implementers), and its secondary targeted beneficiaries were civil society organizations (CSOs), community-based groups (CBOs), and other TJ practitioners

The overall goal of this project was to ensure that TJ mechanisms in Tunisia, Nepal, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Uganda are designed and implemented in ways that provide redress for victims of gender-based violence and contribute to the prevention of recurrence of gender-based violations.

In order to reach that goal, the project aims to achieve three main outcomes:

1. Women victims groups in target countries strategically engage in ongoing TJ processes;
2. Policymakers take concrete steps to make TJ policies gender-sensitive and to ensure they address women victims' specific justice needs; and
3. Participating women's groups, policymakers and program staff have enhanced and up-to-date comparative knowledge on strategies on how TJ measures can better address gender-based human rights abuses.

The strategy adopted to achieve the above outcomes was to conduct training workshops to build the capacity of relevant policymakers, TJ practitioners, and women's groups.

The total resources allocated for the 3-year project was \$1,371,004, of which the expected UNTF contribution was \$966,496. The actual resources spent from UNTF funds as of the date of this report totaled \$508,013.

### Purpose and Audience for the Evaluation

The final evaluation meets the mandatory requirements of the UNTF, as well as ICTJ's need to understand the project's effectiveness. Results, lessons, and recommendations derived from the evaluation will inform future programming for both organizations. The primary audience for the evaluation is ICTJ's GJP and its senior management; secondary audiences are UNTF and ICTJ country offices and other relevant programs. The evaluation's overall objectives are to:

- Evaluate the entire project in terms of effectiveness, relevance, efficiency, sustainability and impact, with a strong focus on assessing the results at the outcome and project goal levels
- Generate key lessons and identify promising practices for learning.

The evaluation will examine the entire project (November 1, 2012 to October 31, 2015) and cover the following target groups: women's groups (primary); government officials and state institutions (decision-makers and policy implementers) (primary); other CSOs (secondary)| other TJ practitioners (secondary).

### Methodology and limitations

Set up as a pretest-posttest without comparison group, the evaluation partially relies on comparison with data gathered through a baseline study conducted in early 2013. However, given the fact that much of the baseline data is no longer relevant (indicators have changed, target groups have changed, there is missing baseline information for added indicators), we have also employed retrospective pretest methodologies as well as simple

posttest methodologies for this evaluation. There were no specific participatory methods used in this evaluation, given the limited scope and resources available.

Given the time-intensive, qualitative nature of this approach, primary attention was given to Tunisia and Kenya in order to answer the evaluation questions; the evaluator conducted 5 days of field research in each country. The evaluator also surveyed beneficiaries in Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda. No survey was conducted in Colombia or Nepal given the limited number of beneficiaries in each country. When sampling was used for interviews, it was purposive or convenience-based. Rubrics from the original baseline study were used (and new ones created, where relevant) in order to assess qualitative dimensions of change.

Data was generated through 65 interviews with ICTJ staff, GJP beneficiaries in Tunisia and Kenya, and the UNTF; as well as a survey of 13 women's group beneficiaries in Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire (with 11 complete responses). Data collection also included a desk review of relevant documents (internal ICTJ work plans, budgets, trip reports, monitoring data, technical assistance documents, etc.; GJP publications; TJ institutions' web sites and unpublished documentation; news reports; etc.) and a media analysis of GJP publications.

Limitations were numerous, the most significant one being the fact that the baseline-endline comparison was not particularly useful, given the changes in the results framework and the target beneficiaries. There was also a lack of quality monitoring data for all six countries.

## Findings

<b>Overall</b>	This complex project in six countries (essentially, six different projects) achieved some results in spite a range of implementation challenges, including under-resourcing and operating in politically risky contexts. In the evaluator's judgment, the level of results for what is largely a capacity building and policy-influencing program are adequate based on the level of investment per country, which was roughly \$70,000 per year over three years.
<b>Effectiveness</b>	<p>The program's highest level of result was at the outcome level. There were real achievements in terms of improving the capacity of women's organizations to engage strategically with TJ processes (<b>Outcome 1</b>). In most countries, however, the number of women's groups with which GJP engaged in a consistent way over time was small. There were moderate achievements in terms of policymakers taking concrete steps to make TJ gender sensitive (<b>Outcome 2</b>). In only one case did we find that these steps were systematic within a TJ institution (<b>Tunisia</b>). In other countries, such steps were taken, but with a more limited scope and/or implementation. GJP faced significant challenges on the policy level, finding a lack of gender champions to work with inside TJ institutions (<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>), or being subject to slow or nonexistent TJ policy development in several countries (<b>Kenya, Uganda</b>).</p> <p>While achievements at the output and outcome levels do suggest progress toward the goal level, particularly with Tunisia's TDC, it is impossible to predict whether goal-level outcomes will be achieved in any of these countries. Indeed, the program mainly reached beneficiaries at the outcome level—that is, women's organizations and policymakers—rather than beneficiaries at the goal level, which are the women victims who stand to benefit from TJ, once it is implemented in a gender sensitive manner.</p> <p>The program was most effective in those countries where the funding could supplement a robust country-level strategy on gender. The most important signal of this kind of robust engagement was the existence of a continuous gender focal point who worked in collaboration with GJP. Also important were pre-existing contacts/networks with appropriate women's group beneficiaries (especially women victims), and contact with gender champions in key positions inside TJ institutions. This said, the program was structurally limited in what it could achieve from the start, having not properly resourced an ambitious program of activities across six countries. Its effectiveness was also significantly hampered as state commitments to TJ shifted over time.</p> <p>We note finally, that <b>Outcome 3</b>, which focused on improving stakeholder (including ICTJ staff) knowledge on gender and TJ, was more or less orphaned in this project. Although there were some changes achieved in ICTJ staff comfort level and knowledge over the past three years (<b>Tunisia and Kenya</b>), these changes were largely unintended consequences of close collaboration on activities. This part of the project was not supported by a strategy and complementary set of activities from</p>

	the start, as noted in the Baseline Study. Lack of follow through is yet another sign that the project was not adequately resourced from the start.
<b>Relevance</b>	The program was and is relevant to the needs of women victims. Relevance of the results that were actually achieved was stronger for outcomes around strengthening women’s groups than for outcomes around policy change, as the latter are so far limited in their scope and/or implementation.
<b>Efficiency</b>	<p>This program was difficult to implement both for internal and external reasons. Generally, there was a lack of adequate resources to implement the grant (especially in the start up period) and an unrealistic expectation for positive outcomes given the level of resource commitment. We also found a lack of adequate systems (or internal support) for basic project management functions, including monitoring of project performance, as well as challenges around information management, information sharing, and communication. Externally, factors such as the rocky relationship with the donor and changing political landscapes for TJ affected the efficiency and timeliness of implementation.</p> <p>This said, UNTF achieved more value than expected through its funding of this program, both through ICTJ contributions of staff time (which were apart from and on top of ICTJ’s promised co-financing), as well as GJP’s strategic leveraging of its funds with other programs at ICTJ.</p>
<b>Sustainability</b>	Sustainability of gains with both women’s organizations and policy change is mixed at the outcome level. At the goal level—changes in women’s lives—sustainability may be dependent on the effective implementation of gender sensitive TJ, which has not yet taken place in any of the six countries.
<b>Impact</b>	None; too soon to tell.

### Key recommendations

<b>Evaluation Criteria</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	<b>Relevant Stakeholders</b>	<b>Suggested timeline</b>
<b>Overall</b>	<p>Based on the experience with this grant, ICTJ should initiate an internal reflection process concerning the role of victims in its work, with the goal of clarifying both for staff and for external stakeholders (including but not limited to donors) who ICTJ’s primary, direct partners are, as well as when and under what conditions these direct partners include victims and victim organizations. Process should result also in internal guidelines on working with victims, addressing issues such as “do no harm,” security, confidentiality, provision of psychosocial support, etc.</p> <p>Fundraising processes should include more specific costing tools and discussions, in order to make sure that resources match the promised outputs and outcomes in a proposal; in particular, ICTJ should develop a tool for costing average hours needed to develop and implement trainings/workshops, to be used in budget development for future proposals. All ICTJ programs whose staff time is implied in the costing of any proposal should be allowed to review full budgets—not just activity costs, but also salary/staff costs.</p>	<p>ICTJ Program Office; Senior Mgmt; ICTJ stakeholders</p> <p>ICTJ Senior Mgmt; Finance; and Development</p>	<p>12 months</p> <p>3 months (integrated into next work plan, FY17)</p>
<b>Effectiveness</b>	<p>Every country program and thematic unit should thread a gender-sensitive approach through its work, rather than adding “gender” activities on top of their work; if possible, create (or cultivate over time) gender focal points within each program; also, build the capacities of all staff on gender issues.</p> <p>Context analysis prior to starting work should include an assessment</p>	ICTJ Program Office; ICTJ GJP; Country Programs	12 months (integrated into work plan FY18)

	<p>of potential gender champions within TJ institutions and their positions in terms of power relative to others. Where there are no clear gender champions in positions of power, the engagement strategy should reflect this absence.</p> <p>Context analysis should also include an assessment of ICTJ country program's own networks with relevant beneficiaries, such as victim organizations; where these are weak, then a strategy should be included to strengthen them as a key first step in project implementation (e.g., through mapping exercises).</p> <p>For each country, have a general training strategy (for CSOs, policymakers, etc.) as part of the country program work plan that identifies target groups and key learning objectives; the number of people who need to be trained in order for a higher level outcome to be achieved; how much training will be needed over time to reach a higher level outcome; and what non-training activities are needed to support the training strategy (i.e., mentorship/coaching, technical assistance, access to resources for organizational development etc.). Finally, strategy should include monitoring plan and specific tools geared both to learning objectives and to higher-level outcomes.</p> <p>Complex projects involving multiple ICTJ programs should be required to develop internal communication strategies, starting with a kick-off meeting to discuss both substance and process. Communication should be regular and periodic from all sides, rather than ad hoc; it should focus on strategy as much as it does on activities. Communication on strategy should take place periodically, and outside of ICTJ's annual work planning process.</p> <p>ICTJ should consider the need for more specific guidance on when to say "yes" or "no" to a new opportunity. It is true that it may not be clear in the moment whether or not any one opportunity is going to lead somewhere (rather than nowhere.). But if a program is being more opportunistic than strategic over the span of 12 months or so, this may be reason to pause and consider a different direction.</p>	<p>ICTJ GJP; Country Programs</p> <p>ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p> <p>ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p> <p>ICTJ Program Office; ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p> <p>ICTJ Program Office</p>	<p>Immediate</p> <p>Immediate</p> <p>3 months (next work plan, FY17)</p> <p>Immediate</p> <p>6 months</p>
<b>Relevance</b>	<p>Related to the recommendations on training above, training programs should be backed by explicit training strategies, in order to ensure that the subject matter, the frequency, the duration, etc., is relevant to the needs of the target beneficiaries.</p>	<p>ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p>	<p>3 months (next work plan, FY17)</p>
<b>Efficiency</b>	<p>Managers should consider using a broader range of tools (beyond tracking expenditures against budgets) to monitor basic project management functions, especially if a program is struggling; tools such as staff time tracking, used even on a periodic or limited basis, can help managers and staff work together to understand how work loads and efficiency can be improved.</p> <p>Managers should do more to signal their interest in accountability for outcomes and results; this includes asking for evidence for outcomes that go beyond a project director's own reporting/experience of them, which are written in long, internal narrative reports. Monitoring <b>data</b> can be useful in this regard; managers should consider reviewing it on a periodic basis: 1) to make sure that it exists, 2) to ensure that it is of good quality, and 3) to signal that this type of information is important and useful.</p> <p>A methodology for beneficiary counting relevant to ICTJ work should be developed. All staff should then be trained in it, with attention to</p>	<p>ICTJ Program Office</p> <p>ICTJ Program Office; ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p> <p>ICTJ DME Specialist</p>	<p>Immediate</p> <p>Immediate</p> <p>6 months</p>

	<p>issues like double counting, and counting at different levels of change (output vs. outcome levels).</p> <p>ICTJ staff who are struggling to comply effectively with donor monitoring requirements should be given immediate direct support, either through ICTJ's DME staff person or by hiring an external consultant to help with methodology and tool development.</p> <p>ICTJ staff should use its shared Intranet as much as possible to store documents, in particular, "final" rather than draft documents. These include all final documents relating to workshops, trainings, and meetings; technical assistance documents; and relevant external documents, such as those of TJ institutions. If ICTJ does not have policies on documentation and information sharing, then these should be developed and staff should be trained in them.</p> <p>If the Intranet truly is not an option, then GJP should organize files in a way to clearly document and keep track of their own work. For each workshop, for example, GJP should have copies of relevant files, such as participants lists, agendas, training modules, and monitoring data (e.g. pre- and posttests).</p> <p>All ICTJ staff should be more proactive about communicating through means other than email; this is particularly the case when communicating with thematic units (like GJP), which have significantly higher email loads on average than country programs.</p> <p>Have a frank discussion between grantor and grantees at the start of the project about risks to achieving outcomes in politically dynamic contexts. Agree in advance on responsibilities for communication and making project modifications.</p> <p>UNTF should clarify in advance its criteria for decision-making around issues like subgrants and no-cost extensions, in order to prevent unnecessary work by both grantees and subgrantees.</p> <p>UNTF should consider an alternative to its current results framework system for programs that are implementing substantially different work across countries (i.e., rather than implementing essentially a single project in several different countries). If UNTF continues to fund projects such as GJP's, an alternative or improved framework should be developed to meet needs of multi-country programs.</p>	<p>ICTJ DME Specialist</p> <p>ICTJ Senior Management; All staff</p> <p>ICTJ GJP</p> <p>ICTJ all staff</p> <p>ICTJ Development; UNTF</p> <p>UNTF</p> <p>UNTF</p>	<p>Immediate</p> <p>6 months</p> <p>6 months</p> <p>Immediate</p> <p>Immediate</p> <p>6 months</p> <p>6 months (before next funding cycle)</p>
<b>Sustainability</b>	<p>Reiterating the recommendations above on training, programs should have an explicit training strategy that deals not just with subject matter/learning objectives, but also the frequency and duration of the training, as well as what actions are needed in between trainings (coaching, etc.) in order to make the changes sustainable.</p>	<p>ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p>	<p>3 months (next work plan, FY17)</p>
<b>Knowledge generation</b>	<p>Complex projects involving multiple ICTJ programs should include reflection exercises on a periodic basis; these exercises would aim not just to discuss substantive issues, but also build relationships and clarify processes related to implementing/managing the project.</p> <p>Similarly, such programs should consider building in funds or for deploying existing funds toward country program staff travel to other country programs; for example, use a gender focal point from Tunisia to provide expert assistance in meetings in Côte d'Ivoire (as GJP did in Year 3 of the grant), which promotes cross-program learning and relationship building.</p>	<p>ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p> <p>ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p>	<p>3 months (next work plan, FY17)</p> <p>3 months (next work plan, FY17)</p>



## 1. OVERVIEW

### Background and Context of Project<sup>1</sup>

Periods of conflict and authoritarianism not only lead to a dramatic increase in violence against women, but also reduce possible recourses for defending their rights. Moments of transition, when countries seek to establish societies based on rule of law and democracy, offer an opportunity to address these violations, as well as their causes and consequences. If this opportunity is not seized, impunity is entrenched and women can continue to face high levels of discrimination and violence. As affirmed by Security Council Resolution 1888, “Ending impunity is essential if a society in conflict or recovering from conflict is to come to terms with past abuses committed against civilians affected by armed conflict and to prevent future such abuses, drawing attention to the full range of justice and reconciliation mechanisms to be considered, including national, international and ‘mixed’ criminal courts and tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions, and noting that such mechanisms can promote not only individual responsibility for serious crimes, but also peace, truth, reconciliation and the rights of victims.”<sup>2</sup>

Transitional justice (TJ) can contribute not only to combating impunity for violence against women, but also has profound potential to address the impact of gender-based violence during conflict and authoritarian rule. Understanding the differentiated ways that women and men experience conflict or authoritarian contexts is essential for transitional justice measures to provide accountability and appropriate redress for victims. Without such an understanding, truth commissions will only document a slice of the wide range of human rights violations that have impacted both men and women, and reparations programs may fail to provide appropriate benefits to meet victims’ needs. By grappling with gendered legacies of abuse and the factors that made such abuse possible, transitional justice measures provide an opportunity to reduce gender-based violence, promote women’s leadership and enhance their access to justice.

### About the Implementer

Founded in 2005, ICTJ’s Gender Justice program (GJP) works to ensure that women’s voices infuse every aspect of TJ, and that women have the skills and knowledge they need to meaningfully participate in TJ initiatives. The program is staffed by a Director, a Senior Associate, and a half-time Program Associate, all based in New York. It also engages consultants on an as-needed basis, most of whom have long-term experience with gender at ICTJ. It works closely with country programs, some of which have dedicated full- or part-time program officers working on gender issues.

Primary activities include:

- Supporting local women’s groups to influence TJ processes.
- Bringing activists together to learn, share ideas and strategies.
- Advising policymakers on implementing gender justice initiatives.
- Sharing examples of TJ in other countries to help craft policies and procedures to address gender-based violence.
- Researching and analyzing global processes to address gender justice.

### Description of Project

The project timeframe was from November 1, 2012 through October 31, 2015. Its primary target beneficiaries were women’s victims groups (women/girls survivors of violence) and government officials (i.e. decision-makers and policy implementers), and its secondary targeted beneficiaries were civil society organizations (CSOs), community-based groups (CBOs), and other TJ practitioners

The overall goal of this project was to ensure that TJ mechanisms in Tunisia, Nepal, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya and Uganda are designed and implemented in ways that provide redress for victims of gender-based violence and contribute to the prevention of recurrence of gender-based violations.

In order to reach that goal, the project aims to achieve three main outcomes:

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<sup>1</sup> The evaluator thanks Mouna Msaddak (Tunisia) for assistance with Arabic language interpretation and analysis of interview data.

<sup>2</sup> UN Security Council, S/RES/1888 (2009), available at [www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1888%282009%29](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1888%282009%29).

1. Women victims groups in target countries strategically engage in ongoing transitional justice processes
2. Policymakers take concrete steps to make TJ policies gender-sensitive and to ensure they address women victims' specific justice needs
3. Participating women's groups, policymakers and program staff have enhanced and up-to-date comparative knowledge on strategies on how TJ measures can better address gender-based human rights abuses

The first outcome focuses on empowering women's groups to actively participate in TJ processes. This goes beyond ensuring they are consulted in the development of TJ policies, to include their capacity to raise awareness of women victims' challenges and needs, and to articulate and effectively advocate for their own recommendations. The project approach to support this change is to:

1. Equip women's groups with general knowledge in TJ and specific knowledge on gender justice issues, including around relevant TJ mechanisms
2. Help women's groups identify practical strategies to advocate for their constituency specific needs, formulate and submit recommendations and plan other forms of engagement with TJ processes
3. Facilitate initial collaboration between policymakers and women's groups on TJ policy design

Secondly, the work with policymakers and TJ practitioners is critical not only to provide them with the technical tools and analysis to take into account the needs of women and create gender-responsive TJ measures, but also to change their attitudes towards the participation of women's groups in the design of TJ policies. The project seeks to expose policymakers and TJ practitioners to the realities of gender-based violence and the importance of addressing its consequences so that they prioritize the incorporation of gender justice principles in TJ mechanisms.

Finally, the project aims at ensuring that actors in each of these TJ contexts can learn from each other's experiences and develop shared strategies for advancing the ability of the TJ field to address gender-based violence and enhance women's participation in TJ measures. This is done through informal exchanges and the sharing of case studies.

The strategy adopted to achieve the above outcomes was to conduct training workshops to build the capacity of relevant policymakers, TJ practitioners, and women's groups.

The total resources allocated for the 3-year project totalled \$1,371,004, with UNTF's contribution estimated at \$966,496.00 and ICTJ's at \$404,508.00. As of the date of this report, the actual resources spent from UNTF funds totalled \$508,013.

## Purpose of Evaluation

The final evaluation meets the mandatory requirements of the UNTF, as well as ICTJ's need to understand the project's effectiveness. Results, lessons, and recommendations derived from the evaluation will inform future programming for both organizations.

As far as possible, the final evaluation will also include an endline evaluation that will enable a comparison of data with our baseline study, conducted at the start of the project. However, there is a major caveat here, which is that many of the indicators originally measured have changed, as have the target groups who were originally surveyed. **Expectations for a baseline-endline comparison should therefore be tempered.**

ICTJ requires that programs develop "Management Evaluation Responses" that summarize and reflect on the findings of projects and develop operational plans to respond to recommendations and address weaknesses.

## Evaluation Objectives and Scope

The evaluation will examine the entire project (November 1, 2012 to October 31, 2015) and cover the following target groups in Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nepal, Tunisia, and Uganda: women's groups (primary)<sup>2</sup>; government officials and state institutions (decision-makers and policy implementers) (primary); other CSOs (secondary)| other TJ practitioners (secondary).

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<sup>2</sup> While the Program Document makes clear reference to "women's victims groups," this primary target group was expanded during the intervention to "women's groups," which include "women's victims groups." The reason is that many women victims are represented in social or community organizations that are not properly speaking "victims organizations."

In general, the evaluation's overall objectives are to:

- Evaluate the entire project in terms of effectiveness, relevance, efficiency, sustainability and impact<sup>3</sup>, with a strong focus on assessing the results at the outcome and project goal levels
- Generate key lessons and identify promising practices for learning.

The endline study, which is a crucial component of the final evaluation will, specifically, provide terminal comparison data for key program indicators **where appropriate—i.e., where indicators have not been changed, or where the target groups have not changed.**<sup>4</sup> An appraisal of difference between baseline and endline results will be the basis for determining the extent to which project objectives and desired changes had been achieved. The following data points will be investigated:

### Outcome indicators for final evaluation

*\*Blue text signals indicators measured in the 2013 baseline study*

#### GOAL LEVEL

**1: Women's group beneficiaries' perception of how well current TJ policies/mechanisms address the major needs of women victims**

**2: Women's group beneficiaries' perspectives on how well current TJ policies/mechanisms impact women victims.**

**3: Qualitative assessment of the extent to which TJ measures or policies adequately address gender based violence**

#### OUTCOME AREA 1:

**1.1: Instances of direct engagement between women/women's groups and policymakers**

**1.2: Assessment of the quality of participating women's groups' formalized engagement strategy**

**1.3: # of ICTJ women's group beneficiaries who report carrying out monitoring activities of TJ measures**

#### OUTCOME AREA 2:

**2.1: Qualitative assessment of the level of awareness and change in attitudes towards women victims needs among interviewed policymakers (Tunisia and Kenya only)**

**2.2: # of TJ institutions who have developed an operational plan to facilitate women's participation**

**2.3: Quality assessment of TJ institutions' operational plan to facilitate women's participation**

See the matrix for final outcome/endline indicators (with data values from the baseline) in Annex 5, "Outcome Indicators for Final Evaluation."

For practical reasons, the endline study will rely on field research in two of the six target countries; additional data will be collected in the four other countries through phone/online technologies. Given the limited budget, this methodology was used for the baseline study and proved to be successful, albeit with some significant limitations. As noted in our approved modifications at the end of year 2, the two countries selected for the

<sup>3</sup> While the TOR asks to evaluate program impact, we are skeptical that we will have any findings on long-term social changes at this point in time.

<sup>4</sup> Please see Annex 6 for a comparison of the baseline indicators and the endline indicators. In short, 6/11 (more than half) of the baseline indicators have been deleted or moved to the "output" level, so they will not be measured for the endline study. Additionally, 4 new indicators have been developed for the endline study, which thus have no baseline data. Furthermore, a significant methodological limitation in some countries is that the original groups surveyed for the baseline did not actually end up as the main beneficiaries of GJP's work, and therefore will not be re-surveyed in the endline study. This is particularly the case in Kenya (where ICTJ worked with different groups) and Nepal (where ICTJ did not end up working with the gender and TJ working group, which was more or less defunct).

endline fieldwork are Tunisia and Kenya. The baseline study had focused on what had seemed to be the most active TJ countries at the start of the project – Cote d’Ivoire and Tunisia; however, as noted in all of our reports, the truth commission and special chambers in Cote d’Ivoire proved to lack credibility and transparency, and for these reasons, ICTJ chose to disengage with the processes. Over the course of the project, developments in Kenya around vetting of the police and reparations resulted in a greater investment under this grant in programming.

The consultant will coordinate with ICTJ country office staff for the preparation work and in particular to help arranging local accommodation and meetings with stakeholders.

### Evaluator’s Bio

Paige Arthur is a researcher and evaluator working in the field of international human rights. She is the Principal of Public Action Research, which she founded in 2011. Her clients have included the Ford Foundation, UN Women, the UN Department of Political Affairs, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), the Counter-terrorism and Humanitarian Engagement Project at Harvard Law School, and the U.S. State Department, among others. An established researcher in the field of human rights, Ms. Arthur was deputy director of research and deputy director of institutional development at ICTJ from 2006 to 2011, where she spearheaded the integration of design, monitoring, and evaluation practices into ICTJ’s work. She is the editor of *Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional Justice in Divided Societies* (Cambridge University Press, 2011), co-editor of *International Assistance, Civil Society, and Transitional Justice: Missed Connections* (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2016), and her work has appeared in *Human Rights Quarterly*, the *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, *Transitional Justice Review*, and other academic journals. She holds a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley (2004).

### Evaluation Criteria and Questions

#### *Effectiveness:*

1. To what extent were the intended project goal, outcomes and outputs achieved and how?
2. To what extent did the project reach the targeted beneficiaries at the project goal and outcome levels? How many beneficiaries have been reached?
3. To what extent has this project generated positive changes in the lives of targeted (and untargeted) women and girls in relation to the specific forms of violence addressed by this project? Why? What are the key changes in the lives of those women and/or girls? Please describe those changes.
4. What internal and external factors contributed to the achievement and/or failure of the intended project goal, outcomes and outputs? How?
5. To what extent was the project successful in advocating for legal or policy change, or ensuring that gender considerations were incorporated in the design and implementation of TJ mechanisms? If it was not successful, explain why. In case the project was successful in setting up new policies and/or laws, is the legal or policy change likely to be institutionalized and sustained?
6. To what extent was the project successful in ensuring policymakers consulted women’s groups? How is this explained?

#### *Relevance:*

7. To what extent was the project strategy and activities implemented relevant in responding to the needs of women and girls?
8. To what extent do achieved results (project goal, outcomes and outputs) continue to be relevant to the needs of women and girls?

#### *Efficiency:*

9. How efficiently and timely has this project been implemented and managed in accordance with the Project Document?
10. What are the internal and external factors that affected implementation and management? How were these responded to?

11. To what extent were the outputs achieved with the lowest possible use of resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, administrative costs, etc.)?

*Sustainability:*

12. How are the achieved results, especially the positive changes generated by the project in the lives of women and girls at the project goal level, going to be sustained after this project ends?

*Impact:*<sup>5</sup>

13. What are the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by the project, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended on (but not limited to) the following?
  - a. the participation of women victims groups in the TJ process;
  - b. policy actions, changes or debates

*Knowledge Generation:*

14. What are the key lessons learned that can be shared with other practitioners on Ending Violence against Women and Girls?
15. Are there promising practices? If yes, what are they and how can these promising practices be replicated in other projects and/or in other countries that have similar interventions?

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<sup>5</sup> As mentioned above, we will be unlikely to see any long-term effects from the program activities and strategies at this point. Therefore, this section may overlap considerably with the questions on effectiveness.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

Sub-sections	Inputs by the evaluator(s)
Description of evaluation design	<p>1. Overall approach</p> <p>Set up as a pretest-posttest without comparison group, the evaluation partially relies on comparison with data gathered through a baseline study conducted in early 2013. However, given the fact that much of the baseline data is no longer relevant (indicators have changed, target groups have changed, there is missing baseline information for added indicators), we have also employed retrospective pretest methodologies as well as simple posttest methodologies for this evaluation.</p> <p>The general approach follows an outcome mapping philosophy, in the sense of elucidating the logical intended changes of GJP’s work in the six countries by documenting changes in boundary partners that resulted from (or were the result of contributions from) GJP’s interventions. This is an actor-centric methodology—usually used for program monitoring—that asks social change actors (in this case, GJP) to observe and document specific changes (behavioral, attitudinal, etc.) in the social actors that are directly in their sphere of interest, called “boundary partners.” Since the majority of GJP’s work seeks to change boundary partners in a way that will have positive outcomes for women and girl victims of human rights abuse, this approach is relevant to the evaluation.</p> <p>A key feature of the methodology is sensitivity to emerging intentions in program design. Since TJ efforts are highly sensitive to politics (note that TJ often pauses around elections, and changes in government can profoundly affect the prospects for TJ), it will be important to understand how programmatic intentions necessarily changed as a result of changes in the political context. Some of these nuances are already included in the evaluation questions.</p> <p>The approach has influenced the design of the interview questionnaires for women’s group beneficiaries, policymakers, and key informant interviews (KIIs). Interviewees were asked not only about changes in their own groups, but changes they have observed in others. Given the time-intensive, qualitative nature of this approach, primary attention will be given the Tunisia and Kenya in order to answer the evaluation questions. The evaluator will sample from the other four countries on a purposive and/or convenience basis.</p> <p>An additional methodology that will be applied with respect to evaluation questions on policy influence will be process tracing. This approach will be used to reconstruct and verify a path of influence, triangulating data from at least two sources.</p>
Data sources	<p>For a description of data sources organized by evaluation question, see the Evaluation Matrix (Annex 1).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• KIIs with ICTJ program staff (all 6 country programs; reparations; program management)</li> <li>• KII with UNTF (mainly for questions on efficiency)</li> <li>• In Tunisia and Kenya: interviews with boundary partners (women’s victim org’s, CSOs, state institutions in Tunisia and Kenya)</li> <li>• In Tunisia and Kenya: KIIs with other TJ actors, such as OHCHR, UNDP, UN Women; in CDI, Uganda, Nepal, Colombia: KII with one knowledgeable actor, time permitting</li> <li>• Internal ICTJ program documents (work plans, trip reports, workshop reports and survey data, etc.)</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All published outputs of the GJP</li> <li>• Unpublished technical assistance outputs of the GJP</li> <li>• Secondary sources (news reports, CSO reports, etc.)</li> </ul>
<p>Description of data collection methods and analysis (including level of precision required for quantitative methods, value scales or coding used for qualitative analysis; level of participation of stakeholders through evaluation process, etc.)</p>	<p>Data was generated through these means:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extensive desk review of relevant documents (internal ICTJ work plans, budgets, trip reports, monitoring data, technical assistance documents, etc.; GJP publications; TJ institutions' web sites and unpublished documentation; news reports; etc.)</li> <li>• Surveys (<b>n=13, with 11 responses, in Uganda and CDI</b>): Similar to the baseline study, the survey used a mix of multiple choice and open-ended questions to gather data on women's organization's perceptions of the TJ process and to self-report on the impact of GJP efforts on their work. On questions of satisfaction and perception, a 5-point Likert scale was employed. To head off problems with participation that are based on lack of good internet connectivity, the surveys were sent as MS Word documents (rather than through a link to SurveyMonkey), and results were entered manually into SurveyMonkey for processing.</li> <li>• Interviews (<b>n=65, in NYC, Kenya, Uganda, Colombia, Tunisia, Nepal, CDI</b>): Interview guides were developed for distinct groups, including women's groups and policymakers (beneficiaries and boundary partners); women victims (beneficiaries); ICTJ staff (internal beneficiaries and boundary partners); non-ICTJ experts (non-beneficiary boundary partners); UNTF.</li> <li>• Rubrics: Assessment of endline quality indicators employed the same rubrics that were developed for the baseline study. One new rubric was developed in order to assess the quality of boundary partner strategies on TJ. All rubrics are based on international normative standards on TJ.</li> <li>• Media analysis: ICTJ's Communications Unit generated metrics on the performance of UNTF-supported publications across several platforms: ICTJ's web site, Facebook page, Twitter account, and international media outlets.</li> </ul> <p>There were no specific participatory methods used in this evaluation, given the limited scope and resources available.</p>
<p><b>Description of sampling</b></p> <p>Area and population to be represented</p> <p>Rationale for selection</p> <p>Mechanics of selection limitations to sample</p> <p>Reference indicators and benchmarks/baseline, where relevant (previous indicators, national statistics, human rights treaties, gender statistics,</p>	<p>Sampling strategies included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• KIIs with ICTJ staff will be based on purposive sampling, in order to access a cross section of internal boundary partners (country offices, thematic units, etc.). However, at least representative from all six country offices will be interviewed.</li> <li>• In Tunisia and Kenya, we will use purposive sampling, focusing on the institutions and groups that received the most assistance over time.</li> <li>• With respect to sampling of women's victim groups and CSOs for surveying in Uganda, Côte d'Ivoire, Colombia, and Nepal: GJP is working with a very small number of organizations; therefore, the full population of organizations was targeted for data collection. Note, however, that no work was done with women's organizations in Nepal, so it will not be surveyed. In Colombia, only a single women's organization was engaged; since ICTJ-Colombia had recently conducted an interview with the organization's director for UNTF reporting, we used information from that interview rather than sending an additional data collection tool.</li> <li>• Concerning the evaluation questions on policy influence: in Tunisia and Kenya we will likely have time to examine all instances of policy influence using</li> </ul>

etc.)	<p>process tracing; in other countries, if we do find evidence of policy influence, then we will do a purposive sample, selecting one instance from each country for deeper examination and independent verification.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sampling for external KIIs will be purposive, based on an assessment of the person’s closeness to and knowledge of the TJ process in question. In many cases, these KIIs will be drawn from GJP’s non-beneficiary boundary partners, such as UN Women, UNDP, OHCHR, and local/international CSOs – organizations that likely have similar goals to ICTJ and that are contributing to the same outcomes.</li> </ul> <p>The sampling strategy is justified given that there is no pretension in this evaluation for substantiating generalizable, causal claims. The sample is non-probabilistic by design.</p>
<p><b>Description of ethical considerations in the evaluation</b></p> <p>Actions taken to ensure the safety of respondents and research team</p> <p>Referral to local services or sources of support</p> <p>Confidentiality and anonymity protocols</p> <p>Protocols for research on children, if required</p>	<p>Given serious security concerns for foreigners (especially single women travelers) in Tunisia and somewhat less so in Kenya, the evaluator has requested a car and driver, as well as accompaniment outside of large urban areas.</p> <p>All interviewees will be asked for consent to be interviewed, they will be informed of the confidentiality of the interview, and they will be told of the purpose for the research.</p> <p>It was important to be sensitive to the fact that KIIs sometimes included victims of human rights abuse. The evaluator endeavored to set expectations with these groups and to clearly state the objectives of the visit. The evaluator respects the full confidentiality of any stories these women shared. She offered them several options in terms of acknowledgment in the report: no acknowledgement at all, acknowledgment through initials, and acknowledgment through full names. She also ensured that such victims were supported that day by others in the group (the evaluator had no access to psychosocial support for victims as part of the evaluation). Indeed, all victims who were interviewed were accompanied by women known to them—usually women in their support network.</p>
<p><b>Limitations of the evaluation methodology used</b></p>	<p>There are many limitations to the evaluation. The first one to note is the fact that the work in the 6 countries follows different patterns and strategies. So this evaluation is not the evaluation of a single strategy, but rather six strategies, each punctuated by different political and contextual challenges. Given the level of resources committed to this evaluation and the short time frame for completing it, focus will be on Tunisia and Kenya.</p> <p>Methodological limitations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As mentioned, there are significant limitations in the baseline-endline comparison for this program: indicators have changed, target groups have changed, there is missing baseline information since indicators were added to the results framework in the middle of the project.</li> <li>There is limited monitoring data, including a lack of rich, qualitative observational data that is most useful for the outcome mapping methodologies.</li> <li>The existing monitoring data, especially relating to the counting of beneficiaries, did not follow an established methodology, and therefore is of limited value.</li> <li>There is a lack of clarity regarding some of the outcome indicators. See Annex 6 (Comparison of Baseline and Endline Indicators) for specific notes on the indicators.</li> <li>The main focus is on two countries; the other four will likely not generate enough reliable data to contribute meaningfully to answering all of the</li> </ul>



	<p>evaluation questions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The change in focus from Côte d’Ivoire to Kenya for the endline analysis means that it will be harder to assess change over time for Kenya. Indeed, as noted in the baseline study, Kenya was the most difficult place in which to generate data for the baseline, not least of all because GJP was not clear about which target groups it would be working with. In general, much of the baseline data for Kenya was not relevant to the endline study.</li> <li>• The evaluator does not speak Swahili or Arabic, which placed her at a disadvantage particularly in interviewing vulnerable populations who may not feel comfortable in English (Kenya) or French (Tunisia). In Tunisia, a female Arabic language interpreter accompanied the evaluator on most of the interviews. Although in most cases people did speak French well enough, it was useful in cases where people felt more comfortable either in Arabic or who wanted to switch back and forth between French and Arabic; in the latter case, the evaluator often found it challenging to know whether she was capturing all the information. In Kenya, an interpreter was used in one instance, a local male NGO activist who was well known to the victims being interviewed. The evaluator’s observation was that the interpreter took a more active role than usual in his job (for example, explaining concepts, rather than allowing the participants to explore and ask questions). This made it challenging, in particular, to understand the depth of the interviewees’ understanding of the TJ process under discussion.</li> <li>• The evaluator notes that she is general TJ expert, with no specialized experience in any of the six contexts under evaluation—except for having undertaken the baseline study in Tunisia. This gap in local knowledge was most felt in Kenya, even though the evaluator does not believe that it will have any significant bearing on the findings of the evaluation.</li> <li>• In Kenya in particular, the evaluator observed that many respondents had a positive response bias to her questions, almost uniformly emphasizing positive aspects of their relationships with ICTJ or their views on gender. Additional questions were asked in these cases in order to test the strength of these positive responses.</li> </ul>
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### 3. FINDINGS

#### Effectiveness

Evaluation Criterion	Effectiveness
Evaluation Question 1	<b>To what extent were the intended project goal, outcomes and outputs achieved and how?</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	<p><b>GOAL: The project goal was that TJ mechanisms in Tunisia, Nepal, CDI, Kenya and Uganda provide redress for victims of GBV and contribute to the prevention of the recurrence of GBV.</b></p> <p>There is one instance (<b>Colombia</b>) where the goal has been partially achieved, through the ongoing implementation of a reparations program that includes victims of GBV. In this case, we could not find evidence of direct contribution of GJP’s efforts to the partial achievement of this goal during the grant period. We found no instances where the goal had been fully achieved during the grant period.</p> <p>Regrettably, in most countries, TJ processes have been slow and have not been fully implemented during the grant period. In the one case where a process was completed—the CDVR in <b>Côte d’Ivoire</b>—the exercise was judged unsatisfactory from a number of perspectives, not just the perspective of gender.</p> <p><b>OUTCOMES:</b></p> <p><b>1. Women victims groups in target countries strategically engage in ongoing transitional justice processes</b></p> <p>We found several instances where this outcome had been partially or mostly achieved. In <b>Tunisia</b>, we saw clear evidence of women’s groups who were engaging strategically with TJ initiatives in a way that they did not do at the beginning of the grant period, and that can be directly traced to ICTJ’s work with them. These groups have formed a network, “TJ Is Also for Women,” that bridges the secular/Islamist divide to a degree, and has conducted sensitization events for women victims in four regions. As a result of these efforts, women victims have directly participated in Tunisia’s Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC). In <b>Kenya</b>, we saw one women’s group, Grace Agenda, who was successfully engaging with the vetting and police reform process as well as with the reparations process, which can be directly traced to ICTJ’s work. “Women victims are found across the victim groups,” one victim representative noted in Kenya. “But when Grace Agenda came, they really specialized in women victims.” That group has not only conducted outreach to women victims that has resulted in direct participation of women in the vetting process, it is now part of the leadership in the victims movement that has just presented delivered a petition to Parliament demanding adoption of the KJTRC report and implementation of the promised KES10 billion Restorative Justice Fund, which was announced by the President in March 2015. In <b>Côte d’Ivoire</b>, we found that there was somewhat greater strategic engagement on TJ among several women’s groups that ICTJ had worked with in an informal network, called the Groupe d’Initiative des Femmes pour la Justice Transitionnelle (GIFJT). Two of the women’s organizations in this informal group are now on the civil society liaison committee with CONARIV, which is developing the state-led reparations program in CDI. In <b>Colombia</b>, we found that one women’s organization, the Corporación Mujer Sigue Mis Pasos (CMSMP) had engaged more strategically on TJ, through its partnership with ICTJ and the Colombian Government’s Victim’s Unit in delivering training on TJ to victims. This group, which trained more than 100 of its members directly, and disseminated the information to the rest of its 1,000+ membership, was one of the civil society participants in the recent Havana peace talks. And in <b>Uganda</b>, one ICTJ subgrantee partner, Women’s Advocacy Network/Justice and Reconciliation Project (WAN/JRP), deepened its already-existing strategic engagement with TJ through extending its work on</p>

	<p>lobbying local authorities in the delivery of reparations to women victims.</p> <p>We found that this outcome was “partially” to “mostly” achieved because the strength, quality, and sustainability of the strategic engagement varied from context to context. In <b>Tunisia</b>, the 10-member TJ Is Also for Women network has achieved gains, but it remains weak and depends on ICTJ for its funding and organization of activities. Similarly in <b>CDI</b>, the 5-member GIFJT does not seem to be particularly active; rather, women’s groups are involved on an individual basis with CONARIV. In Kenya, the maturity achieved by the women’s organization that ICTJ worked with is real, but it is just a single group. Ideally, there would have been more. Similarly, in Uganda and Colombia, the achievements are mainly with a single women’s group—even if, in both cases, the networks for both of these groups are quite large (WAN/JRP counts hundreds of members, and CMSMP counts 1,000+). Moreover, in Uganda, ICTJ was only a contributor, as the real driver of change was WAN/JRP.</p> <p>We did not find evidence for direct ICTJ influence on this outcome in <b>Nepal</b>.</p> <p><b>2. Policymakers take concrete steps to make TJ policies gender-sensitive and to ensure they address women victims’ specific justice needs</b></p> <p>We found evidence for this outcome in <b>Tunisia</b>, in particular changes in a number of policies and procedures for the TDC. Given the very small number of actors working on TJ in Tunisia, it is uncontroversial to say that GJP’s efforts made a critical difference. Most significant among these are the creation of a Women’s Commission inside the TDC—after having resisted including it in the original TJ law—and influence on the statement taking process, in order to make it more gender sensitive. We also found evidence for this outcome in <b>Uganda</b>, where ICTJ efforts contributed to a petition (led by WAN/JRP) for reparations for GBV survivors that was unanimously passed in Parliament in April 2014. Also in Uganda, this is evidence that that National Human Rights Commission has taken up ICTJ’s suggestions on gender sensitivity in its tools and processes for its yet-to-be-launched Human Rights Documentation Project (HRDP). In <b>Colombia</b>, the Victim’s Unit took up a suggestion from GJP and an external partner to train women members of its Victim Participation Roundtables so that they could better represent women victims’ interests and needs in the ongoing reparations process.<sup>6</sup> We found an increased gender-sensitivity in the newly established reparations program—CONARIV—in <b>Côte d’Ivoire</b> (when compared to the level of gender-sensitivity of its prior truth commission, the CDVR); we have indications that ICTJ has indirectly influenced this sensitivity, as it previously trained 2/8 of CONARIV’s current commissioners on issues relating to gender, when these commissioners were on staff at the CDVR. Moreover, discussions during and following the ICTJ-led national victims conference with CONARIV stressed the need to for reparations to prioritize sexual violence victims, as well as vulnerable populations such as women and widows; we are told that these suggestions have been included in CONARIV’s progress report, which is not yet published. So far, 551/31,377 (2 percent) of the validated dossiers are related to sexual violence.</p> <p>Each of these changes are clearly linked to women victims’ specific justice needs. The significance, however, of these policy changes varies. The changes in <b>Tunisia</b> are the most significant, in the sense that they are durable and they have the most potential to cascade through the institution (as long as the institution survives, and it is unfortunately not clear that it will). In <b>Colombia</b>, the decision to train the women roundtable members seems to be firm, and the training itself is being supported by a range of civil society and donor partners. In <b>Uganda</b>, the significance of the reparations petition may be more symbolic</p>
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<sup>6</sup> This was the very first recommendation in the ICTJ/Casa de la Mujer report, “Queremos ser oídas” (2014), 39 (published with UNTF support). Please note that this publication had 254 downloads and 450 page views from the time of its publication in 2014 to December 2, 2015. In both cases, 76 percent of downloads and page views were by people in Colombia, suggesting that the publication hit its target group. The report ranks in the top 5 percent for downloads and the top 20 percent for page views among all of ICTJ’s publications over the same period. For a deeper analysis of the performance of all UNTF-funded publications, see Annex 4: “Media Analysis of UNTF-Funded Publications.”

than real, as the reparations process has stalled at the national level. Through a sub-grant from ICTJ/UNTF, WAN/JRP has researched and drafted recommendations for actions that local governments can take to help address women victims needs, but it is so far unclear whether or not this has resulted in any concrete changes. With respect to the HRDP, ensuring gender-sensitivity of both the data collection tools and the documentation process are highly relevant to women victim's needs—especially as this 5-year project will provide an official reference point on the extent of human rights abuse over the past twenty years. In **Côte d'Ivoire**, as mentioned, the degree of influence of GJP's work is hard to determine, as it has been indirect.

We did not find evidence for this outcome in **Nepal** or **Kenya** during the grant period. We note, however, that was an indication that Kenya's National Police Service Commission (NPSC) may still take up policy guidance on gender-sensitive vetting that ICTJ developed at NPSC's request in early 2015. In the evaluator's estimation, this guidance is highly relevant and indeed very much needed, as the NPSC has had little experience with GBV cases thus far—but will start receiving much higher numbers of such cases starting in December 2015 as a direct result of the work of ICTJ's subgranting partner, Grace Agenda. Ensuring that these cases are properly researched, that confidentiality for women victims is maintained, and that risks to complainants against police are mitigated are critical to achieving positive outcomes for women victims this process.

In general, institution-wide policy changes (**Tunisia's TDC**) are more significant than smaller steps (**Colombia's** training for women in the Participatory Roundtables).

**3. Participating women's groups, policymakers and program staff have enhanced and up-to-date comparative knowledge on strategies on how TJ measures can better address gender-based human rights abuses.**

This is an outcome that needs some clarification. According to both the original project proposal, as well as the final results framework, the outcome is referring to two things: improved knowledge on TJ across ICTJ's own country programs, on the one hand, and the development of new knowledge products on gender and TJ, on the other.

For the first part, we found clear evidence of significant changes in program staff knowledge and confidence with gender and TJ concepts in both **Tunisia** and **Kenya**. We found minimal changes in **Colombia** staff on gender and TJ. We found no evidence of change in **Uganda**, **Côte d'Ivoire**, or **Nepal**. We note that GJP did not have a particular strategy of set of activities to achieve these changes; and that when they happened, they were unintended consequence of working together on the UNTF program.

For the second, in terms of generating new comparative knowledge (through the development of new knowledge products), we did not find that this outcome had been achieved. However, we note that there is clear evidence, in Tunisia, of uptake of already existing knowledge on comparative approaches to gender and TJ. We do not have findings on this for the other countries.

**OUTPUTS:**

There is evidence of substantial achievement of the outputs in the final version of the Program Document (dated August 2015) with GJP's target beneficiaries—with one caveat, however, which relates outputs on knowledge changes of beneficiaries. The caveat is significant because such a large proportion of GJP's effort went into trainings: the surveys used to assess changes in knowledge from trainings did not follow a common methodology, nor were they used consistently. The evaluator has therefore supplemented this limited information with data from the survey she administered in CDI and Uganda, as well as direct observation of beneficiaries in Tunisia and Kenya.

**Tunisia** demonstrates the fullest achievement of the outputs: women's organizations benefiting from the intervention clearly have enhanced technical knowledge and they have developed a common strategy to engage the TDC (**Output 1.1 and 1.2**). Policymakers in the TDC have been equipped with comparative knowledge on TJ, they have enhanced skills to

	<p>operationalize gender—in particular, the leadership of the TDC’s Women’s Commission—and their awareness of the specific needs of women has been raised (<b>Outputs 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4</b>). One output area in Tunisia where we have not seen improvement is related to <b>Output 2.3</b>: there is, as yet, no operational plan to facilitate the participation of women in the TDC’s activities. This gap is one reason why ICTJ-GJP’s work with women’s groups to engage women victims in the process has been seen as highly relevant by all parties involved, including the TDC.</p> <p>In <b>Kenya</b>, we did find achievement of outputs on enhanced technical knowledge and strategy development on TJ for one women’s group beneficiary. We also found achievement of an additional output (only in the RF for Kenya and CDI), whereby women’s groups built working relationships with decision-makers working on TJ. There is evidence of such a new “working” relationship with one women’s group, most clearly in the process leading up to the presentation of the petition to Parliament, where a back-and-forth with Parliamentarians on drafts of the petition were necessary. We found mixed success in achieving outputs around policymaker technical skills, operational plans, and awareness of women victims’ needs. Awareness was raised among the NPSC running the vetting process—to the degree that ICTJ was asked to develop a guidance document on gender-sensitivity in vetting processes. On the other hand, there is no operational plan to reach women victims, and it’s not clear whether the NPSC has the technical skills to operationalize a gender-sensitive approach, given the fact that training with the commissioners was cancelled by them at the last minute. Finally, we note improved awareness of women victims’ needs among members of Kenya’s Administration Police Service (APS) trained by ICTJ.</p> <p>Since our research was limited in the other countries, especially at the output level, we note only some brief observations. In <b>CDI</b>, similar to Kenya, we found better success on the outputs related to women’s groups beneficiaries than to policymakers (including most recently the building of working relationships with CONARIV)—mainly because one of the key targets of the intervention, the CDVR, was not as receptive to ICTJ’s efforts in general (not just GJP’s efforts). In <b>Uganda</b>, we also see achievement of outputs relating to women’s groups beneficiaries, as well as most of the outputs relating to policymakers (with the exception—here as elsewhere—of the existence of an operational plan to facilitate women’s participation in TJ institutions). In <b>Colombia</b>, there were achievements at the output level relating to a limited number of groups: training for CMSMP (women’s organization) and policy actors (Fiscalia prosecutors, members of the Participation Roundtables). We also saw the achievement of a publication output, the ICTJ/Casa de la Mujer report, “Queremos ser oídas” (2014).</p> <p>In <b>Nepal</b>, the only output achieved was contribution to the report, “Walk Freely with a Wide Heart” (2014). We have not been able to determine the impact of this report. Other outputs relating to building the capacity of the women’s TJ network were not achieved or the publication of a report on women victims’ psychosocial needs were not achieved.</p> <p>Finally, we note that since activities for Outcome 3 were not completed, we must assess that the lone output for this area—“Country programs identify and reflect on good practices to end violence against women through TJ mechanisms” (<b>Output 3.1</b>)—was only partially achieved. There was the most progress in this output in Kenya and Tunisia, simply through the course of implementing the project. However, we did not see intentional or coordinated attempts by GJP to promote opportunities for reflection or learning.</p>
<p>Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence gathered by the evaluation team to support the</p>	<p>Mixed methods were used with a strong skew toward qualitative data. Triangulation was used, with at least two data points supporting each findings. Data sources were numerous, including:</p> <p>Interviews: Beneficiary interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; key informant interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; ICTJ program staff interviews in New York, Tunisia, Kenya, Nepal, CDI, Uganda, Colombia; interview with UNTF representative in New York</p> <p>Survey (and follow up questions) in Uganda and CDI on perceptions of the TJ process and</p>

response and analysis above	<p>self-reporting on ICTJ influence</p> <p>Document review: extensive review of internal ICTJ documents and monitoring data; review of ICTJ-GJ publications; review of TJ institutions' web sites and unpublished documents (provided by ICTJ); general news stories.</p> <p>Rubrics assessing the quality of TJ institutions</p>
Conclusions	<p>ICTJ's highest level of impact for this intervention has been at the outcome level. At that level, it has achieved moderate success in several countries with a limited number of women's organizations and TJ initiatives. This level of success is likely less than was initially intended, both for women's organizations and for policy change. While achievements at the output and outcome levels do suggest progress toward the goal level, particularly with Tunisia's TDC, it is impossible to predict whether goal-level outcomes will be achieved in any of these countries.</p> <p>We note that due to the fact that so many activities for the grant took place in the last six months, we have not been able to assess their outcomes (if any). This includes a major research publication on children born of rape, "From Rejection to Redress" (2015) that was launched in Uganda in October in collaboration with ICTJ's Children and Youth Program.</p>
Other	

Evaluation Criterion	Effectiveness
Evaluation Question 2	<b>To what extent did the project reach the targeted beneficiaries at the project goal and outcome levels? How many beneficiaries have been reached?</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	<p>While the project has reached beneficiaries at the goal level, the number is smaller than anticipated. We found that the project reached:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>913</b> women victims directly</li> <li>• <b>1,679</b> women victims indirectly (through other organizations)</li> <li>• For a total of <b>2,612</b> women victims reached</li> <li>• Of these, at least <b>268</b> women victims took the extra step of participating in an accountability process, as a direct result of this outreach by ICTJ and its local partners.</li> <li>• <b>These 268 women are the goal level beneficiaries.</b></li> </ul> <p>GJP could have reached many more such women victims through direct outreach, if had it started its programming around women victims' participation in TJ sooner, and then executed more of this type of programming—in particular, in <b>Kenya</b> and <b>Tunisia</b>.</p> <p>This said, it is regrettable that because of the discontinuous pace of TJ implementation in all six countries, there were no indirect beneficiaries that could be included in this count—i.e., women victims who would have benefited from the gender-sensitive implementation of truth, justice, and reparative measures. It was assumed at the start of the grant period that a high number of such indirect beneficiaries would exist after 3-years' time. This slow implementation partly explains the gap between the original target number for goal-level beneficiaries and the number of beneficiaries actually reached. However, it must also be noted that some TJ efforts, such as the CDVR in <b>CDI</b>, did complete its work, but not in a gender-sensitive way.</p> <p>At the outcome level, ICTJ reached:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>169</b> individual women civil society representatives as direct beneficiaries</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>347</b> state representatives as direct beneficiaries</li> <li>• <b>595</b> state representatives (all police officers in Kenya) as indirect beneficiaries</li> <li>• <b>15</b> TJ-related institutions as direct beneficiaries</li> <li>• <b>19</b> women’s groups as direct beneficiaries</li> </ul> <p>There were, however, a much higher number of secondary civil society groups reached through the project, mainly as participants in trainings. This higher number is reflected in ICTJ’s reporting to UNTF. We have only counted here the primary beneficiaries, meaning the women’s groups with whom ICTJ worked closely in the six countries.</p> <p>Overall, therefore, the total number of individual beneficiaries reached through this project was: <b>3,723 individuals and 34 TJ institutions and women’s groups</b>. (See Annex 8, “Final Beneficiary Data.”)</p>
Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence	<p>In counting beneficiaries, we follow the succinct advice of DFID’s, <a href="#">“Proposed approach for identifying beneficiaries for DFID’s Civil Society Challenge Fund”</a> (Feb 2012).</p> <p>We used monitoring data, where it exists, and also reconstructed data mainly from participant lists, and also from CSO beneficiaries’ self-reporting.</p> <p>At the goal level, we counted all women victims who had been directly reached by ICTJ or ICTJ subgranting partners’ work. We then broke out a smaller group of women who had not only been reached, but had also taken the step of participating in an accountability process. In Tunisia, these were women victims who submitted dossiers to the TDC, as a direct result of ICTJ’s engagement. In Kenya, these were women victims who submitted complaints on police officers for the ongoing police vetting process, run by the NPSC.</p> <p>At the outcome level, we counted civil society and government actors who were direct beneficiaries of ICTJ or ICTJ’s subgranting partners’ work; these include participants in trainings, workshops, and consultations, as well as recipients of technical assistance. We also counted indirect beneficiaries—people who benefited from GJP’s work through a secondary channel. For example, a number of organizations in Kenya and Colombia have self-reported that they disseminated information from GJP’s trainings to their broader membership on their own initiative.</p> <p>Care was taken to avoid double counting.</p>
Conclusions	The number of goal-level direct and indirect beneficiaries was regrettably limited. At the outcome level, ICTJ reached an adequate number of such beneficiaries.
Other	

Evaluation Criterion	Effectiveness
Evaluation Question 3	<b>To what extent has this project generated positive changes in the lives of targeted (and untargeted) women and girls in relation to the specific forms of violence addressed by this project? Why? What are the key changes in the lives of those women and/or girls? Please describe those changes.</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	The main type of change in women victim lives at the goal level was that they participated in a state-led accountability process, in spite of feelings of powerlessness, fear, and mistrust of the state and security forces. Focus group and individual interviews suggest that women victims who have participated in these process have awareness of accountability measures, have the capability to articulate their needs and make demands, and have a better understanding of themselves as rights-holders. The quality of this change, and the courage it entails, should not be underestimated:

“There was a 7-year old girl in my community who was defiled by her father [after the post-election violence]. I reported the case to police at the time, and nothing was done. It was hard on my morale.”—victim in Kenya

“Filling in the forms [complaints for the vetting process] is not easy. Some of the women are very afraid.”—victim/facilitator in Kenya

“Victims are still afraid to come forward. Some victims are employed by the state, and they are afraid.”—CSO rep/victim in Tunisia

The changes that this kind of participation provoked varied. Some women emphasized the **importance of “speaking out” in reducing their social marginalization**. This finding was underscored in a more general way in survey results from Uganda, where respondents emphasized the importance of women speaking and being visible in public space as a positive change. In Kenya, victims said:

“I reported [my rape] back in 2007 as usual. I came back to my family for support and was discriminated against. It’s with Grace Agenda that I learned about my rights. I put in my report [complaint with the vetting commission] and it really helped me out.”—victim in Kenya

“Grace Agenda has lifted me from somewhere. I hope soon that we will be called women of the nation.”—victim in Kenya

Some discussed how their own act of participation could contribute to **solidarity and institutional reform**:

“We thought: Grace Agenda can push this and bring us some hope...the forms will bring change and hope.”—victim in Kenya

“We filled out the form with the purpose that the police will hear and they will know that women were harmed. We did it on behalf of other victims back in the community. Police reform is the right thing for people in this country.”—victim in Kenya

“All of our complaints are against junior officers or OCS’s [Officers Commanding Police Stations] who haven’t been vetted yet. We have very strong cases against them.”—victim in Kenya

Others emphasized an empowering **change in their knowledge**. In **Tunisia**, in particular, it was emphasized that so many women—especially “indirect” victims, such as wives of political prisoners, who often suffered daily harassment under the previous regime owing to their husband’s status—do not know they are also victims under the law. This knowledge gap partially accounts for the low proportion of dossiers submitted to the TDC by women so far (roughly 15 percent as of November 2015). In **Kenya**, participants in Grace Agenda’s trainings often described a feeling of empowerment through knowledge, as well:

“I haven’t been to school much, but because of ICTJ I am an expert in police reform. I do a lot of facilitation on the NPSC and police vetting.”— victim in Kenya

“Grace Agenda and ICTJ are not social welfare organizations. But they make us feel that we are not forgotten. We are being addressed and informed. Grace Agenda is where I learned about my rights.”—victim in Kenya

Some, however, felt **discouraged or afraid** as a result of their participation. The act of submitting a dossier can feel empowering, but this feeling may fade as time drags on and there are no tangible results from this act. In **Tunisia**, during one interview in November 2015 with a CSO representative (herself a victim) and another victim member of the organization, they described the feeling of disappointment with the fact that they had submitted their dossiers in March and April 2015, and neither had heard anything since that time (the next step is to be called to give your official statement).

“For me, the result is negative—it’s less than zero. Ask someone to submit and dossier



	<p>and then nothing happens. There’s no psychological support. They should at least have a psychologist.”—CSO rep in Tunisia</p> <p>“Our country is corrupt. We will all be killed if we identify police. We will leave our children penniless. ICTJ please help us.”—victim in Kenya</p>
Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence	<p>Interviews with women victims in Tunisia and Kenya, which are the only two countries where we found goal-level beneficiaries for the intervention.</p> <p>Survey data from CDI and Uganda, which collected general observations on the impact of TJ on women victims’ lives.</p>
Conclusions	<p>The extent of the change in women’s lives is limited at this point in the TJ processes, especially since those who have participated have not seen outcomes yet from their participation. There has been a positive change for many women victims, resulting from ICTJ’s efforts; the extent of that change may depend on whether TJ institutions will deliver in a timely a gender-sensitive way.</p>
Other	

Evaluation Criterion	Effectiveness
Evaluation Question 4	<b>What internal and external factors contributed to the achievement and/or failure of the intended project goal, outcomes and outputs? How?</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	<p><b>FACTORS</b></p> <p>Factors contributing to achievement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Committed, expert staff in GJP (internal)</li> <li>• Existence of a robust country-level strategy on gender (internal)</li> <li>• Dedicated and continuous gender focal point in country office (internal)</li> <li>• Open and continuous dialogue between GJP and country office (internal)</li> <li>• Leveraging partnerships with other ICTJ programs (internal)</li> <li>• Motivated, committed, higher-capacity women’s group partners with real ties to women victims (external)</li> <li>• Gender champions with power/influence within TJ institutions (external)</li> <li>• Strong civil society and/or victims movement favoring TJ (external)</li> <li>• State commitment to TJ (external)</li> </ul> <p>Factors contributing to failure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Program not adequately resourced for intended goals, outcomes, outputs (internal)</li> <li>• In some countries, the program would have benefited from a clearer strategy; sometimes too opportunistic or reactive to the state (internal)</li> <li>• Lengthy start up period for some countries (internal)</li> <li>• Varying degrees of ownership of the goals/objectives/activities by country program teams (internal)</li> <li>• Communication challenges (internal)</li> <li>• Political circumstances in all 6 countries hindered TJ processes (external)</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutional dysfunction of TJ initiatives (external)</li> <li>• Lack of gender champions in key positions in TJ institutions (external)</li> <li>• Variability among the 6 countries in ICTJ networks with relevant women’s victim groups (external)</li> <li>• Rocky relations with donor (external)</li> </ul> <p><b>ANALYSIS</b></p> <p>In the interests of space, we will highlight only the most important factors that cut across country programs.</p> <p>One issue that cuts across everything else is the <b>design and costing of the program</b> itself. Ambitious as it was—both influencing policy and developing the capacity of women victims (which we know are often highly marginalized) in six countries—our analysis suggests that it was under-resourced from the very start. This gap is most acute in terms of the staff time needed for implementation, and it is signaled by the fact that the budget includes <b>no funds for staff time in any of the six countries</b>, even though this staff was called to implement nearly all of the activities. The budget also does not cover any funds for GJP’s Senior Associate, even though this person was critical to implementation. (More on these points in the “Efficiency” section.) It’s not that the program was impossible, but rather that it was very difficult at the proposed level of resources in the UNTF budget.<sup>7</sup></p> <p>This point about budgets ties into to other key factors shaping the scope of the outcomes and outputs that were achieved. The funds themselves (roughly \$70k per country per year) would not be sufficient to actualize a full gender strategy in any country, and <b>therefore the program worked best where the UNTF funds were supplementing a robust country-level strategy on gender</b>. The most important signal of this kind of country-level gender strategy was the existence of a country-level gender focal point. Indeed, the program was <b>most effective in those countries where there was a continuous gender focal point at the local level</b>—a person in the country office who worked as a true partner on the project, providing day-to-day assistance, insight, and engagement with stakeholders on the ground. The only country this was found was in <b>Tunisia</b>, which—not coincidentally in our judgment—also happens to be the country with the strongest outcomes. As another observation on this issue, the program also worked best when it collaborated with other internal partner, such as the <b>Reparations Unit</b>, that already have a finely tuned approach to gender, and can therefore take forward technical assistance on gender issues on their own, as they did in <b>Côte d’Ivoire</b>.</p> <p>Second, the program was <b>most effective in contexts where a) ICTJ offices already had contacts/networks with appropriate women’s group beneficiaries, especially women victims, from the very start and b) there were gender champions in key positions (of power) within TJ institutions</b>. Both of these conditions were met in <b>Tunisia</b>, as well. The GJ program did not have either the resources or a strategic “Plan B” in cases where these conditions were absent. For example, in <b>Kenya</b>, ICTJ did not have a clear picture of its women’s group beneficiaries from the start, and ultimately only ended up working closely with one group; in <b>Côte d’Ivoire</b>, it did have a picture, but later decided that these groups may not have been the best fit for the UNTF program strategy. In both places, the local ICTJ offices networks with women victims were weak. This is fine as a starting point, but in this</p>
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<sup>7</sup> To underscore the point on mismatch of resources to goals/outcomes, consider the following comparison: UNTF funded a 3-year project in a single country, Cambodia, to promote gender-sensitivity of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and to work with women survivors of sexual violence to help them participate in and benefit from the ECCC as well as other legal and psychosocial programs. This project had a total project budget, including co-financing, of **\$819,828.88**. By contrast, GJP’s budget for 6 countries was \$1,371,004. This amounts to **\$228,500** per country over three years—roughly one quarter of the total budget of the Cambodia project. While the projects have some differences, particularly concerning the extent of direct engagement with women victims, they shared similar goals. In this sense, the difference in budgets alone should give everyone involved pause concerning expectations for results.

case one needs a strategy to identify women victim organizations who one could work with. This kind of mapping did finally take place in CDI, but only under the aegis of another program at ICTJ, led by the Reparations Unit (which the GJ program participated in with UNTF funds), and the results were thus not available until the final year of the grant period. Additionally, in **Côte d'Ivoire**, there were no well-placed gender champions within TJ institutions, and therefore policy work was limited. This is a question it will be useful for the GJ program to deal with in the future: what is the strategy when these champions do not exist, or their institutional positions are weak?

Third, the program was **most effective on the policy level in contexts where the political situation was favorable to TJ**. The level of commitment has been maintained over the grant period in **Colombia**. However, commitment remains weak or has weakened further in the other five countries. So we see that in **Tunisia** that the GJ program had good influence on the TDC's processes up to a certain point, but a change in commitment from the state means that it's unclear that the TDC will complete its work, and therefore benefit women victims. Indeed, support to TJ processes is **inherently risky**. What to do when the state starts to withdraw from its commitments is a question that has arisen in 5/6 of these countries. ICTJ's strength is in providing strategic guidance—based on comparative expertise—to ongoing TJ institutions. Where state commitment is weak, however, interviews and document review suggests that ICTJ appears to take a more opportunistic approach, looking for “openings” where its expertise can be leveraged. This was the case in **Kenya**. When progress on reparations and the adoption of the KJTRC report seemed blocked, the GJ program tried to engage a number of other state institutions (vetting commission, police reform)—not based on a particular strategy, but rather on opportunities or requests for assistance; however, we have seen no outcome-level policy change as a result of these engagements, as discussed in Question 1 above. It is therefore not clear that this opportunistic approach—which continues to react to state actors' interests and needs—is effective.

Fourth, on the civil society side, the program was **most effective working with higher-capacity women's organizations with ties to victims**, as it did in **Kenya** (e.g., Grace Agenda), **Uganda** (e.g., WAN/JRP), **Colombia** (e.g., CMSMP), and **Tunisia** (e.g., some members of the TJ Is Also for Women Network). It should be noted, however, that even in these cases, the actual number of such organizations is limited, with GJP working closely with just one or two organizations in some countries. Since the GJP does not have the resources or the mandate to build organizational capacity of grassroots women's groups/CBOs—but rather only their capacity on TJ—the scope of its impact with women victims was necessarily limited. This point is perhaps best evidenced in the subgranting process: in **Tunisia**, most of the organizations ICTJ worked with had no grant experience and there was concern that they would not have been able to handle a grant. In **Kenya**, ICTJ had difficulty identifying women's organizations, in particular, to which to make these grants; ultimately, the partner it did make a grant to was highly successful in its work.

Finally, there were a number of institutional factors that affected the program's effectiveness. We found that—given its limited resources—the GJP could more effective when it could **join forces with another program's set of activities**. This happened in **CDI**, where it joined up with an EU-funded project for the Reparations Unit and the CDI country program to map victims organizations and bring them into the reparations process. We found that GJP effectiveness was influenced by the **varying levels of ownership of GJP's UNTF work at the country level** specifically, and varying levels of ownership of gender issues in general. While most of the activities for the project were completed, there was more or less follow through and engagement on them in some countries over others. One country in particular saw one workshop that was cancelled at the last minute, another that never materialized in spite of planning, and one where key actors did not show up. We also found that the **quality and frequency of communication** varied across countries. Where communication was open and continuous, there was higher engagement at the country level. Discontinuous communication, by contrast, was linked to lower engagement and, in some cases, disruption to activities (e.g., cancelled trainings). (We make no judgment here

	<p>about who or what is responsible for communication deficits, we just observe that it existed in some cases.)</p> <p>We also found that the <b>rocky relationship with UNTF</b> had consequences for effectiveness, in particular around the subgranting process and in delaying some activities due to a travel freeze. In both of these instances, this rocky relationship had negative consequences in particular for reaching greater numbers of goal-level beneficiaries (i.e. women victims participating in accountability processes) in both <b>Tunisia</b> and <b>Kenya</b>. That is, had the subgranting process gone more smoothly, and had the travel freeze not been in place, more women victims would have been reached. (Again, we make no judgment here about who is responsible for the rockiness of the relationship, we just note its impact on effectiveness, per the question asked. The issue will be further addressed under “efficiency.”)</p>
Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence	<p>Interviews: Beneficiary interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; key informant interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; ICTJ program staff interviews in New York, Tunisia, Kenya, Nepal, CDI, Uganda, Colombia; interview with UNTF representative in New York</p> <p>Survey of beneficiaries in CDI and Uganda</p> <p>Document review: extensive review of internal ICTJ documents and monitoring data; External Evaluation of the UNTF-funded project, “Promoting Gender Equality and Improving Access to Justice for Female Survivors and Victims of Gender-Based Violence under the Khmer Rouge Regime.”</p>
Conclusions	<p>The program was most effective in those countries where the funding could supplement a robust country-level strategy on gender. The most important signal of this kind of robust engagement was the existence of a continuous gender focal point who worked in collaboration with GJP. Also important were pre-existing contacts/networks with appropriate women’s group beneficiaries (especially women victims), and contact with gender champions in key positions inside TJ institutions. This said, the program was structurally limited in what it could achieve from the start, having not properly resourced an ambitious program of activities across six countries. Its effectiveness was also significantly hampered as state commitments to TJ shifted over time.</p>

Evaluation Criterion	Effectiveness
Evaluation Question 5	<b>To what extent was the project successful in advocating for legal or policy change, or ensuring that gender considerations were incorporated in the design and implementation of TJ mechanisms? If it was not successful, explain why. In case the project was successful in setting up new policies and/or laws, is the legal or policy change likely to be institutionalized and sustained?</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	<p>Since policy change was one of the key intended outcomes of the program, this question has already been discussed under Question 1 above. The program had limited to moderate success in advocating for legal/policy change in a number of countries, as this was one of its intended outcome areas. Please see above for a discussion, where this ground has already been covered.</p> <p>On the question of sustainability of these changes, this will be discussed in the questions on sustainability below, in an effort to streamline this report and avoid duplication of findings.</p>
Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence	See above.

Conclusions	See above.
Evaluation Criterion	Effectiveness
Evaluation Question 6	<b>To what extent was the project successful in ensuring policymakers consulted women’s groups? How is this explained?</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	<p>We found that GJP provided space for policymakers and women’s groups to interact on policy issues; indeed, this was a key feature of the way that ICTJ works in all five countries where the GJP conducted UNTF activities. In some cases, like in <b>Côte d’Ivoire</b> and <b>Kenya</b>, these were formal spaces constructed for dialogue between civil society and state actors on a particular issue, such as reparations. In such every instance, women’s groups were invited and also given a central role in the proceedings. This included separate sessions for women, so that they could speak freely and then report back to plenary, as well as highlighting the presence of women as speakers in plenary sessions. In some cases (<b>Kenya</b> on police vetting and reparations), ICTJ would organize a workshop with women’s groups and/or women victims prior to the larger convening, in order to improve their effectiveness in the larger proceedings.</p> <p>In other cases, these were workshops or meetings with other purposes, to which both civil society and state actors working on TJ were invited. In <b>Tunisia</b>, for example, TDC staff were invited to all of the sensitization events conducted with women victims, and the head of the TDC’s Women’s Committee was invited to several meetings with ICTJ’s women’s group partners. Moreover, interviews suggest that ICTJ country offices have also actively created one-on-one connections and introductions for civil society actors seeking contact with state actors. In <b>Kenya</b>, for example, the country office provided introductions to both the NPSC and the APS for a women’s organization that had created a proposal for a gender crimes unit within the National Police Service.</p> <p>This practical and normative focus on ensuring contact and consultation is reflected in data from GJP’s UNTF-funded workshops. Available data show that roughly 30 percent of all workshops/trainings organized through the program included both civil society and state representatives of TJ institutions. In the evaluator’s judgment, the level of contact was appropriate; in instances where the two sides were not brought together, this was because safe spaces were being created explicitly for either civil society/victims or for state actors to speak freely among themselves (for example, the 19 workshops conducted with civil society in <b>Côte d’Ivoire</b>, or multiple technical assistance workshops to the TDC in <b>Tunisia</b>).</p> <p>This said, we have found mixed results in terms of formal outreach and engagement with women’s groups on the part of TJ institutions in many of the target countries. Apart from <b>Colombia</b>, where the Victim’s Unit has engaged the women’s organization Sisma Mujer to help it with implementation of its gender-sensitive mandate, and <b>Tunisia</b>, where the TDC’s Women’s Commission has started to execute some limited outreach from its draft work plan, we found almost no instances of the TJ institutions under review having created operational plans to conduct outreach to or to engage either women victims or to women’s groups. In <b>Kenya</b>, where we had a chance to interview policymakers and key informants, the main obstacle appears to be a lack of resources. In <b>Côte d’Ivoire</b>, we do see CONARIV consulting women’s groups as part of a larger set of civil society groups, but whether this is a formal strategy or not is so far unclear. In <b>Uganda</b>, JLOS did conduct outreach to women in the north on Uganda’s TJ Policy, but the results of this one-time event are unclear, as JLOS did not have the resources needed to write up and circulate the findings.</p>
Quantitative and/or	Interviews: Beneficiary interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; key informant interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; ICTJ program staff interviews in New York, Tunisia, Kenya, Nepal, CDI, Uganda,

qualitative evidence	Colombia Survey in Uganda and CDI  Document review: extensive review of internal ICTJ documents and monitoring data; review of TJ institutions' web sites and unpublished documents (provided by ICTJ)
Conclusions	Connecting civil society and state actors on TJ is a strength of GJP's (and ICTJ's) work. There was not, however, a clear transmission of GJP's norms and practices on this issue to the norms and practices of TJ institutions. We still find TJ institutions in the relevant countries lagging behind in either their willingness or capacity to engage women's groups.

## Relevance

Evaluation Criterion	Relevance
Evaluation Question 7	<b>To what extent were the project strategy and activities implemented relevant in responding to the needs of women and girls?</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	<p>As noted in the initial baseline study:</p> <p>“Data collected for the baseline study suggests that all three of these outcomes are highly important. If successful, the project will fill an important gap for women victims seeking justice for human rights violations. Indeed, women's groups' strategic engagement with TJ is weak across all six countries (outcome #1), and in some cases it is nonexistent. Moreover, policymakers' need for technical assistance (outcome #2) is clear both from interviews and from objective assessments of existing TJ institutions.”</p> <p>We still believe that this initial analysis of relevance was sound. In general, the program strategy, which targets both women's organizations and policymakers simultaneously, is highly relevant to the needs of women victims of past human rights abuse who are looking to TJ to provide them with a measure of recognition, redress, and relief. One need to look no further than the evaluator's group discussions with women victims in Kenya to understand what a difference TJ could make in their lives, if only it were implemented.</p> <p>The strategy depends, however, on state commitment to TJ. Also, as mentioned above, it depends on having gender champions in key positions within TJ institutions. In those instances where TJ institutions were failing to deliver, or gender champions were lacking, interviews with GJP partners suggest that it might have been more relevant to develop a stronger and more continuous engagement with a broader range of women's groups and civil society organizations—rather than continue to try to work with both “sides.” It would have been good to develop a “Plan B” strategy for these instances. We did see the GJP adopt this kind of strategy change in <b>Tunisia</b>, when it reallocated resources away from technical assistance to state officials toward further work with the emerging network of women's groups in its Project Modification #2. This change was relevant to the evolving context, given the political setbacks the TDC has faced.</p> <p>At the activity level, interviews with program staff, beneficiaries, and key informants suggest that concern for the needs of women victims were always at the center of decision-making about what activities to undertake and how to construct them. To the extent that GJP worked from the beginning with women's organizations at the grassroots or grassroots level (i.e., with direct connections to women victims), the activities relating to Outcome 1 were more relevant to women' victims needs. In some countries, ICTJ did not have strong existing networks with women victims. Because of this, some of the workshops implemented targeted more general women's organizations that may have lacked connections to victims and therefore may have had less direct relevance to the</p>

	<p>needs of women victims.</p> <p>An additional issue around relevance concerns the relevance of the training strategy deployed in each country context. In some countries, such as <b>Tunisia</b>, there appeared to be a more thoughtful and sustained approach to training and mentorship for UNTF-related work than in others, such as <b>Côte d’Ivoire</b> or <b>Kenya</b>. The existence of a gender focal point and a committed gender strategy in <b>Tunisia</b> greatly facilitated continuous contact with both women’s groups and policymaker beneficiaries, outside of the workshops for which international staff might fly in. In other places, beneficiaries observed that capacity building was less continuous and did less to meet beneficiaries’ needs.</p> <p>As a minor point: we also note here again the opportunistic approach to policy openings taken in some countries—Kenya (ASP trainings) and Colombia (Fiscalia trainings) for example—may not have been as relevant to the needs of women victims, since as more or less one-off interventions, they did not yield any clear results. We say this in emphasizing, as mentioned above, that the decision-making in taking on these opportunities was clearly centered on women victims’ needs; clearly, both countries could benefit from gender sensitivity in the areas of policing and prosecution of GBV cases. We only suggest that they would have been more relevant if they had been part of a longer-term strategy to create change within these two institutions.</p>
Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence	<p>Interviews: Beneficiary interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; key informant interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; ICTJ program staff interviews in New York, Tunisia, Kenya, Nepal, CDI, Uganda, Colombia</p> <p>Survey in Uganda and CDI</p> <p>Document review: extensive review of internal ICTJ documents and monitoring data; Baseline study</p>
Conclusions	The strategy in general remains relevant to the needs of women victims. Some activities were more relevant than others, however.

Evaluation Criterion	Relevance
Evaluation Question 8	<b>To what extent do achieved results (project goal, outcomes and outputs) continue to be relevant to the needs of women and girls?</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	<p>GJP did not achieve results at the goal level; in general, however, achieving the goal of gender-sensitive TJ remains highly relevant to the needs of women victims of past human rights abuse.</p> <p>In terms of Outcome 1, which concerned strengthening the capacity of women’s groups to engage with TJ, the outcomes are still relevant, especially since TJ is ongoing in most of these places. The women’s groups who were strengthened can, in theory, continue to deepen their engagement both with TJ institutions and with women victims. In some instances, it would have been more relevant to strengthen a larger number of such organizations (<b>Kenya</b>, in particular, where women’s groups are fairly detached from TJ processes).</p> <p>In terms of Outcome 2, which concerns policymakers taking concrete steps to make TJ more sensitive, we do find that the outcomes are relevant to women’s needs. In particular, the outcomes for TJ, which go the farthest in influencing a TJ institution as a whole, as has been the case in <b>Tunisia</b>, are the most relevant. This level of outcome was what GJP was intending to achieve in all of the countries where it works. In other cases, however, the changes are more narrow and/or piecemeal and therefore will be somewhat less relevant</p>

	<p>to women victims' needs.</p> <p>To underscore this point, the relevance of these policy outcomes is captured in the indicator assessing women's groups perceptions of how well TJ institutions in their country address women victims' needs. The only place where we see appreciable positive change in this indicator over the past three years is in <b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>, where women's groups are likely responding positively to recent experience with reparations and CONARIV.</p>
Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence	<p>Interviews: Beneficiary interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; key informant interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; ICTJ program staff interviews in New York, Tunisia, Kenya, Nepal, CDI, Uganda, Colombia</p> <p>Survey in Uganda and CDI</p>
Conclusions	<p>Relevance of the results that were actually achieved was stronger for outcomes around strengthening women's groups than for outcomes around policy change.</p>

## Efficiency

Evaluation Criterion	Efficiency
Evaluation Question 9	<b>How efficiently and timely has this project been implemented and managed in accordance with the Project Document?</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	<p>A side-by-side comparison of the original Program Document, the final modified Program Document (August 2015), and the completed activities yields the following information<sup>8</sup>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There were many modifications to the program over time. Of the 28 key activities in the original Program Document, 13/28 (nearly 50 percent) of these original activities were cancelled or changed</li> <li>• Of these cancelled activities, 5/13 were replaced with other activities; for the rest, resources were allocated to existing or to new activities that were added to the Program Document</li> <li>• We note, additionally, that in some cases there were modifications to some of the modifications—essentially, modified or new activities in Program Modification #1 that that then were cancelled in Program Modification #2</li> <li>• For the activities that were NOT cancelled or modified (15/28 activities), we found that nearly all of these activities were delivered in a timely way, in accordance with quarter and year promised in the original Program Document</li> <li>• Finally, most of the activities that appear in the final Program Document were actually completed within the grant period. We are still verifying completion of these three activities: 2.1.5 (added in Project Modification #1), 2.2.4 (in original Program Document), and 2.4.2 (modified in Project Modification #1).</li> </ul> <p>In the first half of the grant period, the program struggled to deliver in a timely way. The issue of expenditure rates and activity completion rates for the first two years has already been dealt with adequately by the audit by Moore Stephens LLP. According to their review, which this evaluator has no reason to dispute, actual expenditures to the date of their audit report were only 46 percent of the projected expenditures. This evaluator's review of reporting on the first year of GJP's activities, in particular, shows low expenditures and low</p>

<sup>8</sup> See Annex 17 for this comparison. Please note that these counts may be off by 1 or 2 activities, due to unclear information; therefore, these are best taken as roughly accurate rather than exact (even though they may be exact).



	<p>completion rate of activities.</p> <p>This does not mean, however, that GJP did not deliver; rather, that delivery of activities has been strongly skewed toward the end of the grant period. Although we do not yet have financial data for the entire last year of the grant, it is clear that activity picked up significantly. According to existing data concerning workshops delivered, more than 60 percent (roughly 64/94) of all such activities have taken place in Year 3 of the grant. (See Annex 3 for a list of workshop activities.)</p> <p>Indeed, the data show that GJP has, in the end, delivered a higher number of activities—in particular, workshops—than originally planned. This has happened through leveraging funds with other donors (e.g., OHCHR and UN Women in <b>Tunisia</b>, EU in <b>CDI</b>). Whether the higher level of activity has always translated to stronger results at the output or outcome level is unclear.</p>
Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence	Side-by-side analysis of Program Documents, comparing projected and completed activities; review of all UNTF reports
Conclusions	Given all the changes the program experienced—changes that, by themselves, created inefficiencies and delays, we must conclude that the program would not be considered timely or efficient in comparison to a program that did not experience such changes. The data suggest, however, that program management was sensitive to issues of timeliness and efficiency (for example, the fact that activities that were <b>not</b> changed were implemented in a timely manner). What is needed, however, is a better perspective on why the changes were made, and whether they were truly necessary or not. See question 10 below for further analysis.

Evaluation Criterion	Efficiency
Evaluation Question 10	<b>What are the internal and external factors that affected implementation and management? How were these responded to?</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	<p>It is important to recognize that all institutions have inefficiencies, and global organizations navigating HQ/country program relationships are particularly at risk. The fact that this program was being implemented with 6 different strategies across 6 countries and 4 regions was an additional signal of inherent complexity.</p> <p>Keeping this general context in mind, there were several factors affecting implementation/management that relate to considerations of efficiency:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Program not adequately resourced for intended goals, outcomes, outputs; unclear processes for management oversight of project design, costing, monitoring, and implementation (internal)</li> <li>• Changes in state commitment to TJ (external)</li> <li>• Lack of strategy/follow-through around monitoring and data production; lack of institutional support for monitoring (internal)</li> <li>• Information management and internal communication challenges (internal)</li> <li>• Rocky relationship with donor (external)</li> </ul> <p>As a starting point, we must revert back to an issue highlighted in the factors on effectiveness above: the <b>program was not adequately resourced</b> to undertake all the projected activities or to achieve the projected outcomes/goal. This gap appears to be a</p>

major factor in initial delays in starting up the program. At the start of the grant period, GJP consisted of a lone expert (the Director), plus a part-time assistant. Essentially, all of the work fell on the shoulders of a single person who, internal ICTJ reports show, was stretched thin in both closing out other grants and trying to start up this new one. It is also important to keep in mind that this single person was expected to provide technical assistance to all of ICTJ's country programs, not just the 6 countries for the UNTF grant. She was also expected to develop a sophisticated M&E plan on her own, given the limited institutional resources (one M&E staff person to service the whole of ICTJ). No backstopping was available until the hiring of the Senior Associate, who only came on board in January 2014—that is, 15 months after the start of the grant period. As an **indicator of the relative workload of thematic units**, and the challenges in efficiency that a lack of backstopping and support poses, consider the fact that the **average email load is roughly 32 percent higher** for ICTJ's thematic directors (like GJP's director) than the average email load of its country office heads (71 emails/day vs. 54 emails/day). In fact, the email load for thematic directors is higher on average than the people that sit above them in the Program Office (65 emails/day). Given the fact that thematic directors service the entire institution with technical assistance, to expect—on top of that—the timely and efficient implementation of activities in 6 countries without any additional personnel for the first 15 months was likely unrealistic.

Given the above, **inefficiencies and lack of timeliness were foreseeable**. In general, it has been difficult to reconstruct the **internal approval processes at ICTJ** governing approval of this project and budget, which took place more than three years ago. The evaluator routinely asked staff when they first recall being consulted on the proposal and what their level of involvement at the design phase of the project was, and people's memories are understandably fuzzy and contradictory. A review of the original Program Document, alongside interviews, suggests the following gaps in the internal proposal approval process, all of which have impacted on the efficient and timely implementation of the grant activities:

- **Budgeting:** no staff time for country programs or for GJP's Senior Associate, and not enough time for its Director; no funds for monitoring, which was a key part of the project work. (While UNTF rules placed restrictions on how much staff time the grant could cover, the fact that so much was promised with so little staff time probably should have raised concerns.)
- **Design:** questioning of how realistic the goal/outcomes were, given the level of resources available in the grant and in GJP more generally; more analysis of the risks, should state commitment to TJ fail or should TJ institutions be woefully inadequate; ensuring adequate buy-in from country offices, where all the work was being implemented on the ground (this remains a sticking point with country offices, according to interviews)
- **Management:** gaps in institutional checks/oversight of project management functions, e.g., underspending; lack of institutional interest in and support for performance monitoring data needed to track progress toward results in the RF

The gaps in adequate initial resourcing cascaded into other areas, most notably project oversight functions. We have already discussed underspending. We note here that there did not appear to be systems in place at ICTJ at the time to raise a red flag on underspending, so that it could be addressed in a timely way. (The evaluator has been told that this has since been corrected.) An additional area of project oversight where GJP has had trouble since the beginning in both **developing and executing a monitoring plan** for its work. The Baseline Study noted that this was an area of concern that needed immediate attention, as it was clear that UNTF expected more monitoring than ICTJ was used to, that ICTJ staff lack capacity in this area, and that the original RF was very difficult to use. GJP reiterated this points in its first Progress Report to UNTF. To this day, there still is no formal monitoring plan (aside from the RF, which is even more difficult to decipher now than it was at the project start, owing to all the changes—See Annex 6, "Comparison of Baseline

and Endline Indicators”), written guidance on developing data, or common tools for data collection. This has produced painful inefficiencies for everyone involved in the project (GJP and country offices), as they struggle to keep up with ad hoc demands from GJP for information that are all centered on feeding the UNTF reporting system, rather than centered on monitoring and managing the performance of the program in a systematic way. GJP does not appear to have gotten any institutional support on this issue. Interviews suggest that there is a prevalent feeling among ICTJ staff that data is not important, and that UNTF requests for data—even the most basic data, like counting training participants—have been unreasonable and pointless.

We highlight the issue of monitoring because it was consistently mentioned in interviews with all ICTJ staff as a major burden on their time. This issue is linked with **inefficiencies around information management at ICTJ**. The evaluator’s own experience confirms that there are real challenges in accessing basic information about ICTJ’s programming. While there is an Intranet that theoretically could be used to store and share files, its current use seems to be quite limited. Documents therefore exist on staff hard drives, in email archives, and even as paper hard copies in country offices. Many documents do not have identifying information (author, date, title). And so forth. This may seem like a small issue, but the evaluator’s experience suggests that a lot of staff time in reporting may be wasted in chasing down information.

Adding to this general problem with information management are the related issues of **information sharing and communication**. Communication gaps have been cited in nearly all ICTJ interviews as a challenge for the efficient, timely, and effective implementation of this program. As mentioned in the section on effectiveness above, open and continuous communications between GJP and a country program was a key factor in success (**Tunisia**). This communication helped ensure country program investment and ownership over the activities that they were implementing. The evaluator is not in a position to trace where or why the breakdowns in communications occurred, she only observes that they were there: not just in Kenya, but also in **Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire**, and possibly elsewhere.

Turning to external factors, the two main project oversight issues taken together—underspending and lack of monitoring data—led directly to the **rocky relationship with the donor**: the UNTF asked GJP to freeze travel twice during the life of the grant (amounting to 10 months out of a 36 month grant), UNTF denied GJP a no-cost extension, and it disallowed subgrants to a number of prospective local partners. Even though they may have been justified, the actions led to unintended, negative consequences for timeliness and efficiency. In **Tunisia**, for example, activities related to establishing the TJ Is Also for Women network in late 2014 were delayed as a direct consequence. Owing to this delay, fewer women victims were reached, as the network ultimately did not have time to complete all of its intended sensitization activities, especially as the no-cost extension was denied. While the travel freezes were based on clearly defined UNTF criteria that GJP was aware of (or should have been aware of), the criteria for denying a no-cost extension and for disallowing the subgrants was more arbitrary, in the fundamental sense that the decisions were not based on pre-established or announced criteria, but rather on the donor’s judgment. This arbitrariness also led to inefficiencies, as local partners spent a lot of time putting together full proposals and budgets, and as GJP also put together a final proposal for a no-cost extension, with full knowledge of UNTF. (We make no judgment on whether the decisions were justified or not, we just note that it had consequences.)

Another factor that has already been highlighted under effectiveness concerns **changes in state commitment to TJ**, and the impact that this had on the program’s efficiency and timeliness. Some of the delays and cancellations the project incurred, and which have also contributed to mistrust with the donor, were due to changes or uncertainty in the political context. The question of **who should bear the risk**—and the blame—when the context changes and the original plan no longer fits the context is something it would have been worth discussing before the grant started, especially given the lack of flexibility in the UNTF online reporting framework. A review of the original Project Proposal shows that GJP

	<p>flagged many of these risks up front. In <b>Côte d’Ivoire</b>, GJP wrote, “One of the risks involved with such programming is that the TJ landscape will fall victim to the ethnic tensions that fueled the conflict.” In <b>Kenya</b>, it wrote, “The risk to this programming is that the upcoming March 2013 election may delay the establishment of a reparations program.” And in <b>Nepal</b>, it wrote, “Given the disbandment of the Constituent Assembly in May 2012, there is a risk that this [the truth commission] may not happen until a much later date, if at all.” We do not see evidence that anyone at ICTJ or at UNTF discussed what should happen in cases where these risks actually affected the contractually agreed plans, which they did to an extent (along with other factors mentioned above). To GJP’s credit, it did not simply push through with a set of predetermined, but now irrelevant, activities.</p>
Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence	<p>Interviews: ICTJ program staff interviews in New York, Tunisia, Kenya, Nepal, CDI, Uganda, Colombia; UNTF representative in New York</p> <p>Document review: extensive review of internal ICTJ documents, UNTF reporting, and monitoring data; Baseline study</p> <p>Email data generated by ICTJ’s Director of Operations from its Microsoft Office Server, over the period 11/1/2015 to 12/1/2015; looking at all 3 thematic directors, all 3 program office director/deputy directors, and all 10 country program heads.</p>
Conclusions	<p>This was a highly complex program that was difficult to implement both for internal and external reasons. Internally, there were gaps in the initial internal approvals process at ICTJ, which resulted in a lack of adequate resources to implement the grant and an unrealistic expectation for positive outcomes given the level of resource commitment. We also found a lack of adequate systems (or internal support) for basic project management functions, including monitoring of project performance, as well as challenges around information management, information sharing, and communication. Externally, factors such as the rocky relationship with the donor and changing political landscapes for TJ affected the efficiency and timeliness of implementation.</p>

Evaluation Criterion	Efficiency
Evaluation Question 11	<b>To what extent were the outputs achieved with the lowest possible use of resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, administrative costs, etc.)?</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	<p>We honestly do not have criteria for judging this across such a diverse (and numerous) set of activities in 6 different countries. While there may be specific activities that could have been achieved with lower cost (for example: finding alternatives to hotel conference rooms for workshops; in one or two instances, hiring a local or regionally based consultant, rather than flying in an international one from a distant continent), a spot check of budgets does not suggest any systematic issues concerning outsized expenditures. We also refer readers to the audit conducted by Moore Stephens LLP on this question.</p> <p>We note that because of inadequate initial costing, <b>ICTJ’s true financial contribution to GJP’s work under the UNTF grant was far higher than expected</b>—i.e., much higher than the promised co-financing. In all six countries, GJP relied on country staff time that was counted against other grants. Additionally, the salary of its Senior Associate was counted against other grants. ICTJ has no systems in place (i.e., staff time tracking) to help us understand what the true costs of the program have been.</p> <p>We also note that GJP was able to leverage funds with other programs internally at ICTJ—not just country programs, but thematic programs like the Reparations Unit (<b>Côte d’Ivoire</b>) and the Children and Youth Unit (<b>Uganda</b>). It also leveraged funds in <b>Tunisia</b> with OHCHR. In these cases, it was able to reduce expenditures and create efficiencies.</p>

Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence	Document review: reporting to UNTF; budgets Audit by Moore Stephens LLP.
Conclusions	UNTF achieved more value than expected through its funding of this program, both through ICTJ contributions of staff time, as well as GJP's strategic leveraging of its funds with other programs at ICTJ.

## Sustainability

Evaluation Criterion	Sustainability
Evaluation Question 12	<b>How are the achieved results, especially the positive changes generated by the project in the lives of women and girls at the project goal level, going to be sustained after this project ends?</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	<p>As mentioned in the sections on effectiveness, the program did not achieve goal level changes. Where it did reach goal-level beneficiaries—namely, women victims who participated in an accountability process owing to GJP effort—there is reason to believe that changes related to knowledge and to reducing marginalization are likely to be sustained, especially insofar as these women are part of support networks with other women. We also found, however, that initial feelings of empowerment have dissipated for some women victims, who have submitted their dossiers but have not heard any further news regarding their cases. Where women victims participate, but do not see any concrete result from their participation, then feelings of empowerment may be replaced with feelings of discouragement.</p> <p>At the level of Outcome 1, there is reason to believe that the gains in strategic engagement of women's organizations on TJ may be sustained in the case of some individual organizations: namely, Grace Agenda in <b>Kenya</b>, CMSMP in <b>Colombia</b>, RIDDEF in <b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>, WAN/JRP in <b>Uganda</b>, and several members of the TJ Is Also for Women network in <b>Tunisia</b>. At this point, however, neither GIFJT in CDI nor the TJ Is Also for Women network in Tunisia would survive without significant ICTJ support and leadership.</p> <p>At the level of Outcome 2, there is reason to believe that the policy changes in <b>Tunisia</b> and <b>Colombia</b> will be sustained after the end of the grant, even without ICTJ support. Sustainability of changes in <b>Côte d'Ivoire</b> and <b>Uganda</b> remains a question, however, as the policy changes are less formalized (CDI) or have not yet been implemented (Uganda).</p>
Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence gathered by the evaluation team to support the response and analysis above	<p>Interviews: Beneficiary interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; key informant interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; ICTJ program staff interviews in New York, Tunisia, Kenya, Nepal, CDI, Uganda, Colombia</p> <p>Survey in Uganda and CDI</p> <p>Document review: extensive review of internal ICTJ documents, UNTF reporting, and monitoring data</p>
Conclusions	Sustainability of gains with both women's organizations and policy change is mixed at the outcome level. At the goal level—changes in women's lives—sustainability may be dependent on the effective implementation of gender sensitive TJ, which has not yet taken

	place in any of the six countries.
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## Impact

Evaluation Criterion	Impact
Evaluation Question 13	<p><b>What are the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by the project, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended on (but not limited to) the following?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>the participation of women victims groups in the TJ process;</b></li> <li>• <b>policy actions, changes or debates</b></li> </ul>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	As mentioned, the program did not have achievements at the goal level. We did not have findings related to longer-term impact of GJP's work with UNTF at this point in time.
Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence	None.
Conclusions	None.

## Knowledge generation

Evaluation Criterion	Knowledge Generation
Evaluation Question 14	<p><b>What are the key lessons learned that can be shared with other practitioners on Ending Violence against Women and Girls?</b></p>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	<p>While lessons learned are mainly related to ICTJ and its work, other practitioners may find the following useful:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complex global organizations should thread gender through their work rather than adding "gender" activities on top of their work; if possible, create (or cultivate over time) gender focal points within each program; also build the capacities of all staff on gender issues</li> <li>• When undertaking policy work, context analysis prior to starting work should include an assessment of potential gender champions within TJ institutions and their positions in terms of power relative to others. Where there are no clear gender champions in positions of power, the engagement strategy should reflect this absence</li> <li>• In the context of complex global organizations, analysis should also include an assessment of country program's own networks with relevant beneficiaries, such as women's victim organizations; where these are weak, then a strategy should be</li> </ul>

	<p>included to strengthen them as a key first step in project implementation (e.g., through mapping exercises).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For programs that have a focus on training, there needs to be a training strategy that identifies target groups and key learning objectives; the number of people who need to be trained in order for a higher level outcome to be achieved; how much training will be needed over time to reach a higher level outcome; what language(s) the training should be in; how to create a trusted space; and what non-training activities are needed to support the training strategy (i.e., mentorship/coaching, technical assistance, access to resources for organizational development etc.). Finally, strategy should include monitoring plan and specific tools geared both to learning objectives and to higher-level outcomes. This is particularly important when it comes to trainings that try to reach <b>vulnerable groups (such as women victims)</b>, who may have different needs than, for example, policy makers, civil society leaders, and so forth.</li> </ul>
Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence	<p>Interviews: Beneficiary interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; key informant interviews in Tunisia and Kenya; ICTJ program staff interviews in New York, Tunisia, Kenya, Nepal, CDI, Uganda, Colombia</p> <p>Survey in Uganda and CDI</p> <p>Document review: extensive review of internal ICTJ documents, UNTF reporting, and monitoring data</p>
Conclusions	None.

Evaluation Criterion	Knowledge Generation
Evaluation Question 15	<b>Are there promising practices? If yes, what are they and how can these promising practices be replicated in other projects and/or in other countries that have similar interventions?</b>
Response to evaluation questions with analysis of key findings by the evaluation team	We did not find any innovative or promising practices that are unknown to others working in the field.
Quantitative and/or qualitative evidence	None.
Conclusions	None.

## 4. CONCLUSIONS

Evaluation Criteria	Conclusions
<b>Overall</b>	<p>This complex project in six countries (essentially, six different projects) achieved some results in spite a range of implementation challenges, including under-resourcing and operating in politically risky contexts. In the evaluator’s judgment, the level of results for what is largely a capacity building and policy-influencing program are adequate based on the level of investment per country, which was roughly \$70,000 per year over three years.</p>
<b>Effectiveness</b>	<p>The program’s highest level of result was at the outcome level. There were real achievements in terms of improving the capacity of women’s organizations to engage strategically with TJ processes (<b>Outcome 1</b>). In most countries, however, the number of women’s groups with which GJP engaged in a consistent way over time was small. There were moderate achievements in terms of policymakers taking concrete steps to make TJ gender sensitive (<b>Outcome 2</b>). In only one case did we find that these steps were systematic within a TJ institution (<b>Tunisia</b>). In other countries, such steps were taken, but with a more limited scope and/or implementation. GJP faced significant challenges on the policy level, finding a lack of gender champions to work with inside TJ institutions (<b>Côte d’Ivoire</b>), or being subject to slow or nonexistent TJ policy development in several countries (<b>Kenya, Uganda</b>).</p> <p>While achievements at the output and outcome levels do suggest progress toward the goal level, particularly with Tunisia’s TDC, it is impossible to predict whether goal-level outcomes will be achieved in any of these countries. Indeed, the program mainly reached beneficiaries at the outcome level—that is, women’s organizations and policymakers—rather than beneficiaries at the goal level, which are the women victims who stand to benefit from TJ, once it is implemented in a gender sensitive manner.</p> <p>The program was most effective in those countries where the funding could supplement a robust country-level strategy on gender. The most important signal of this kind of robust engagement was the existence of a continuous gender focal point who worked in collaboration with GJP. Also important were pre-existing contacts/networks with appropriate women’s group beneficiaries (especially women victims), and contact with gender champions in key positions inside TJ institutions. This said, the program was structurally limited in what it could achieve from the start, having not properly resourced an ambitious program of activities across six countries. Its effectiveness was also significantly hampered as state commitments to TJ shifted over time.</p> <p>We note finally, that <b>Outcome 3</b>, which focused on improving stakeholder (including ICTJ staff) knowledge on gender and TJ, was more or less orphaned in this project. Although there were some changes achieved in ICTJ staff comfort level and knowledge over the past three years (<b>Tunisia and Kenya</b>), these changes were largely unintended consequences of close collaboration on activities. This part of the project was not supported by a strategy and complementary set of activities from the start, as noted in the Baseline Study. Lack of follow through is yet another sign that the project was not adequately resourced from the start.</p>
<b>Relevance</b>	<p>The program was and is relevant to the needs of women victims. Relevance of the results that were actually achieved was stronger for outcomes around strengthening women’s groups than for outcomes around policy change, as</p>



	the latter are so far limited in their scope and/or implementation.
<b>Efficiency</b>	<p>This program was difficult to implement both for internal and external reasons. Generally, there was a lack of adequate resources to implement the grant (especially in the start up period) and an unrealistic expectation for positive outcomes given the level of resource commitment. We also found a lack of adequate systems (or internal support) for basic project management functions, including monitoring of project performance, as well as challenges around information management, information sharing, and communication. Externally, factors such as the rocky relationship with the donor and changing political landscapes for TJ affected the efficiency and timeliness of implementation.</p> <p>This said, UNTF achieved more value than expected through its funding of this program, both through ICTJ contributions of staff time (which were apart from and on top of ICTJ's promised co-financing), as well as GJP's strategic leveraging of its funds with other programs at ICTJ.</p>
<b>Sustainability</b>	Sustainability of gains with both women's organizations and policy change is mixed at the outcome level. At the goal level—changes in women's lives—sustainability may be dependent on the effective implementation of gender sensitive TJ, which has not yet taken place in any of the six countries.
<b>Impact</b>	None; too soon to tell.
<b>Knowledge generation</b>	None.

## 5. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Evaluation Criteria	Recommendations	Relevant Stakeholders	Suggested timeline (if relevant)
Overall	<p>Based on the experience with this grant, ICTJ should initiate an internal reflection process concerning the role of victims in its work, with the goal of clarifying both for staff and for external stakeholders (including but not limited to donors) who ICTJ’s primary, direct partners are, as well as when and under what conditions these direct partners include victims and victim organizations. Process should result also in internal guidelines on working with victims, addressing issues such as “do no harm,” security, confidentiality, provision of psychosocial support, etc.</p> <p>Fundraising processes should include more specific costing tools and discussions, in order to make sure that resources match the promised outputs and outcomes in a proposal; in particular, ICTJ should develop a tool for costing average hours needed to develop and implement trainings/workshops, to be used in budget development for future proposals. All ICTJ programs whose staff time is implied in the costing of any proposal should be allowed to review full budgets—not just activity costs, but also salary/staff costs.</p>	<p>ICTJ Program Office; Senior Mgmt; ICTJ stakeholders</p> <p>ICTJ Senior Mgmt; Finance; and Development</p>	<p>12 months</p> <p>3 months (integrated into next work plan, FY17)</p>
Effectiveness	<p>Every country program and thematic unit should thread a gender-sensitive approach through its work, rather than adding “gender” activities on top of their work; if possible, create (or cultivate over time) gender focal points within each program; also, build the capacities of all staff on gender issues.</p> <p>Context analysis prior to starting work should include an assessment of potential gender champions within TJ institutions and their positions in terms of power relative to others. Where there are no clear gender champions in positions of power, the engagement strategy should reflect this absence.</p> <p>Context analysis should also include an assessment of ICTJ country program’s own networks with relevant beneficiaries, such as victim organizations; where these are weak, then a strategy should be included to strengthen them as a key first step in project implementation (e.g., through mapping exercises).</p> <p>For each country, have a general training strategy (for CSOs, policymakers, etc.) as part of the country program work plan that identifies target groups and key learning objectives; the number of people who need to be trained in order for a higher level outcome to be achieved; how much training will be needed over time to reach a higher level outcome; and what non-training activities are needed to support the training strategy (i.e., mentorship/coaching, technical assistance, access to resources for organizational development etc.). Finally, strategy should include monitoring plan and specific tools geared both to learning objectives and to higher-level outcomes.</p> <p>Complex projects involving multiple ICTJ programs should be</p>	<p>ICTJ Program Office; ICTJ GJP; Country Programs</p> <p>ICTJ GJP; Country Programs</p> <p>ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p> <p>ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p> <p>ICTJ Program Office; ICTJ</p>	<p>12 months (integrated into work plan FY18)</p> <p>Immediate</p> <p>Immediate</p> <p>3 months (integrated into next work plan, FY17)</p> <p>Immediate</p>

	<p>required to develop internal communication strategies, starting with a kick-off meeting to discuss both substance and process. Communication should be regular and periodic from all sides, rather than ad hoc; it should focus on strategy as much as it does on activities. Communication on strategy should take place periodically, and outside of ICTJ's annual work planning process.</p> <p>ICTJ should consider the need for more specific guidance on when to say "yes" or "no" to a new opportunity. It is true that it may not be clear in the moment whether or not any one opportunity is going to lead somewhere (rather than nowhere.). But if a program is being more opportunistic than strategic over the span of 12 months or so, this may be reason to pause and consider a different direction.</p>	GJP; Country and Thematic Programs  ICTJ Program Office	6 months
Relevance	Related to the recommendation on training above, training programs should be backed by explicit training strategies, in order to ensure that the subject matter, the frequency, the duration, etc., is relevant to the needs of the target beneficiaries.	ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs	3 months (integrated into next work plan, FY17)
Efficiency	<p>Managers should consider using a broader range of tools (beyond tracking expenditures against budgets) to monitor basic project management functions, especially if a program is struggling; tools such as staff time tracking, used even on a periodic or limited basis, can help managers and staff work together to understand how work loads and efficiency can be improved.</p> <p>Managers should do more to signal their interest in accountability for outcomes and results; this includes asking for evidence for outcomes that go beyond a project director's own reporting/experience of them, which are written in long, internal narrative reports. Monitoring <b>data</b> can be useful in this regard; managers should consider reviewing it on a periodic basis: 1) to make sure that it exists, 2) to ensure that it is of good quality, and 3) to signal that this type of information is important and useful.</p> <p>A methodology for beneficiary counting relevant to ICTJ work should be developed. All staff should then be trained in it, with attention to issues like double counting, and counting at different levels of change (output vs. outcome levels).</p> <p>ICTJ staff who are struggling to comply effectively with donor monitoring requirements should be given immediate direct support, either through ICTJ's DME staff person or by hiring an external consultant to help with methodology and tool development.</p> <p>ICTJ staff should use its shared Intranet as much as possible to store documents, in particular, "final" rather than draft documents. These include all final documents relating to workshops, trainings, and meetings; technical assistance documents; and relevant external documents, such as those of TJ institutions. If ICTJ does not have policies on documentation and information sharing, then these should be developed and staff should be trained in them.</p> <p>If the Intranet truly is not an option, then GJP should organize files in a way to clearly document and keep track its their own work. For each workshop, for example, GJP should have copies of</p>	<p>ICTJ Program Office</p> <p>ICTJ Program Office; ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p> <p>ICTJ DME Specialist</p> <p>ICTJ DME Specialist</p> <p>ICTJ Senior Mgmt; All staff</p> <p>ICTJ GJP</p>	<p>Immediate</p> <p>Immediate</p> <p>6 months</p> <p>Immediate</p> <p>6 months</p> <p>6 months</p>

	<p>relevant files, such as participants lists, agendas, training modules, and monitoring data (e.g. pre- and posttests).</p> <p>All ICTJ staff should be more proactive about communicating through means other than email; this is particularly the case when communicating with thematic units (like GJP), which have significantly higher email loads on average than country programs.</p> <p>Have a frank discussion between grantor and grantees at the start of the project about risks to achieving outcomes in politically dynamic contexts. Agree in advance on responsibilities for communication and making project modifications.</p> <p>UNTF should clarify in advance its criteria for decision-making around issues like subgrants and no-cost extensions, in order to prevent unnecessary work by both grantees and subgrantees.</p> <p>UNTF should consider an alternative to its current results framework system for programs that are implementing substantially different work across countries (i.e., rather than implementing essentially a single project in several different countries). If UNTF continues to fund projects such as GJP's, an alternative or improved framework should be developed to meet unique needs of multi-country programs.</p>	<p>ICTJ all staff</p> <p>ICTJ Development; UNTF</p> <p>UNTF</p> <p>UNTF</p>	<p>Immediate</p> <p>Immediate</p> <p>6 months</p> <p>6 months (before next funding cycle)</p>
Sustainability	<p>Reiterating the two recommendations above on training, all programs should have an explicit training strategy that deals not just with subject matter/learning objectives, but also the frequency and duration of the training, as well as what actions are needed in between trainings (coaching, etc.) in order to make the changes sustainable.</p>	<p>ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p>	<p>3 months (integrated into next work plan, FY17)</p>
Impact	<p>None.</p>		
Knowledge generation	<p>Complex projects involving multiple ICTJ programs should include reflection exercises on a periodic basis; these exercises would aim not just to discuss substantive issues, but also build relationships and clarify processes related to implementing/managing the project.</p> <p>Similarly, such programs should consider building in funds or for deploying existing funds toward country program staff travel to other country programs; for example, use a gender focal point from Tunisia to provide expert assistance in meetings in Côte d'Ivoire (as GJP did in Year 3 of the grant), which promotes cross-program learning and relationship building.</p>	<p>ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p> <p>ICTJ GJP; Country and Thematic Programs</p>	<p>3 months (integrated into next work plan, FY17)</p> <p>3 months (integrated into next work plan, FY17)</p>

## ANNEXES

## Annex 1: Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation criterion	Evaluation question	Indicators	Data collection tool(s)	Notes
<b>Effectiveness</b>	To what extent were the intended project goal, outcomes and outputs achieved and how?		Interviews, survey, policy document comparison, document review, endline (outcome) data	
<b>Effectiveness</b>	To what extent did the project reach the targeted beneficiaries at the project goal and outcome levels? How many beneficiaries have been reached?		Interviews, survey, GJP output data	# of beneficiaries reached has already been reported in the output indicators
<b>Effectiveness</b>	To what extent has this project generated positive changes in the lives of targeted (and untargeted) women and girls in relation to the specific forms of violence addressed by this project? Why? What are the key changes in the lives of those women and/or girls? Please describe those changes.		Interviews, survey, endline (outcome) data	Will only gather data on this in Tunisia and Kenya. Will focus on women/girls who have participated in TJ processes that were made more gender sensitive through ICTJ-GJ's efforts.
<b>Effectiveness</b>	What internal and external factors contributed to the achievement and/or failure of the intended project goal, outcomes and outputs? How?		Interviews, survey, document review, GJP output data	

<b>Effectiveness</b>	To what extent was the project successful in advocating for legal or policy change, or ensuring that gender considerations were incorporated in the design and implementation of TJ mechanisms? If it was not successful, explain why. In case the project was successful in setting up new policies and/or laws, is the legal or policy change likely to be institutionalized and sustained?		Interviews, survey, document comparison	
<b>Effectiveness</b>	To what extent was the project successful in ensuring policymakers consulted women's groups? How is this explained?		Interviews, survey, endline (outcome) data	
<b>Relevance</b>	To what extent was the project strategy and activities implemented relevant in responding to the needs of women and girls?		Interviews, survey, endline (outcome) data	
<b>Relevance</b>	To what extent do achieved results (project goal, outcomes and outputs) continue to be relevant to the needs of women and girls?		Interviews, survey	
<b>Efficiency</b>	How efficiently and timely has this project been implemented and managed in accordance with the Project Document?		Interviews (ICTJ, UNTF), document review	
<b>Efficiency</b>	What are the internal and external factors that affected implementation and management? How were these responded to?		Interviews (ICTJ, UNTF), document review	
<b>Efficiency</b>	To what extent were the outputs achieved with the lowest possible use of resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, administrative costs, etc.)?		Document review, including budgets and spend rate data	We lack criteria for evaluative judgments for this question; also, I am unlikely to have enough time to look at specific outputs
<b>Sustainability</b>	How are the achieved results, especially the positive changes generated by the project in the lives of women and girls at the project goal level, going to be sustained after this project ends?		Interviews, survey, endline (outcome) data	

<b>Impact</b>	<p>What are the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by the project, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended on (but not limited to) the following?</p> <p>the participation of women victims groups in the TJ process;</p> <p>policy actions, changes or debates</p>		Interviews, survey, policy document comparison, document review, endline (outcome) data	Unlike to see impact at this time; answers will probably replicate answers to “effectiveness” questions.
<b>Knowledge Generation</b>	<p>What are the key lessons learned that can be shared with other practitioners on Ending Violence against Women and Girls?</p>		Interviews, survey, policy document comparison, document review, endline (outcome) data	Unclear whether there are lessons learned at the level of practice that aren’t already known
<b>Knowledge Generation</b>	<p>Are there promising practices? If yes, what are they and how can these promising practices be replicated in other projects and/or in other countries that have similar interventions?</p>		Interviews, survey, policy document comparison, document review, endline (outcome) data	Unlikely to find result: there do not appear to be any practices in this program that are unknown to the wider field.

## Annex 2: List of interviewees

Country	Organization	First Name	Last Name
Colombia	ICTJ	Carolina	Carter
Colombia	ICTJ	Maria Camila	Moreno
Côte d'Ivoire	ICTJ	Mohamed	Suma
Kenya	ICTJ	Chris	Gitari
Kenya	ICTJ	Kasiva	Mulli
Kenya	ICTJ	Agatha	Ndonga
Nepal	ICTJ	Jan	Borgen
Tunisia	ICTJ	Salwa	El Gantri
Tunisia	ICTJ	Rim	El Gantri
Tunisia	ICTJ	Emna	Sammari
Uganda	ICTJ	Sarah	Kasande
Uganda	ICTJ	Michael	Otim
USA	ICTJ	Cristián	Correa
USA	ICTJ	Amrita	Kapur
USA	ICTJ	Marcie	Mersky
USA	ICTJ	Kelli	Mudell
USA	UNTF	Anna Theresia	Thylin
Kenya	APS	Masisi	Kiilu
Kenya	APS	Salome	Kumbuti
Kenya	APS	Dorothy	Migamsha
Kenya	APS	Patrick	Ndula
Kenya	APS	Winfred	Onyimbo
Kenya	APS	Elisha	Yalo
Kenya	APS	Michael	Zike
Kenya	Grace Agenda	Jacqueline	Mutere
Kenya	Grace Agenda	E.	A.
Kenya	Grace Agenda	M.	A.
Kenya	Grace Agenda	S.	J.
Kenya	Grace Agenda	L.	N.
Kenya	Grace Agenda	A.	O.
Kenya	Grace Agenda	Name withheld	
Kenya	Grace Agenda	Name withheld	
Kenya	Grace Agenda	Name withheld	



Country	Organization	First Name	Last Name
Kenya	Grace Agenda	Name withheld	
Kenya	Grace Agenda	Name withheld	
Kenya	Grace Agenda	Name withheld	
Kenya	Grace Agenda	Name withheld	
Kenya	Grace Agenda	Name withheld	
Kenya	Grace Agenda	Name withheld	
Kenya	Grace Agenda	Name withheld	
Kenya	Kituo Cha Sheria	Aimee	Ongeso
Kenya	National Police Service Commission	Sarah	Muthiga
Kenya	National Victims and Survivors Network	Wachira	Waheire
Kenya	Physicians for Human Rights	Christine	Alai
Kenya	Rights Promotion and Protection Center	Mungai	Mbuthi
Kenya	Usalama Reforms Forum	Caleb	Wanga
Kenya	Wangu Kanja Foundation	Wangu	Kanja
Tunisia	Association of Tunisian Women for Research on Development	Samia	Letaief
Tunisia	Nisaa Aasilat	Khadija	Salah
Tunisia	Nisaa Tounissiet Association	B.	A.
Tunisia	Nisaa Tounissiet Association	H.	B.
Tunisia	Promotion of Arab Women	Hana	Abdouli
Tunisia	Promotion of Arab Women	Dhahri	Nasseur
Tunisia	Tounissiet	Sanaa	Baldi
Tunisia	Tounissiet	Monia	Ben Guirat
Tunisia	Tounissiet	Souad	El Hani
Tunisia	Truth and Dignity Commission	Ibtihel	Abdellatif
Tunisia	Truth and Dignity Commission	Mohamed Kamel	El Heni
Tunisia	Truth and Dignity Commission	Hedi	Kolsi
Tunisia	Truth and Dignity Commission	Leila	Rabhi
Tunisia	Tunisian Association for Development Law	Sihem	Bouazza
Tunisia	UN Women	Anne	Eyrignoux
Tunisia	UNDP	Özlem	Celebi
Tunisia	Women Challenging the Bars	Raja Derbel	Kammoun
Tunisia	Women Challenging the Bars	Awatef	Mezghani

**Annex 3: List of Workshops with Funding from UNTF**

Number	Program		Workshop title	Date
	Year	Country		
1.	1	Uganda	Workshop with women victims in Gulu	Mar-13
2.	1	CDI	Strategy workshop with 5 women's groups (to become GIFJT)	Mar-13
3.	1	Uganda	Workshop with women victims in Lira	Mar-13
4.	1	Uganda	Workshop with women victims in Soroti	Mar-13
5.	1	Tunisia	Workshop with women victim groups in Tunis	Jun-13
6.	1	Tunisia	Workshop with women victim groups in Monastir	Jun-13
7.	1	Tunisia	Workshop with women victim groups in Kasserine	Jun-13
8.	1	Tunisia	Workshop with women victim groups in Nabeul	Jun-13
9.	1	Tunisia	Workshop with women victim groups in Tabarka	Jun-13
10.	1	Tunisia	Workshop with Ministry of TJ and HR on gender issues and Ministry of Women's Affairs	Jun-13
11.	1	Tunisia	Workshop with women victim groups in Tunis	Sep-13
12.	1	Tunisia	Workshop with women victim groups in Monastir	Sep-13
13.	1	Tunisia	Workshop with women victim groups in Kasserine	Sep-13
14.	1	Tunisia	Workshop with women victim groups in Nabeul	Sep-13
15.	1	Tunisia	Workshop with women victim groups in Tabarka	Sep-13
16.	2	CDI	Workshop with GIFJT	Nov-13
17.	2	CDI	Seminar for women's organizations	Nov-13
18.	2	Tunisia	Workshop with grassroots victims in Tunis	Apr-14
19.	2	Tunisia	Workshop with grassroots victims in Nabeul	Apr-14
20.	2	Tunisia	Workshop with grassroots victims in Sfax	Apr-14
21.	2	Tunisia	Workshop with grassroots victims in Sidi Bouzid	Apr-14
22.	2	Uganda	Consultation and validation workshop on recommendations from women's groups	Apr-14
23.	2	Tunisia	Workshop with grassroots victims in Kef	Jun-14
24.	2	Tunisia	Workshop with grassroots victims in Gafsa	Jun-14
25.	2	Kenya	Training on gendering the vetting process - GBV WG and PR WG	Jun-14
26.	2	Tunisia	Training for TDC Commission on its launch	Jun-14
27.	2	Kenya	Training on police vetting for GBV Working Group Members	Jun-14
28.	2	Tunisia	Training for TDC Commissioners on gender unit	Aug-14
29.	2	Kenya	Trainings for CSOs on police vetting - Nairobi	Oct-14

Number	Program		Workshop title	Date
	Year	Country		
30.	2	Kenya	Trainings for CSOs on police vetting - Eldoret	Oct-14
31.	2	Kenya	Trainings for CSOs on police vetting - Mombasa	Oct-14
32.	2	Kenya	Trainings for CSOs on police vetting - Nakuru	Oct-14
33.	2	Kenya	Stocktaking workshop on police and judicial vetting in Nairobi	Oct-14
34.	3	Colombia	CMSMP Training with Women Victims - El Darien, Valle del Cauca	Oct-14
35.	3	Tunisia	Training for TDC staff	Nov-14
36.	3	Colombia	Trainings to Fiscalía on handling sexual violence cases	Nov-14
37.	3	CDI	9 Consultations on reparations with 100+ women	Nov-14
38.	3	CDI	9 Consultations on reparations with 100+ women	Nov-14
39.	3	CDI	9 Consultations on reparations with 100+ women	Nov-14
40.	3	CDI	9 Consultations on reparations with 100+ women	Nov-14
41.	3	CDI	9 Consultations on reparations with 100+ women	Nov-14
42.	3	CDI	9 Consultations on reparations with 100+ women	Nov-14
43.	3	CDI	9 Consultations on reparations with 100+ women	Nov-14
44.	3	CDI	9 Consultations on reparations with 100+ women	Nov-14
45.	3	CDI	9 Consultations on reparations with 100+ women	Nov-14
46.	3	Uganda	Reparations workshop for government officials	Nov-14
47.	3	Tunisia	First workshop for women's groups on forming a network	Nov-14
48.	3	CDI	10 Consultations on reparations with at least 120+ women	Feb-15
49.	3	CDI	10 Consultations on reparations	Feb-15
50.	3	CDI	10 Consultations on reparations	Feb-15
51.	3	CDI	10 Consultations on reparations	Feb-15
52.	3	CDI	10 Consultations on reparations	Feb-15
53.	3	CDI	10 Consultations on reparations	Feb-15
54.	3	CDI	10 Consultations on reparations	Feb-15
55.	3	CDI	10 Consultations on reparations	Feb-15
56.	3	CDI	10 Consultations on reparations	Feb-15
57.	3	CDI	10 Consultations on reparations	Feb-15
58.	3	Tunisia	Training for TDC staff	Feb-15
59.	3	Tunisia	Workshop with women's groups and TDC together	Feb-15
60.	3	Kenya	Consultation with women's groups on reparations	Apr-15
61.	3	Tunisia	Second workshop for women's groups on forming a network in Tunis, Nabeul, Sfax and	Apr-15

<b>Number</b>	<b>Program Year</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Workshop title</b>	<b>Date</b>
			Sidi Bouzid	
62.	3	Uganda	Assessment research with women victims of CRSV and their children in Northern Uganda	Apr-15
63.	3	Colombia	CMSMP Training with Women Victims - Bogota	May-15
64.	3	Kenya	Vetting sensitization in Nairobi (Muthare etc)	May-15
65.	3	Kenya	Vetting sensitization in Nairobi (Kibera etc)	May-15
66.	3	Kenya	Vetting sensitization in Nairobi (Kiambu etc)	May-15
67.	3	Kenya	Vetting sensitization in Nairobi (Soweto etc)	May-15
68.	3	CDI	National consultative conference on reparations for victims	May-15
69.	3	Tunisia	Third workshop for women's groups on forming a network	Jun-15
70.	3	Uganda	Workshop on documentation for Human Rights Commission	Jul-15
71.	3	Colombia	CMSMP Training with Women Victims - Cartagena	Jul-15
72.	3	Uganda	2 Validation meetings with women and government officials in Northern Uganda (Gulu)	Jul-15
73.	3	Uganda	2 Validation meetings with women and government officials in Northern Uganda (Gulu)	Jul-15
74.	3	Tunisia	Retreat and public launch of "TJ is Also for Women" Network	Aug-15
75.	3	Uganda	2 Validation meetings with women and government officials in Northern Uganda (Gulu)	Aug-15
76.	3	Uganda	2 Validation meetings with women and government officials in Northern Uganda (Gulu)	Aug-15
77.	3	Kenya	Vetting sensitization in Busia	Aug-15
78.	3	Kenya	National Victims Conference	Aug-15
79.	3	Colombia	Participation RT - Training	Sep-15
80.	3	Colombia	Participation RT - Training	Sep-15
81.	3	Kenya	Vetting sensitization in Nairobi (Mathare etc)	Sep-15
82.	3	Kenya	Administration Police Service Gender Sensitivity Training Nairobi	Sep-15
83.	3	Kenya	Administration Police Service Gender Sensitivity Training Kisumu	Sep-15
84.	3	Kenya	Administration Police Service Gender Sensitivity Training Mombasa	Sep-15
85.	3	Kenya	Administration Police Service Technical Workshop with High Ranking Police Mombasa	Sep-15
86.	3	Kenya	Administration Police Service Gender Sensitivity Training Nakuru	Sep-15
87.	3	Colombia	CMSMP Training with Women Victims - Villa Vicencio	Oct-15
88.	3	Colombia	Participation RT - Training	Oct-15
89.	3	Uganda	High-level symposium with civil society, victims and government officials presenting results and recommendations from assessment work. Women victims met with officials directly.	Oct-15
90.	3	Tunisia	Women's TJ Network Sensitization events in Tunis	Oct-15

<b>Number</b>	<b>Program Year</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Workshop title</b>	<b>Date</b>
91.	3	Tunisia	Women's TJ Network Sensitization events in Sfax	Oct-15
92.	3	Tunisia	Women's TJ Network Sensitization events in Sidi Bouzid	Oct-15
93.	3	Tunisia	Women's TJ Network Sensitization events in Kasserine	Oct-15
94.	3	Kenya	Vetting sensitization in Nairobi (Kariobangi)	Oct-15
95.	3	Kenya	Vetting sensitization in Nairobi (Kenya Sex Workers Alliance)	Oct-15
96.	3	Kenya	Vetting sensitization in Kericho	Oct-15
97.	3	Kenya	Vetting sensitization in Kisumu	Oct-15
98.	3	Kenya	Administration Police Service Feedback Forum Nairobi	Oct-15
99.	3	Kenya	Administration Police Service Workshop High Ranking Police Kisumu	Oct-15
100.	3	Kenya	Administration Police Service Feedback Forum Nakuru	Oct-15
101.	3	Kenya	Administration Police Service Feedback Forum Mombasa	Oct-15
102.	3	Kenya	Administration Police Service Feedback Forum Kisumu	Oct-15

## Annex 4: Media Analysis of UNTF-funded Publications

In terms of both page views and downloads, each report performed well, landing well within the top 25% of ICTJ publications.

### Web Traffic (1/1/2014 – 12/2/2015) – page views

- Queremos ser oídas (Colombia): 450 (top 20%)
- "To Walk Freely with a Wide Heart" (Nepal): 463 (top 5%)
- From Rejection to Redress (Uganda): 258 (top 5%)
- Confronting Impunity and Engendering Transitional Justice Processes in Northern Uganda: 277 (top 25%)

### Web traffic by country

- Queremos ser oídas (Colombia):
  - Colombia – 76%
  - Spain – 4%
  - France – 3%
  - Switzerland – 2%
  - Ecuador – 2%
- "To Walk Freely with a Wide Heart" (Nepal):
  - US – 32%
  - Nepal – 19%
  - UK – 12%
  - Belgium – 4%
  - France – 3%
- From Rejection to Redress (Uganda):
  - US – 19%
  - UK – 14%
  - Canada – 11%
  - Uganda – 9%
  - Netherlands – 8%
- Confronting Impunity and Engendering Transitional Justice Processes in Northern Uganda:
  - US – 22%
  - UK – 14%
  - Uganda – 12%
  - Sweden – 8%
  - Spain – 7%

### Downloads (1/1/2014 – 12/2/2015)

- Queremos ser oídas (Colombia): 254 (top 5%)
- "To Walk Freely with a Wide Heart" (Nepal): 180 (top 10%)
- From Rejection to Redress (Uganda): 145 (top 15%)
- Confronting Impunity and Engendering Transitional Justice Processes in Northern Uganda: 97 (top 20%)

#### Downloads by country

- Queremos ser oídas (Colombia):
  - Colombia – 76%
  - Spain – 4%
  - France – 4%
  - Switzerland – 3%
  - Belize – 2%
- "To Walk Freely with a Wide Heart" (Nepal):
  - US – 24%
  - France – 14%
  - UK – 14%
  - Nepal – 14%
  - Belgium – 4%
- From Rejection to Redress (Uganda):
  - US – 30%
  - UK – 16%
  - Canada – 11%
  - Switzerland – 8%
  - Colombia – 5%
  - Uganda – 5%
- Confronting Impunity and Engendering Transitional Justice Processes in Northern Uganda:
  - Uganda – 23%
  - UK – 20%
  - US – 20%
  - Spain – 7%
  - France – 7%

#### Press Release Web Traffic (1/1/2014 – 12/2/2015) – page views

- Queremos ser oídas (Colombia): 335
- "To Walk Freely with a Wide Heart" (Nepal): 339
- From Rejection to Redress (Uganda): 888
- Confronting Impunity and Engendering Transitional Justice Processes in Northern Uganda: 668

## Facebook

- Queremos ser oídas (Colombia): 279 likes; 94 shares, 6 comments
- "To Walk Freely with a Wide Heart" (Nepal): 1,677 likes; 16 shares; 5 comments
- From Rejection to Redress (Uganda): 602 likes; 124 shares; 34 comments
- Confronting Impunity and Engendering Transitional Justice Processes in Northern Uganda: 336 likes; 20 shares; 5 comments

## Twitter

- Queremos ser oídas (Colombia): 19 total engagements; 5 retweets; 1 like
- "To Walk Freely with a Wide Heart" (Nepal): 23 total engagements; 5 retweets; 2 likes
- From Rejection to Redress (Uganda): 85 total engagements; 33 retweets; 10 likes
- Confronting Impunity and Engendering Transitional Justice Processes in Northern Uganda: 19 total engagements; 10 retweets; 2 likes

## Media Coverage

The reports were covered widely in the international media, including The Himalayan Times and AllAfrica.

- "To Walk Freely with a Wide Heart" (Nepal): 4 mentions
  - "HEALING SCARS LEFT BY CONFLICT AND RIGHTS ABUSES," Himalayan Times, September 16 2014
  - "Nepal: New Study by ICTJ Finds Conflict Victims Continue to Have Acute Needs; Calls for Comprehensive Reparations," PRWeb, September 17 2014
  - "Nepal: New Study by ICTJ Finds Conflict Victims Continue to Have Acute Needs; Calls for Comprehensive Reparations," The Advocate Online, September 17, 2014
  - "Neglecting The Wronged Ones," MyRepublica.com, September 17 2014
- From Rejection to Redress (Uganda): 9 mentions
  - "Redress Needed for Children Born of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Northern Uganda and Their Mothers," Legal Monitor Worldwide, October 28 2015
  - "Uganda: Mothers and Children Born From Wartime Sexual Violence Need Redress," AllAfrica, October 29 2015
  - "Uganda: Mothers and Children Born From Wartime Sexual Violence Need Redress," Afropages.fr, October 29 2015
  - "Uganda: Mothers and Children Born From Wartime Sexual Violence Need Redress," My Informs, October 29 2015
  - "Children Born of Wartime Sexual Violence Need Urgent Redress – ICTJ," Chimp Reports, October 29 2015
  - "Uganda: Mothers and Children Born From Wartime Sexual Violence Need Redress," AidNews, October 29 2015
  - "Redress Needed for Children Born of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Northern Uganda and Their Mothers," DailyMe, October 30 2015
  - "Uganda: Mothers and Children Born From Wartime Sexual Violence Need Redress," Africa News, 30 October 2015
  - "Redress Needed for Children Born of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Northern Uganda and Their Mothers," PressReleasePoint, October 28 2015
- Confronting Impunity and Engendering Transitional Justice Processes in Northern Uganda: 1 mention
  - "Uganda: For Effective Justice for Women in Northern Uganda, Listen to Survivors," AllAfrica, October 22 2014



## Annex 5: Outcome indicators for final evaluation

Text in blue signals indicators measured in the 2013 baseline study

Black boxes indicate that the indicator was not measured or will not be measured.

Outcome indicators for final evaluation	Colombia baseline	Colombia endline	Cote d'Ivoire baseline	Cote d'Ivoire	Kenya baseline	Kenya endline	Tunisia baseline	Tunisia endline	Uganda baseline	Uganda endline	Nepal baseline	Nepal endline	Data sources Methodological notes and limitations
1: Women's group beneficiaries' perception of how well current TJ policies/mechanisms address the major needs of women victims	Poor (2.0)	No data	Very Poor (1.33)	Average (3.25)	Well (3.4)	Very Poor (1.0)	Poor (2.0)	Very Poor (1.2)	Poor (2.25)	Average to Poor (2.57)	Poor (2.0)		Kenya/Tunisia: interviews with beneficiaries Other 4 countries: survey Methodology: 5-point scale; same as baseline. Limitations: In Kenya, a different set of groups was surveyed.
2: Women's group beneficiaries' perspectives on how well current TJ policies/mechanisms impact women victims.		No data		Average (3.33)		Very Poor (1.0)		Very Poor (1.5)		Average (2.86)			Kenya/Tunisia: interviews with beneficiaries Other 4 countries: survey Methodology: Open-ended question to gather qualitative examples of impact. Limitations: it is questionable that respondents will see a difference between this question and the previous one on women's needs.
3: Qualitative assessment of the extent to which TJ measures or policies adequately address gender based violence	Lowest (JPL)	No data	Lowest (CDV R)	Lowest (CDV R)	Avg (TJRC)	Lowest (Vetting)	Low (Draft Law)	Avg (TDC)	Lowest (ICD)	No Data	Lowest (IRP)		Kenya/Tunisia: interviews with KIIs; document review Other 4 countries: interviews with KIIs; document review Methodology: Rubric; same as baseline.
	Avg (Victims Unit)	Avg (Victims Unit)	Lowest (CSE)	No data							Lowest (Ordinance)		

Outcome indicators for final evaluation	Colombia baseline	Colombia endline	Cote d'Ivoire baseline	Cote d'Ivoire endline	Kenya baseline	Kenya endline	Tunisia baseline	Tunisia endline	Uganda baseline	Uganda endline	Nepal baseline	Nepal endline	Data sources Methodological notes and limitations
1.1: Instances of direct engagement between women/women's groups and policymakers		4		11		4		4		16			Kenya/Tunisia: interviews with beneficiaries  Other 4 countries: survey  Methodology: This will be a simple count for the past 12 months, partly based on self-reporting.  Limitations: There was no monitoring data, and it is not possible to reconstruct over a period of three years. Therefore, data for this indicator is not reliable.
1.2: Assessment of the quality of participating women's groups' formalized engagement strategy						Highest		High					Kenya/Tunisia: interviews with beneficiaries; document review  Other 4 countries: none.  Methodology: New rubric was developed.
1.3: # of ICTJ women's group beneficiaries who report carrying out monitoring activities of TJ measures	1	1	1	2	0*	1	0	2	4	4	2		Kenya/Tunisia: interviews with beneficiaries  Other 4 countries: survey  Methodology: Count, same as baseline. Limitations: Self-reporting in the survey may not yield reliable data.
2.1: Qualitative assessment of the level of awareness and change in attitudes towards women victims needs among interviewed policymakers (Tunisia and Kenya only)													Kenya/Tunisia: interviews with KIIs.  Other 4 countries: No data will be collected, as we will not have access to policymakers.  Methodology: Rubric, same as baseline. Limitations: Since there is no baseline data for Kenya, we had to ask KIIs to report on changes they have observed over time. Given the long time frame (3 years), this may not be reliable.

Outcome indicators for final evaluation	Colombia baseline	Colombia endline	Cote d'Ivoire baseline	Cote d'Ivoire endline	Kenya baseline	Kenya endline	Tunisia baseline	Tunisia endline	Uganda baseline	Uganda endline	Nepal baseline	Nepal endline	Data sources Methodological notes and limitations
2.2: # of TJ institutions who have developed an operational plan to facilitate women's participation	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0		Kenya/Tunisia: interviews with KIIs and document review; Other 4 countries: interviews with KIIs and document review  Methodology: Count, same as baseline
2.3: Quality assessment of TJ institutions' operational plan to facilitate women's participation		Avg (Victims Unit)		N/A		N/A		Low (TDC)		N/A			Kenya/Tunisia: interviews with KIIs and document review  Other 4 countries: interviews with KIIs and document review  Methodological notes: Used elements of the rubric for Goal Level Indicator 3 to assess this qualitatively. Limitations were that the evaluator did not have access to written versions of these plans; the Tunisia plan is still not formally approved.

## Annex 6: Comparison of Baseline and Endline Indicators

Original indicator for baseline study	Colombia	Cote d'Ivoire	Kenya	Nepal	Tunisia	Uganda	Added outcome indicators final evaluation	Notes	Outcome indicators that will be measured for final evaluation
1.1: % of women victims groups members who demonstrate a satisfactory level of knowledge in transitional justice mechanisms	To be measured before and after trainings.							Will not be measured for final evaluation; moved to "output" indicators in the final RF	
1.1: % of women victims groups representatives a satisfactory level of self-efficacy (score of at least 3 on a scale of 5) to participate in development and implementation of TJ policies	To be measured before and after trainings.							Will not be measured for final evaluation; deleted from final RF	
							<b>1.1 Added indicator: "Instances of direct engagement between women/women's groups and policymakers; where applicable, an assessment of the effectiveness of inputs, made in improving the ability of TJ policies to affect women's needs."</b>	This is two indicators not one (a count, and a quality assessment requiring a rubric). Unclear if the count is supposed to be a count of all such engagements (however defined) or of engagement's facilitated by ICTJ.	<b>1.1: Instances of direct engagement between women/women's groups and policymakers</b>
1.2: # of ICTJ women's group beneficiaries who report developing a strategy to engage with TJ entities	3	2	0*	3	1	2		Will not be measured for final evaluation; moved to "output" indicators	
							<b>1.2 Added indicator: Assessment of the quality of participating women's groups formalized engagement strategy</b>	Will require creation of a rubric to assess quality. Assumes the existence of written strategies.	<b>1.2: Assessment of the quality of participating women's groups formalized engagement strategy</b>
1.2: # of ICTJ women's group beneficiaries who report carrying out monitoring activities of TJ measures	1	1	0*	2	0	4		Note that this appears in both "outcome" and "output" indicators in the final RF, therefore duplication; wording modified to "# of women's groups carrying out monitoring activities (i.e.,	<b>1.3: # of ICTJ women's group beneficiaries who report carrying out monitoring activities of TJ measures</b>

Original indicator for baseline study	Colombia	Cote d'Ivoire	Kenya	Nepal	Tunisia	Uganda	Added outcome indicators final evaluation	Notes	Outcome indicators that will be measured for final evaluation
								referring to whole universe of women's groups, and not about self-reporting). I propose to revert back to the language of self-reporting, as it is not feasible for the evaluator to assess the whole universe of women's groups in 6 countries. Re-labeled 1.3.	
1.3: # of women's groups reporting that policymakers have directly consulted them more than two times in past 12 months	2	1	2*	1	2	3		Will not be measured for final evaluation; moved to "output" indicators in the final RF	
1.3: # of women victims groups consulted on reparations program or national Transitional Justice policies in Kenya and CDI	At the time of the baseline, there were no reparations programs of national TJ policies in place in Kenya or CDI.							Will not be measured for final evaluation; moved to "output" indicators in the final RF	
1.3: Women's group beneficiaries' perception of how well current TJ policies/mechanisms address the major needs of women victims	Poor (2.0)	Very Poor (1.33)	Well (3.4)*	Poor (2.0)	Poor (2.0)	Poor (2.25)		Moved to "Project Goal" section of RF, and re-labeled "Indicator 1"	1: Women's group beneficiaries' perception of how well current TJ policies/mechanisms address the major needs of women victims
							Added indicator (at Goal level): 2 Women's group beneficiaries' perspectives on how well current TJ policies/mechanisms impact women victims.	Unclear wording "how well" something "impacts" women. Possible overlap with Project Goal indicator #1. Will need to be careful on wording the question in the questionnaire.	2: Women's group beneficiaries' perspectives on how well current TJ policies/mechanisms impact women victims.
2.2 (TJ initiative 1): Qualitative assessment of the extent to which TJ measures or policies adequately address gender based violence	Low est (JPL)	Low est (CDV R)	Avg (TJRC)	Low est (IRP)	Low (Draft Law)	Low est (ICD)		Moved to goal level in final RF, and re-labeled as Indicator #3	3: Qualitative assessment of the extent to which TJ measures or policies adequately address gender based violence

Original indicator for baseline study	Colombia	Cote d'Ivoire	Kenya	Nepal	Tunisia	Uganda	Added outcome indicators final evaluation	Notes	Outcome indicators that will be measured for final evaluation
2.2 (TJ initiative 2): Qualitative assessment of the extent to which TJ measures or policies adequately address gender based violence	Avg (Victims Law)	Low est (CSE)		Low est (Ordinance)					
2.3: # of TJ institutions who have developed an operational plan to facilitate women's participation	0	0	1	0	0	0		Re-labeled as indicator 2.2 in final RF	2.2: # of TJ institutions who have developed an operational plan to facilitate women's participation
<del>2.3: # of institutional activities planned by TJ measures to engage women victims</del>		0			0			Will not be measured for final evaluation; moved to "output" indicators in the final RF	
							2.3: Proportion of TJ institutions' operational plans to facilitate women's participation that have been carried out effectively (or deemed feasible and effective if not carried out yet)	The indicator is not clear in terms of what it is asking for. Is this a numerical indicator (proportion) or a quality assessment? If it is a proportion, then it is hard to see how one could measure the proportion of a "plan", which is not in itself numerical. Propose to rewrite this one.	2.3: Will be re-written to be some version of this; quality assessment of operational plan, etc.
2.4: Qualitative assessment of the level of awareness and change in attitudes towards women victims needs among interviewed policymakers		Low est			Avg			Re-labeled Indicator 2.1 in final RF	2.1: Qualitative assessment of the level of awareness and change in attitudes towards women victims needs among interviewed policymakers (Tunisia and Kenya only)

Original indicator for baseline study	Colombia	Cote d'Ivoire	Kenya	Nepal	Tunisia	Uganda	Added outcome indicators for final evaluation	Notes	Outcome indicators that will be measured for final evaluation
							<p><b>3.1: Perspectives of key stakeholders on the usefulness of the impact studies and how they applied to the studies to their work</b></p>	<p>This is not an indicator; rather it asks some evaluation questions related to utility and impact.</p> <p>We will not measure this indicator since no activities took place under this Outcome area.</p>	

## Annex 7: Final Output Indicators as Reported in ICTJ Progress Reports

The evaluator did not validate this data.

UNTF OUTPUT INDICATORS AS REPORTED IN ICTJ PROGRESS REPORTS											
Output	Indicator	Progress Report 1	Annual Report 1	Year 1 Total	Progress Report 2	Annual Report 2	Year 2 Total	Progress Report 3	Annual Report 3	Year 3 Total	TOTAL
<b>Output 1.1</b> Women victims groups have the technical knowledge and skills to participate in the development and implementation of Transitional Justice policies	% of women victims groups members who demonstrate a satisfactory level of knowledge in Transitional Justice mechanisms. Will be determined during the baseline study and/or during pre-test prior to training.	0	0	0	0	78	78	0	0	0	78
<b>Output 1.2</b> Strategies are developed by women victims groups to engage with Transitional Justice entities.	# of women groups who have developed a strategy to engage with TJ entities. # of women groups who carry out monitoring activities of TJ measures.	0	0	0	0	7	7	31	4	35	42
<b>Output 1.3</b> Women victims groups in Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire build working relationships with decision-makers working on TJ processes	# of events where women's groups representatives directly engage with policymakers # of women groups consulted on reparations program or national Transitional Justice policies	0	0	0	1	4	5	0	6	6	11
<b>Output 2.1</b> Policymakers are equipped with foundational and comparative knowledge on gender justice in TJ measures	Perceived relevance, usefulness and quality of training sessions by participants	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	169	186	186
<b>Output 2.2</b> Policymakers have the technical skills to operationalize measures that address gender-based violence and its consequences within the framework of reparations, accountability and prosecutions policies.	Perceived relevance, usefulness and quality of training sessions by participants	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	11	34	34
<b>Output 2.3</b> TJ institutions have an operational plan to facilitate the participation of women victims in the	# of institutional activities planned by TJ measures to engage women victims	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	5	5



UNTF OUTPUT INDICATORS AS REPORTED IN ICTJ PROGRESS REPORTS											
Output	Indicator	Progress Report 1	Annual Report 1	Year 1 Total	Progress Report 2	Annual Report 2	Year 2 Total	Progress Report 3	Annual Report 3	Year 3 Total	TOTAL
implementation of TJ measures.											
<b>Output 2.4</b> Policymakers' awareness of the specific needs of women victims is raised.	Qualitative assessment of the level of awareness and change in attitudes towards women victims needs among interviewed policymakers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Output 3.1</b> Country programs identify and reflect on good practices to end violence against women through TJ mechanisms.	# of downloads of studies on ICTJ website	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	676	676	676

## Annex 8: Final Beneficiary Data Sheet

The data has been validated by the evaluator, except where indicated.

Beneficiary group		The number of beneficiaries reached	
		At the project goal level	At the outcome level
Female domestic workers			
Female migrant workers			
Female political activists/human rights defenders			
Female sex workers			
Female refugees/internally displaced/asylum seekers			
Indigenous women/from ethnic groups			
Lesbian, bisexual, transgender			
Women and girls in general			
Women/girls with disabilities			
Women/girls living with HIV and AIDS			
Women/girls survivors of violence		268	2612
Women prisoners			
Others (specify)			
Primary Beneficiary Total		268	2612
Civil society organizations (including NGOs)	Number of institutions reached	NA	289 *No reliable data
	Number of individuals reached	NA	169
Community-based groups/members	Number of groups reached	NA	
	Number of individuals reached	NA	
Educational professionals (i.e. teachers, educators)		NA	
Faith-based organizations	Number of institutions reached	NA	
	Number of individuals reached	NA	
General public/community at large		NA	
Government officials (i.e. decision makers, policy implementers)		NA	942
Health professionals		NA	
Journalists/Media		NA	
Legal officers (i.e. lawyers, prosecutors, judges)		NA	
Men and/or boys		NA	

## Annex 9: TJ Institutions' Gender Sensitivity Scorecard

	1-Poor	2-Mixed	3-Good	SCORE
<b>1. The content of the TJ measure is relevant to GBV</b>				
<b>List of violations:</b> TJ measures' statutes and list of violations to investigate explicitly include GBV—including sexual violence, but not exclusively sexual violence	Poor: No mention of sexual violence or GBV	Mixed: Includes sexual violence but not GBV	Good: Includes both sexual violence and GBV	
<b>Investigation approach:</b> Investigations seek to understand if and how men and women experienced human rights violations differently (e.g.: women who are detained may also be exposed to gender-related acts of humiliation).	Poor: No distinction is made between male and female victims in investigation approach (especially investigation questions)	No middle score	Good: Distinction is made between male and female victims in investigation approach (especially investigation questions)	
<b>Both men and women are included:</b> The statutes explicitly note that GBV applies to women and men, so as not to overlook sexual violence experienced by men.	Poor: SBV/GBV is not included; or if it is, both men and women are not explicitly mentioned.	No middle score	Good: Both men and women are explicitly mentioned	
<b>Mandate and/or statutes make reference to special processes for victims of GBV:</b> To include, for example, thematic public hearings for a truth commission, outreach efforts, etc., such as those listed below.	Poor: No mention of special processes for victims of GBV	Mixed: Need for special processes is mentioned, but there are no particulars	Good: Particulars of special processes for victims of GBV are mentioned	
<b>2. The structures of the TJ measure have the capacity to treat GBV</b>				
<b>Organizational structure:</b> An explicit institutional approach to gender is taken, ideally to include both a central gender unit and developing a decentralized, crosscutting approach to gender. The rationale for the approach should be described.	Poor: There is no gender unit	Mixed: There is a gender unit, but it does not take a crosscutting institutional approach and/or its rationale is not clear.	Good: There is a gender unit that takes a crosscutting approach to gender. The rationale for its approach is clear.	
<b>Staffing:</b> Staff should include a person with specific gender expertise at the senior level. A deliberate approach to gender diversity is reflected in the composition of the TJ measure's staffing, with a focus on executive and decision-making functions.	Poor: There is no gender approach to staffing	Mixed: There is a gender approach to staffing, but gender experts may be too junior; gender diversity throughout the institution may be lacking.	Good: There is a fully staffed gender unit with a senior-level leader. Gender diversity is clear and present.	
<b>Funding:</b> The gender unit and gender-related activities should have dedicated funds in the budget.	Poor: There is no gender unit	Mixed: The gender unit is underfunded and/or must do its own fundraising	Good: The gender unit is has dedicated funds adequate to its mission.	
<b>3. The processes the TJ measure deploys are gender-sensitive</b>				

**Consultation:** Women’s groups and women’s victims groups (and other gender-related groups, such as those working on LGBT issues) are actively consulted during all stages, with particular emphasis on the planning stage.

**Outreach:** Communication efforts to victims and to the broader public are gender-sensitive, making GBV visible and sending the message that GBV is wrong.

**Treatment of GBV victims:** The processes for taking inviting submissions, taking statements/testimony, providing psychosocial support, etc., are gender-sensitive.

Poor results: Women’s groups have either no role or have little clear impact on consultations’ outcome

Poor: There is no outreach strategy for women’s groups and/or about GBV

Poor: There are few or no special processes for GBV victims.

Mixed results: A few high-profile women’s groups participate in consultations, and have some impact on their outcome.

Mixed: There is some outreach; however a consistent strategy is not evidence; results may be poor

Mixed: There may be some or a lot of processes, but they are inconsistently applied; staff may lack adequate training or background needed to deal with GBV victims.

Good results: A broad range of women’s groups participate effectively in consultations, with clear influence on the consultations’ results

Good: There is an effective strategy for women’s groups and/or GBV

Good: Processes are in place and consistently applied. Staff have training or existing background needed to handle GBV

#### 4. The outputs of the TJ measure challenge existing gender inequalities

**Reparations:** Benefits are gender-sensitive, with particular attention to the disproportionate impact of human rights violations on vulnerable women (as caregivers, heads of households, etc.), even if they were not direct victims of state violence. Benefits should address the specific ways that women are impacted by violence.

**Truth-telling:** Truth commission final reports are gender-sensitive, with particular attention to linking recommendations to broader gender justice issues, such as legal reforms (e.g., property law), prevalence and cultural acceptance of domestic violence, impunity for GBV, etc.

Poor: Gender-sensitivity is non-existent.

Poor: There is no gender-sensitivity

Mixed: Gender-sensitivity is mentioned, but it may be superficial and lack details.

Mixed: The report mentions women and gender, but the approach is not consistent; recommendations relating to women and gender may be superficial/general or not actionable.

Good: Gender-sensitivity is clear and detailed.

Good: The report takes a clear and reasoned approach to gender; recommendations are reasonable and actionable.

**Prosecutions:** Domestic jurisprudence reflects women’s experience of violence and reinforces that GBV crimes are as serious as other crimes. Reparations stemming from prosecutions are both gender-sensitive and enforced.

Poor: No change in domestic jurisprudence on GBV; if applicable, reparations are non-existence or not gender-sensitive.

Mixed: Some change in domestic jurisprudence; if applicable, reparations may not be consistently enforced or consistently gender-sensitive.

Good: Significant change in domestic jurisprudence; if applicable, reparations are gender-sensitive and enforced.

**#DIV/0!**

**AVERAGE SCORE**

**SCALE:**

**1-1.4=LOWEST**

**1.4-1.8=LOW**

**1.8-2.2=AVERAGE**

**2.2-2.6=HIGH**

**2.6-3=HIGHEST**

## Annex 10: TJ Policymakers' Gender Awareness and Attitudes Scorecard

	1-Poor	2-Mixed	3-Good	SCORE
<b>1. Policymaker/TJ staff awareness of specific needs</b>				
<p>Policymakers can name women's groups working on behalf of women victims (not just women's rights groups).</p>	<p>Poor: Most policymakers cannot name at least 1 group that represents women victims (NOT a women's or feminist org)</p>	<p>Mixed: While some policymakers may be able to name 1-2 such groups, others demonstrate a weak grasp of groups representing women victims</p>	<p>Good: Most policymakers can name 3 or more relevant groups.</p>	
<p>Policymakers can identify GBV issues to be included in a TJ measure.</p>	<p>Poor: Most policymakers cannot identify relevant GBV issues, although some may mention sexual violence.</p>	<p>Mixed: Some policymakers can identify relevant GBV issues, although for some this may be confined to sexual violence.</p>	<p>Good: Most policymakers have a clear grasp of GBV, including its extension beyond sexual violence.</p>	
<p>Policymakers can identify specific needs of women who are indirect victims of human rights violations.</p>	<p>Poor: Most policymakers cannot identify the needs of such victims.</p>	<p>Mixed: Some policymakers can identify the specific needs.</p>	<p>Good: Most policymakers can identify these specific needs.</p>	
<p>Policymakers can identify gender-sensitive practices in conducting a TJ measure.</p>	<p>Poor: Most policymakers are unaware of gender-sensitive practices.</p>	<p>Mixed: While some policymakers may be aware of gender-sensitive practices, others demonstrate a weak grasp, perhaps referencing only the need for private hearings.</p>	<p>Good: Most policymakers have a clear grasp of a range of gender-sensitive practices.</p>	
<p>Policymakers strongly agree that there is a link between GBV and broader gender discrimination in society.</p>	<p>Poor: Most policymakers do not see such a link.</p>	<p>Mixed: While some policymakers may see a link, their description of it may be unclear.</p>	<p>Good: Most policymakers can provide a clear explanation of the link between GBV and gender discrimination.</p>	
<b>2. Policymaker/TJ staff attitudes toward specific needs</b>				

Policymakers identify “gender-based violence” as an important issue for TJ to address.

Poor: Most policymakers do not cite either GBV or sexual violence as one of the key issues for TJ to address.

Mixed: While some policymakers may identify GBV as one of the top issues for TJ to address, this may be confined to sexual violence. (Those who do may be in the gender unit.)

Good: Most policymakers identify GBV--not just sexual violence--as a key issue for Tj to address.

Women victims’ specific needs are seen as “just as important as” the needs of other victims. This should include the needs of women who are indirect victims of rights violations (NB: the question could be about “spouses” in general).

Poor: Most policymakers make no distinction between women's needs and the needs of other victims.

Mixed: While some policymakers see women victims' specific needs as important, others hesitate or are not sure. (Those who do may be in the gender unit.)

Good: Most policymakers see women's victims specific needs as just as important as the needs of other victims.

Policymakers strongly agree that TJ measures should have a strategy for being sensitive to gender, for example, creating a gender unit or mainstreaming gender in its operations.

Poor: Most policymakers do not see the need for having an institutional strategy on gender sensitivity.

Mixed: While some policymakers see the need for such a strategy, others do not. (Those who do may be in the gender unit.)

Good: Most policymakers see the need for an institutional strategy on gender sensitivity.

Policymakers strongly agree that TJ measures have an obligation to make special efforts to ensure participation of women victims.

Poor: Most policymakers do not see an obligation to make special efforts to ensure the participation of women victims.

Mixed: Only some see this need, and they may mainly be those within the gender unit or tasked with gender issues.

Good: Most policymakers see an obligation to make special efforts to ensure the participation of women victims.

**AVERAGE SCORE**

**SCALE:**

**1-1.4=LOWEST**

**1.4-1.8=LOW**

**1.8-2.2=AVERAGE**

**2.2-2.6=HIGH**

**2.6-3=HIGHEST**

**#DIV/0!**

## Annex 11: Strategy Quality Assessment Scorecard

	1-Poor	2-Mixed	3-Good	SCORE
<b>1. Clarity of logic</b>				
Social change objectives are clearly defined	Poor: There are no identifiable social change objectives, but rather a list of activities	Mixed: There are social change objectives, but it may be hard to identify them from the strategy document	Good: Social change objectives are clearly identified and highlighted in the strategy document	
There is an explicit (or clearly implicit) theory of change that links activities to social change objectives	Poor: There is no identifiable theory of change	Mixed: There is a theory of change, but it takes some effort to figure it out.	Good: The theory of change is clear.	
Activities clearly link to one another internally	Poor: The activities appear to be random and unlinked	Mixed: There are some linkages between different activities and parts of the program, but they could be clearer	Good: Linkages are clear	
<b>2. Relevance</b>				
An evidence basis is presented (based on past experience and/or research) as a rationale for why the chosen activities are the best ones for achieving the social change objectives.	Poor: No evidence basis is presented to link the activities to the social change objective	Mixed: There are hints of an evidence basis, but it remains unconvincing	Good: There is a credible evidence basis linking the activities to the social change objectives.	
Resource allocation follows or maps onto the needs identified	Poor: Priority needs do not have adequate resources; there is little logic to resource allocation	Mixed: Resources do map onto relevant needs, but there may be gaps (ie, priority needs are under-resourced)	Good: The link between resources allocated and needs identified is clear	
<b>3. Capacity to implement</b>				
The implementer has the required competencies to execute the activities.	Poor: Implementer lacks all or most of the competencies	Mixed: Implementer has some of these competencies	Good: Implementer has most or all of these competencies	
The implementer demonstrates commitment, initiative, and independence.	Poor: Implementer demonstrates little commitment, initiative, or independence.	Mixed: Implementer demonstrates some commitment, initiative, or independence, but the level varies	Good: Implementer consistently demonstrates commitment, initiative, or independence.	



The implementer is trusted by the target beneficiaries	Poor: Implementer may have little or no trust with the target beneficiaries	Mixed Implementer has gained some trust, but has some work to do	Good Implementer has the trust of the target beneficiaries
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**4. Resources**

The implementer has financial resources to execute the project.	Poor: The implementer has little or no financial resources, with little clarity on where funding may be raised	Mixed: The implementer has some financial resources and/or a reasonable plan for accessing funding in the future	Good: Implementer has most or all of the needed funding in place.
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#DIV/0!

**AVERAGE SCORE SCALE:**  
**1-1.4=LOWEST**  
**1.4-1.8=LOW**  
**1.8-2.2=AVERAGE**  
**2.2-2.6=HIGH**  
**2.6-3=HIGHEST**

## Annex 12a: Women's organizations survey (English)

### GENDER APPROACH TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

This survey is part of an effort to evaluate the work of the Gender Justice program at the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), which has been funded by the UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women (UNTF) over the last three years. The program will use the evaluation to improve its programs that support and empower women victims in their pursuit of justice.

Ms. Paige Arthur, and independent consultant with Public Action Research, is conducting the evaluation. You can contact Ms. Arthur with any questions at [parthur@publicactionresearch.com](mailto:parthur@publicactionresearch.com).

**Ms. Arthur will keep your responses confidential. Your honest feedback is important to us. Please try to be as frank as possible.**

Please type your answers directly into this document, indicating the letter of your response and your comments. **Please be sure that the “tracked changes” function is turned on, so that Ms. Arthur can clearly see your answers.**

We are trying to reach middle to senior level representatives of women's organizations and women victims organizations. Your participation is very important, so thanks in advance for your time. The survey will take about 10 minutes to complete.

### GENDER AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

1. In the past three years (since November 2012), how many times have you participated in a workshop, class, or training about WOMEN/GENDER and transitional justice?

- a. Never in the last 3 years
- b. 1-2 times in the last 3 years
- c. 3 or more times in the last 3 years
- d. I'm not sure

If you did participate in one or more workshops, can you please tell us who organized them?

Name of organization leading the workshop/training	
Year of workshop/training	

2. Tell us about your current understanding of transitional justice.

Please put an “X” in the box that best represents your opinion. Please do not hesitate to “strongly” agree or disagree with any of the following statements—your responses will be kept confidential. PLEASE MARK ONLY ONE BOX PER ROW.

	1 Strongly disagree	2 Disagree	3 Agree	4 Strongly agree	I don't know
Transitional justice is mainly about prosecuting people who have committed crimes.					
One goal of transitional justice is to acknowledge the victims of human rights violations.					
Transitional justice requires forgiving the perpetrators.					

Comments?

3. Tell us how comfortable you feel with transitional justice ideas and practices. Put an “X” in the box that best represents your opinion, and again please don't hesitate to strongly agree or disagree, if that is how you feel. PLEASE MARK ONLY ONE BOX PER ROW.

	1 Strongly disagree	2 Disagree	3 Agree	4 Strongly agree
I would find it difficult to explain transitional justice to a colleague.				
The idea of transitional justice is clear to me.				
I would find it easy to explain how transitional justice can address gender-based violence.				
I would benefit from more information about transitional justice.				

Comments?

4. What is your impression of ICTJ's involvement with gender issues and women victims in your country?

Please select ONE of the following, and please be honest—your answer is private: \_\_\_\_

- a. ICTJ has shown little interest in women and gender.
- b. ICTJ has engaged with women and gender, but it could be doing even more.
- c. ICTJ is deeply engaged with women and gender at every step of the TJ process.

Do you have any comments on ICTJ's involvement with gender issues?

#### **GENDER AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN YOUR COUNTRY**

5. Please tell us your organization's top 3 priorities for TJ in relation to women. [RANDOMIZE]

Even though all may be important, please indicate only your top 3 answers: \_\_\_\_\_

- a. Reparations are given to women victims of human rights abuse
- b. Women participate in TJ processes.
- c. Perpetrators of human rights abuse against women are punished.
- d. The public knows the truth about abuse against women.
- e. Laws are changed to better protect women from human rights abuse.
- f. The government (and/or non-state actors) takes steps to reform the police, judiciary, and/or military.
- g. The government (and/or non-state actors) acknowledges its responsibility for abuse against women.
- h. Another priority: \_\_\_\_\_.

6. How well do current TJ initiatives address women victims' NEEDS in your country?

Please select ONE of the following: \_\_\_\_

- a. Not at all
- b. Poor
- c. Average
- d. Well
- e. Very well

7. How well do you think that local and national policymakers working on TJ understand women victims' needs in your country? Please think about direct interactions and communications you have had with policymakers over the past three years.

- a. Not at all
- b. Poor
- c. Average
- d. Well
- e. Very well
- f. I don't know

Follow up: Have you seen any changes in policymakers' attitudes toward and understanding of women victims needs over the last three years?

\_\_\_\_\_

Has **ICTJ** played a role in shaping policymaker's attitudes and understanding on these issues?

\_\_\_\_\_

What would have happened had **ICTJ** not been active on these issues?

\_\_\_\_\_

8. To what degree have TJ initiatives had an IMPACT on the lives of women in your country? That is, to what degree have women's lives changed as a result of TJ initiatives?

Please select ONE of the following: \_\_\_\_\_

- a. Not at all
- b. A little bit
- c. Somewhat
- d. A lot
- e. Completely

Can you please give examples of impact, if there have been any? \_\_\_\_\_

**YOUR ORGANIZATION'S WORK ON GENDER AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE**

9. How many times have officials from TJ initiatives consulted your organization in the last 3 years (since November 2012)? Consultations could include meetings in which you offer input, or requests for written feedback on draft statutes, laws, etc.

Please select ONE of the following: \_\_\_\_\_

- a. Never in the last 3 years
- b. 1-2 times in the last 3 years
- c. 3 or more times in the last 3 years
- d. I'm not sure

Was your input ever taken up by official from TJ initiatives? If so, could you please give us the most important example of the way your input was used?

\_\_\_\_\_

Did ICTJ play any role in facilitating contact between your organization and TJ initiatives? \_\_\_\_\_

What would have happened without ICTJ support?

\_\_\_\_\_

10. Has your organization developed a strategy to engage with TJ initiatives in your country?

Please select ONE of the following: \_\_\_\_\_

- a. Yes: We have a formal, written strategy.
- b. Somewhat: We may engage with TJ initiatives on an ad hoc basis.
- c. No: We do not have a strategy at this time.
- d. I'm not sure

If you do have a strategy, could you briefly describe it? \_\_\_\_\_

Did ICTJ play any supporting role in developing the strategy? \_\_\_\_\_

What would have happened without ICTJ support? \_\_\_\_\_

11. Is your organization actively following or monitoring any TJ initiatives—for example, closely tracking the actions of a truth commission or of government officials in charge of developing a TJ policy?

Please select ONE of the following: \_\_\_\_

- a. Yes: We are consistently monitoring/following TJ initiatives.
- b. Somewhat: We follow them once in a while.
- c. No: We are not following them right now.
- d. I'm not sure

If you are monitoring TJ initiatives, could you briefly describe what monitoring is being done?

\_\_\_\_\_

Did ICTJ play any supporting role in developing the monitoring plan? \_\_\_\_\_

What would have happened without ICTJ support? \_\_\_\_\_

**ABOUT YOUR ORGANIZATION**

12. Which choice below best describes your organization?

Please select ONE of the following: \_\_\_\_

- a. My organization represents women victims of human rights abuse.
- b. My organization works on women's issues in general
- c. Other: \_\_\_\_\_

13. If your organization does represent women victims, how many victims does it represent? Please feel free to give an estimate, but try to be as accurate as possible:

\_\_\_\_\_

14. Which choice best describes your role at the organization?

Please select ONE of the following: \_\_\_\_

- a. Executive (manager, decision-maker)
- b. Mid-level (runs programs and activities)
- c. Junior (provides support to others)
- d. Other: \_\_\_\_\_

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME.**

**DO YOU HAVE ANY FINAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE EVOLUTION OF GENDER AND TJ IN YOUR COUNTRY OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS?**



## Annex 12b: Women's organizations survey (French)

Nous vous prions de bien vouloir nous aider dans une évaluation du programme Justice de Genre au Centre international pour la justice transitionnelle (ICTJ), qui a été financé par les fonds d'affectation spéciale des Nations Unies pour l'élimination de la violence à l'égard des femmes (UNTF) au cours des trois dernières années.

Nous vous soumettons à cet exercice parce que vous avez participé à quelques activités et engagements sur les femmes et le genre organisés par l'ICTJ. Le formulaire d'enquête comporte 13 questions qui recueillent les renseignements sur:

- Les perceptions sur la justice transitionnelle (JT) dans votre pays
- Les perceptions sur l'ICTJ et d'autres parties prenantes qui travaillent sur la JT
- Les stratégies et les activités de votre organisation en relation avec la JT au cours des trois dernières années

Dr. Paige Arthur, une consultante indépendante travaillant avec *Public Action Research*, mène l'évaluation. Pour toute question, veuillez contacter Mme. Arthur à parthur@publicationresearch.com.

Les réponses fournies dans le cadre de cette enquête demeureront confidentielles. Veuillez répondre aux questions le plus franchement et le plus honnêtement possible.

Nous souhaitons interroger des personnes qui occupent un poste de niveau moyen ou supérieur au sein d'organisations de défense des femmes ou de regroupements de femmes victimes. Votre participation à cette enquête est très importante, et nous vous remercions par avance du temps que vous y accorderez. Ce questionnaire prend environ 10 minutes à remplir.

**Veuillez renvoyer le formulaire d'enquête remplie au plus tard le mercredi 25 novembre à Dr. Arthur à parthur@publicationresearch.com.**

### La justice transitionnelle et le genre

1. Combien de fois avez-vous participé au cours des **trois dernières années** à un atelier, à une classe ou à une formation sur les femmes/le genre et la JT? \_\_\_\_\_

- Jamais au cours des trois dernières années
- 1 à 2 fois au cours des trois dernières années
- 3 fois ou plus au cours des trois dernières années

Si vous avez participé à un atelier/une formation etc., veuillez-nous dire en quelle année a-t-il eu lieu et qui l'a organisé?

Nom du groupe qui a organisé l'atelier/la formation, etc.	L'année

2. Que pensez-vous de la façon dont l'ICTJ, dans votre pays, traite les questions de genre et s'engage auprès des femmes victimes? \_\_\_\_\_

- a) L'intérêt de l'ICTJ pour les femmes et les questions de genre est faible, voire nul.
- b) L'ICTJ s'est engagé, tant auprès des femmes que sur les questions de genre, mais pourrait en faire encore davantage.
- c) L'ICTJ démontre, à chaque étape du processus de JT, son engagement profond auprès des femmes et sur les questions de genre.

**Suite : Avez-vous des commentaires à faire sur la façon dont l'ICTJ s'engage aux questions de genre ?**

3. Dans votre pays, quelles sont les trois principales priorités de votre organisation en matière de justice transitionnelle qui concernent les femmes ? Veuillez cocher uniquement les trois principales priorités de votre organisation, même si toutes vous semblent importantes. \_\_\_\_\_

- a) La modification de lois afin de mieux protéger les femmes contre les violations de droits de la personne.
- b) La sensibilisation du public par rapport aux crimes commis contre les femmes.
- c) La participation de femmes au processus de JT.
- d) L'offre de réparations aux femmes qui ont subi des violations de droits de la personne.
- e) La reconnaissance de la responsabilité du gouvernement (ou d'autres acteurs non étatiques) pour des violations visant des femmes.
- f) La punition des auteurs de violations de droits de la personne commises contre des femmes.
- g) Une réforme de la police, de la magistrature ou de l'armée, entreprise par le gouvernement (ou par d'autres acteurs non étatiques).
- h) Autre priorité (veuillez préciser) : \_\_\_\_\_

4. Dans quelle mesure les initiatives de JT qui ont actuellement cours dans votre pays répondent-elles aux BESOINS des femmes victimes ? Veuillez cocher uniquement une réponse.

1-Aucunement	2-Mal	3-Moyennement	4-Bien	5-Très bien

5. Dans quelle mesure est-ce que les responsables d'initiatives de JT comprennent les besoins des femmes victimes dans votre pays? Veuillez réfléchir aux engagements et communications directes que vous avez eues avec les responsables au cours de ces trois dernières années. Veuillez cocher uniquement une réponse.

1-Aucunement	2-Mal	3-Moyennement	4-Bien	5-Très bien

**Suite : Est-ce que vous avez observé une évolution ou un changement dans les perspectives des responsables d'initiatives de JT en ce qui concerne les besoins des femmes victimes au cours de ces trois dernières années?**

**Est-ce que l'ICTJ a joué un rôle dans cette évolution?**

**Qu'est-ce qui serait passé sans l'engagement de l'ICTJ auprès de ces responsables?**

6. Dans quelle mesure les initiatives de JT ont eu un IMPACT sur les vies des femmes victimes ? C'est à dire, dans quelle mesure ces initiatives ont changé les vies des femmes à la suite des initiatives JT? Veuillez cocher uniquement une réponse.

1-Aucunement	2-Mal	3-Moyennement	4-Bien	5-Très bien

**Suite : Veuillez donner quelques exemples de cet impact sur les vies des femmes, s'ils existent?**

7. Combien de fois votre organisation a-t-elle été consultée par des responsables d'initiatives de JT au cours des 12 derniers mois ? Ces consultations peuvent comprendre des réunions auxquelles vous auriez participé, ou encore, des demandes qui vous auraient été faites pour commenter par écrit un projet de statut ou une loi, par exemple. \_\_\_\_\_

- a) Jamais au cours des 12 derniers mois.
- b) 1-2 fois au cours des 12 derniers mois.
- c) 3 fois et plus au cours des 12 derniers mois.
- d) Je n'en suis pas certain(e).

**Suite : Est-ce que les responsables d'initiatives de JT ont utilisés vos commentaires? Le cas échéant, veuillez citer l'exemple le plus important.**

**Est-ce que l'ICTJ a joué un rôle en facilitant le contact entre votre organisation et les responsables d'initiatives de JT?**

**Qu'est-ce qui serait passé sans l'engagement de l'ICTJ auprès de ces responsables?**

8. Votre organisation a-t-elle mis au point une stratégie pour participer aux initiatives de JT qui ont cours dans votre pays ? \_\_\_\_\_

- a) Oui : nous disposons d'une stratégie officielle.
- b) Dans une certaine mesure : nous participons ponctuellement à certaines initiatives.
- c) Non : nous ne disposons actuellement d'aucune stratégie.
- d) Je n'en suis pas certain(e).

**Suite : Si vous disposez d'une stratégie, veuillez en fournir une brève description.**

**Est-ce que l'ICTJ a joué un rôle en soutenant le développement de cette stratégie?**

**Qu'est-ce qui serait passé sans l'engagement de l'ICTJ?**

9. Votre organisation suit-elle ou contrôle-t-elle activement une ou plusieurs initiatives de JT – par exemple, en surveillant de près les travaux d'une commission de vérité ou ceux de fonctionnaires chargés de mettre en œuvre une politique de JT ? \_\_\_\_\_

- a) Oui : nous assurons un suivi/contrôle régulier d'initiatives de JT.
- b) Dans une certaine mesure : nous suivons des initiatives à l'occasion.
- c) Non : nous ne suivons aucune initiative en ce moment.
- d) Je n'en suis pas certain(e).

**Suite : Le cas échéant, veuillez décrire sommairement vos activités de suivi.**

**Est-ce que l'ICTJ a joué un rôle en soutenant le développement de cette stratégie?**

**Qu'est-ce qui serait passé sans l'engagement de l'ICTJ?**

10. Veuillez réfléchir sur vos connexions et votre accès aux responsables et décideurs politiques d'initiatives de JT. Vos connexions et accès ont-ils **changé (augmenté ou diminué)** au cours de ces trois dernières années? Ou bien sont-ils restés les mêmes, de plus ou moins? Veuillez cocher uniquement une réponse par rangée:

	<b>1-Très faible:</b> nous n'avons pas d'accès	<b>2-Faible:</b> Nous avons accès rarement et toujours avec un grand effort	<b>3-Moyen:</b> Nous avons accès avec un effort	<b>3-Fort:</b> Nous pouvons avoir accès la plupart du temps, parfois avec un effort	<b>4-Très fort:</b> Nous avons accès quand nous voulons, sans difficulté
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Il y a 3 ans					
Aujourd'hui					

**Suite : Est-ce que l'ICTJ a joué un rôle en établissant les connexions ou en facilitant l'accès avec les responsables d'initiatives de JT?**

**Qu'est-ce qui serait passé sans l'engagement de l'ICTJ?**

11. Lequel des choix suivants décrit le mieux votre organisation ? \_\_\_\_\_

- a) Mon organisation représente les femmes victimes de violations des droits de la personne.
- b) Mon organisation travaille sur des questions générales qui concernent les femmes.
- c) Autre (veuillez préciser).

12. Combien de femmes victimes votre groupe représente-t-il ? Au besoin, veuillez estimer leur nombre, mais avec la plus grande précision possible: \_\_\_\_\_

13. Lequel des choix suivants décrit le mieux votre rôle au sein de l'organisation ? \_\_\_\_\_

- a) Haute direction (dirige l'organisation, prend des décisions).
- b) Cadre intermédiaire (gère les programmes et les activités).
- c) Cadre subalterne (seconde les autres dans leurs fonctions).
- d) Autre (veuillez préciser).

14. Nous vous remercions d'avoir pris le temps de participer à cette enquête. Si vous souhaitez formuler quelques derniers commentaires sur la meilleure façon d'utiliser la justice transitionnelle pour répondre aux besoins des femmes, veuillez le faire ci-dessous. Pour toute question complémentaire, veuillez contacter Dr Paige Arthur à l'adresse parthur@publicationresearch.com

**Quelques derniers commentaires ou suggestions ?**

## Annex 13: Women's organizations interview guide

### GENDER APPROACH TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

This interview is part of an effort to evaluate the work of the Gender Justice program at the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), which has been funded by the UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women (UNTF) over the last three years. The program will use the evaluation to improve its programs that support and empower women victims in their pursuit of justice.

Ms. Paige Arthur, an independent consultant with Public Action Research, is conducting the evaluation.

**Ms. Arthur will keep your responses confidential. Your honest feedback is important to us. Please try to be as frank as possible. Your name will be included with your permission at the end of the report, but there will be no way to identify your views in the report itself. Your views will remain anonymous.**

I would like to record the interview, solely for my own purposes. **Do I have your permission?** The recording will not be shared with anyone else.

Interview will last roughly one hour, and will generate data on:

- Women's groups' strategic engagement in ongoing TJ processes
- Women's groups practical strategies to advocate for women victims' needs
- Level of interaction/collaboration with policymakers working on TJ initiatives
- Perceptions of whether or not TJ initiatives' address women victims' needs and impact on women's lives
- Perceptions of policymakers' awareness and understanding of women victims' needs
- Perceptions of change in women's groups capacity to engage and influence
- Perceptions of change in other policymakers' attitudes
- ICTJ's effectiveness in all of the above
- Relevance of ICTJ's programming
- Sustainability of CSO-led initiatives without ICTJ support

### GENDER AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

1. In the past three years (since November 2012), how many times have you participated in a workshop, class, or training about WOMEN/GENDER and transitional justice?

- a. Never in the last 3 years
- b. 1-2 times in the last 3 years
- c. 3 or more times in the last 3 years

d. I'm not sure

If you did participate in one or more workshops, can you please tell us who organized them and what year they took place?

2. What is your impression of ICTJ's involvement with gender issues and women victims in your country?

Please select ONE of the following, and please be honest—your answer is private:

- a. ICTJ has shown little interest in women and gender.
- b. ICTJ has engaged with women and gender, but it could be doing even more.
- c. ICTJ is deeply engaged with women and gender at every step of the TJ process.

Comments?

3. How well do current TJ initiatives address women victims' NEEDS in your country?

Please select ONE of the following:

- a. Not at all
- b. Poor
- c. Average
- d. Well
- e. Very well

4. How well do you think that local and national policymakers working on TJ understand women victims' needs in your country? Please think about direct interactions and communications you have had with policymakers over the past three years.

- a. Not at all
- b. Poor
- c. Average
- d. Well
- e. Very well
- f. I don't know

Follow up: Have you seen any **changes** in policymakers' attitudes toward and understanding of women victims needs over the last three years?

\_\_\_\_\_

Has **ICTJ** played a role in shaping policymaker's attitudes and understanding on these issues?

\_\_\_\_\_

What would have happened had **ICTJ** not been active on these issues?

\_\_\_\_\_

5. To what degree have TJ initiatives had an **IMPACT** on the lives of women in your country? That is, to what degree have women's lives changed as a result of TJ initiatives?

Please select **ONE** of the following: \_\_\_\_\_

- a. Not at all
- b. A little bit
- c. Somewhat
- d. A lot
- e. Completely

Can you please give examples of impact, if there have been any? \_\_\_\_\_

#### **YOUR ORGANIZATION'S WORK ON GENDER AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE**

6. How many times have officials from TJ initiatives consulted your organization in the last 3 years (since November 2012)? Consultations could include meetings in which you offer input, or requests for written feedback on draft statutes, laws, etc.

Please select **ONE** of the following: \_\_\_\_\_

- a. Never in the last 3 years
- b. 1-2 times in the last 3 years
- c. 3 or more times in the last 3 years
- d. I'm not sure

Was your input ever taken up by official from TJ initiatives? If so, could you please give us the most important example of the way your input was used?

\_\_\_\_\_

Did **ICTJ** play any role in facilitating contact between your organization and TJ initiatives? \_\_\_\_\_



What would have happened without ICTJ support?

\_\_\_\_\_

7. Has your organization developed a strategy to engage with TJ initiatives in your country?

Please select ONE of the following: \_\_\_\_\_

- a. Yes: We have a formal, written strategy.
- b. Somewhat: We may engage with TJ initiatives on an ad hoc basis.
- c. No: We do not have a strategy at this time.
- d. I'm not sure

Follow up: If you do have a strategy, could you briefly describe it?

Did **ICTJ** play any supporting role in developing the strategy?

What would have happened without ICTJ support?

Will you need ICTJ's support to continue executing or developing the strategy, or are you taking it forward on your own?

COULD I PLEASE HAVE A COPY OF THE STRATEGY DOCUMENT?

8. Is your organization actively following or monitoring any TJ initiatives—for example, closely tracking the actions of a truth commission or of government officials in charge of developing a TJ policy?

Please select ONE of the following: \_\_\_\_\_

- a. Yes: We are consistently monitoring/following TJ initiatives.
- b. Somewhat: We follow them once in a while.
- c. No: We are not following them right now.
- d. I'm not sure

Follow up: If you are monitoring TJ initiatives, could you briefly describe what monitoring is being done?

Did **ICTJ** play any supporting role in developing the monitoring plan?

What would have happened without ICTJ support?

Will you need ICTJ's support to continue executing or developing the monitoring plan, or are you taking it forward on your own?

9. In your opinion, what has been the **most significant result** of ICTJ's work on gender and TJ in your country? Have you **directly observed** changes in policies,

behaviors, or attitudes that you could share?

10. Is there anything you wish ICTJ had done differently? Is there a way it could have had a greater impact on women's groups or on policymakers working on TJ over the past three years?

**ABOUT YOUR ORGANIZATION**

11. Which choice below best describes your organization?

Please select ONE of the following: \_\_\_\_\_

- a. My organization represents women victims of human rights abuse.
- b. My organization works on women's issues in general
- c. Other: \_\_\_\_\_

12. If your organization does represent women victims, how many victims does it represent? Please feel free to give an estimate, but try to be as accurate as possible:

\_\_\_\_\_

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME.**

**DO YOU HAVE ANY FINAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE EVOLUTION OF GENDER AND TJ IN YOUR COUNTRY OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS?**

## Annex 14a: Policymaker Interview Guide (English)

### GUIDELINES

Introduce myself as an independent consultant. Stress that I am not an ICTJ staff member, but have been hired by ICTJ to do an independent assessment. Tell the policymaker about the baseline study, framing it in terms of a general interest in transitional justice.

**Tell them that the interview is confidential. Their name will be included in a list of interviewees at the end of the report, with their permission, but nothing they say will be attributed to them in the report.** No one will see recordings/notes of my interview except for me.

**Ask if I can record the interview.** Mention that recording insures that I have an exact record of what they say, and also ensures that I can really listen to them, instead of taking notes.

Interview will last roughly 30-40 minutes, and will generate data on:

- Policymakers' perceptions of TJ and gender-based violence (GBV) issues and women victims' needs
- Concrete steps that TJ initiatives have taken to address those needs
- TJ institutions' operational plans to facilitate participation of women victims
- Policymakers' current engagement with women's groups
- Perceptions of change in women's groups capacity to engage and influence
- Perceptions of change in other policymakers' attitudes
- ICTJ's effectiveness

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### Gender and TJ

1. In TJ, people often talk about the important of TJ institutions engaging with civil society—that is, the idea that both the state and civil society need to work together for TJ to be successful. Does this idea resonate with you? And if so, how has women's civil society—women's organizations—played a role in your TJ process?
  - a. What has influenced your thinking on the role of women's groups in TJ processes? Your own reflections? Interactions with colleagues? Direct experiences with women victims? Other?
  - b. Have you seen an evolution in your own approach?

2. In terms of statement taking, testimony, public hearings, design of reparations programs, etc., do women victims have any special needs—needs that are different from male victims?
  - If so, what are some of those needs?
  - Are there any procedures in place to treat the special needs of women victims?
3. More specifically, does your TJ institution have a formalized, written strategy in place to engage with women and women’s organizations, to try to include them in the TJ process? If yes, what is that strategy? Please tell me some of the concrete steps that the institution has taken.
  - a. Has ICTJ’s gender staff [INSERT RELEVANT NAMES HERE] played a supporting role here? If so, in what way?
  - b. What would have happened on these issues had ICTJ not offered support?
4. Have you observed any changes in other policymaker’s attitudes toward women’s victims and their awareness of women victims’ needs?
  - Has ICTJ’s gender staff played a role in sensitizing other policymakers you know? Describe?
  - What would have happened had ICTJ not engaged these policymakers on the issue of gender and women victims?
5. Who are the women’s groups in your country that you have engaged with the most? What are their names?
  - Can you list examples of direct consultations with women’s victims groups?
  - Has ICTJ’s gender staff played a role in facilitating this kind of contact? How? Examples?
6. Have you observed any changes in the capacity of these organizations to engage with you and other policymakers?
  - Has ICTJ’s gender staff played a role in building the capacity of women’s groups that you know? How? Examples?
  - What would have happened had ICTJ not offered support to these women’s groups?
7. How many women victims have actually participated in your TJ institution so far—i.e., giving dossiers (Tunisia), making complaints (Kenya)
  - Do the current numbers match your expectations for women’s participation? If you find the numbers to be low, are there additional steps you are taking to improve their participation at this point?
8. In your opinion, what has been the **most significant result** of ICTJ’s work on gender and TJ in your country? Have you **directly observed** changes in policies, behaviors, or attitudes that you could share?
9. Is there anything you wish ICTJ had done differently? Is there a way it could have had a greater impact on women’s groups or on policymakers working on TJ?

### Demographic information

1. What is your title and the exact name of your institution/agency/organization?
2. What were you doing before you became involved with TJ?

## Annex 14b: Policymaker Interview Guide (French)\*

### \*For members of the Truth and Dignity Commission (Instance de Vérité et Dignité or IVD in French)

#### Directives

Je me présente en tant que consultant(e) indépendant(e). J'insiste sur le fait que je ne fais pas partie du personnel de l'ICTJ, mais que le Centre m'a confié la réalisation d'une évaluation indépendante. Je fournis au décideur des informations sur l'enquête de référence, en décrivant mon intérêt général pour la justice transitionnelle. Je ne fais pas mention de genre ou de femmes.

Je souligne le **caractère confidentiel de l'entretien**. Le nom de la personne interrogée apparaîtra dans la liste des répondants à la fin du rapport, mais ses propos demeureront anonymes. Personne, à part moi et le consultant principal, n'aura accès aux enregistrements et aux notes de l'entretien.

Je demande à la répondante ou au répondant la **permission d'enregistrer l'entretien**. Je lui explique qu'en plus d'aider à la retranscription fidèle de ses réponses, l'enregistrement, en évitant la prise de notes, me permet de lui accorder toute mon attention.

L'entretien, d'environ 20 à 30 minutes, permettra de recueillir des données sur :

- La perception qu'ont les décideurs des enjeux relatifs à la JT et à la violence basée sur le genre (VBG) ;
- Les plans des institutions de JT pour faciliter la participation des femmes victimes ;
- La perception qu'ont les décideurs des besoins des femmes victimes ;
- La participation actuelle des décideurs à des initiatives de JT menées par des groupes de femmes victimes.

1. Veuillez décrire les origines de la Commission Femmes (ou le bureau régional), et comment interagit-elle/il avec les autres unités dans l'Instance?
  - a. Est-ce que l'ICTJ a joué un rôle en facilitant ce contact?
  - b. [A l'égard de la Commission Femmes] Est-ce qu'il y a d'autres organisations qui ont joué un rôle dans la création de la Commission Femmes?
  - c. Qu'est-ce qui serait passé sans l'engagement de l'ICTJ auprès de ces responsables?
2. A-t-on mis en œuvre une **stratégie de communication** formelle (écrite) axée sur les femmes victimes, afin qu'elles connaissent votre institution et y participent? Si oui, quelle est cette stratégie ? Qui s'occupe de la stratégie dans votre institution? Quels sont les efforts supplémentaires déployés pour assurer la participation de femmes victimes aux initiatives de JT ?
3. Combien d'événements ou activités avaient été mis en œuvre avec le but d'assurer la participation des **femmes victimes** au cours des **12 derniers mois**? Est-ce que vous pourriez décrire un exemple?
4. Tournant vers les **organisations féminines** : qui sont les organisations féminines avec lesquelles vous avez eu le plus grand contact au cours des 12 derniers mois?
  - a. Est-ce que l'ICTJ a joué un rôle en mettant ces groupes en contact avec l'Instance?

- b. Est-ce qu'il y a d'autres organisations qui ont joué un rôle en mettant ces groupes en contact avec l'Instance?
  - c. Qu'est-ce qui serait passé sans l'engagement de l'ICTJ auprès de ces responsables?
5. Est-ce que vous avez observé des changements dans la capacité de ces organisations de s'engager auprès de l'Instance au cours de ces dernier 12 mois?
- a. Est-ce que l'ICTJ a joué un rôle dans cette évolution—c-à-d dans le renforcement de capacité des organisations féminines?
  - b. Est-ce qu'il y a d'autres organisations qui ont joué un rôle?
  - c. Qu'est-ce qui serait passé sans l'engagement de l'ICTJ auprès de ces organisations?
6. Quel est l'attitude ou la perspective **d'autres membres de l'Instance** en matière de la JT et le genre, et sur les besoins particuliers des femmes? Est-ce que vous avez observé un changement au cours des ces dernières 12-18 mois?
- a. Est-ce que l'ICTJ a joué un rôle dans cette évolution—c-à-d dans la sensibilisation des membres de l'Instance?
  - b. Qu'est-ce qui serait passé sans l'engagement de l'ICTJ auprès de ces responsables?
7. Quel est l'attitude ou la perspective **dans les bureaux régionales** en matière de la JT et le genre, et sur les besoins particuliers des femmes? Est-ce que vous avez observé un changement au cours des ces dernières 12-18 mois?
- a. Est-ce que l'ICTJ a joué un rôle dans cette évolution—c-à-d dans la sensibilisation des bureaux?
  - b. Qu'est-ce qui serait passé sans l'engagement de l'ICTJ auprès de ces responsables?
8. Combien de femmes victimes ont déposé des dossiers jusqu'à maintenant?
9. Dans votre avis, quel est le résultat le plus important du travail de l'ICTJ en matière de la JT et le genre? Avez-vous observé directement des changements?

## Annex 15: Evaluator CV (Paige Arthur)

### EXPERIENCE

#### Principal

#### Public Action Research LLC, Brooklyn, New York      April 2011-present

Founded a consultancy firm that crafts user-focused research and brings rigor and evidence to bear on the “soft” side of development: human rights, conflict prevention, governance. Consultancies include:

- **International Center for Transitional Justice, Gender Justice Program (2015):** Conducting a final evaluation of the Gender Justice program’s work funded by the UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women (follows on the baseline study completed by Public Action Research in 2013).
- **Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, US State Department (2013-15):** Leading a global study, including field research in five countries (Guatemala, Uganda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Morocco), on international donor assistance to transitional justice measures for a public toolkit on the role of civil society in transitional justice measures; includes outreach to bilateral and multilateral donors to promote more effective and sustainable funding practices.
- **Shift (2014-15):** Developed guidance on impact evaluation for a young organization focused on promoting the uptake of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights among corporations, governments, and civil society groups.
- **International Development Research Centre (2014-15):** Member of a three-person panel that conducted an external review of IDRC’s funding for research in the area of Governance, Security, and Justice over the past five years (more than \$43 million CAD). Assessed the quality, relevance, and significance of outcomes of the funded research projects.
- **Ford Foundation (2013-14):** Developed a research-based strategy and an evaluation framework for Ford’s investments to strengthen the global human rights movement; worked with the Ford team to bring a monitoring and evaluation approach to its current round of funding to grantees.
- **Counterterrorism and Humanitarian Engagement Project, Harvard Law School (2014):** Team leader for a mid-term evaluation of a program that seeks to create a forum for large-scale humanitarian actors to compare experiences on operating in contexts where there are “listed” entities.
- **UN Women (2013):** Created and tested the methodology for the UN’s global indicators on the participation of women and girls in justice initiatives, in order to assess the ongoing implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325.
- **International Center for Transitional Justice, Gender Justice Program (2012-13):** Team leader of a baseline study for ICTJ’s Gender Justice program, funded by the UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women. Designed and implemented data collection strategy to measure progress of ICTJ’s gender-sensitive approach to TJ in six countries (Tunisia, Côte d’Ivoire, Colombia, Uganda, Kenya, and Nepal). Managed one consultant in Côte d’Ivoire and conducted fieldwork in Tunisia.
- **UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (2012):** Designed and carried out a meta-evaluation of research produced by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees from 2010-11, using the criteria of utility, quality, and credibility, and following UN Evaluation Group standards.
- **UN Department of Political Affairs (2012):** Created evaluation guidelines for a UN agency. Conducted an evaluation of one of the department’s flagship programs, its Rapid Response funding mechanism, which allows it to respond effectively to emerging crises.
- **International IDEA (2011):** Created a feasibility study for an annual flagship publication on recent democratic developments and innovations. Conducted a needs assessment among IDEA’s target audience of international policymakers, using a survey, focus groups, and one-on-one interviews.

#### Deputy Director, Institutional Development

#### International Center for Transitional Justice, New York, NY      October 2009–March 2011

- Founding head of ICTJ’s Institutional Learning unit (April 2010). Led two major organizational change efforts: introduced design, monitoring, and evaluation (DM&E) practices to ICTJ, and created a framework (including technology) for knowledge exchange and learning.

- A January 2011 evaluation, which relied on interviews, a survey, and document review, showed that the unit's work had: 1) shifted staff attitudes about DM&E, so that it is seen as a positive means of improving results; 2) developed staff members' design skills; 3) increased demand for assistance with DM&E issues; and 4) increased (dramatically, in this case) interest in having one's own program evaluated.
- Worked with senior management to draft and adopt top-level policies that outline 1) strategic criteria for creating new programs; 2) an established, transparent process for program design; and 3) institution-wide guidance on evaluation on par with other major international NGOs.
- Trained more than 80 staff members in the United States, Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East in principles of good program design and fundamentals of program evaluation management. Developed in-person trainings on design and introduced (for the first time) live, web-based training on evaluation.
- Created an organization-wide knowledge management strategy. Led the first phase of the development of a Drupal-based intranet, including the creation of an information architecture, development of a prototype, content aggregation, and setting a plan for launch. Introduced an internal knowledge sharing competition, which offered funds for exchanges between ICTJ offices in different countries.
- Managed a team of staff and consultants. Responsible for unit budget, all contracts, and reporting to donors.

### **Deputy Director, Research Unit**

#### **International Center for Transitional Justice, New York, NY April 2006–October 2009**

- Assisted the Director in the management and execution of the ICTJ's research program. The mission of the Research Unit is to help build the field of transitional justice and inform ICTJ's programmatic work. Major research projects included examining the relationship between transitional justice and DDR, socioeconomic development, peacebuilding, ethnic conflict, and displaced persons.
- Led an assessment of the state of the field of transitional justice as part of ICTJ's 3-year strategic planning process. Convened focus groups and interviewed 20 thought leaders from around the world.
- Directed a major multi-year research project on transitional justice and ethnic conflict. Brought together an international team of 14 academics and practitioners, resulting in, among other things, an edited volume published by Cambridge University Press. Collaborated with the UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide to develop applications for the research outside of ICTJ.
- Responsible for the unit's budget and for reporting on key Research Unit grants.
- Published a pioneering essay in 2009 on the origins of the field of transitional justice during the "third wave" of democratization, which is already being cited in the transitional justice literature.
- Improved the internal and external visibility of the Research Unit. Convened 15 internal seminars on cutting-edge research; created new publication formats to make research more accessible; and developed new content for ICTJ's web site, which included making all of ICTJ's research available online.

### **Senior Program Officer, Ethics in a Violent World: What Can Institutions Do?**

#### **Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, New York, NY October 2005–March 2006**

- Led the development of a new program, including managing a small team, for a public affairs organization whose audience is a cross-section of UN diplomats, journalists, academics, and NGO staff.
- Published policy briefs and background papers aimed at policymakers that demonstrated how principles of justice are important in understanding and making judgments about policy choices.

### **Deputy Editor (also Managing Editor, Reviews Editor, Assistant Editor), *Ethics & International Affairs***



**Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, New York, NY      September 2000–March 2006**

- Increasing editorial and managerial responsibility for a journal whose goal is to demonstrate the importance of ethics to real-world problems, with a focus on development, democratic governance, and security issues.
- As deputy and managing editor (2003–2006), commissioned original articles and reviews. Oversaw staff and freelancers. Managed all operations, including production, publication schedule, marketing, and budget.

**REPRESENTATIVE PUBLICATIONS****Books**

*Missed Connections: Transitional Justice, International Assistance, and Civil Society* (co-editor) (forthcoming Cambridge University Press, 2016).

*Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional Justice in Divided Societies* (editor) (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

**Articles**

“Notes from the Field: Global Indicators for Transitional Justice and Challenges in Measurement for Policy Actors,” *Transitional Justice Review* (forthcoming January 2016).

“Indigenous Self-Determination and Political Rights: Practical Recommendations for Truth Commissions” in *Strengthening Indigenous Rights through Truth Commissions: A Practitioner’s Resource* (ICTJ, 2012); reprinted in Chief Wilton Littlechild and Elsa Stamatopoulou, *Indigenous Peoples’ Access to Justice* (ISHR, 2014).

“‘Fear of the Future, Lived through the Past’: Pursuing Transitional Justice in the Wake of Ethnic Conflict,” in *Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional Justice in Divided Societies* (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

“Identities in Transition: Developing Better Transitional Justice Initiatives in Divided Societies” (ICTJ, 2009).

“How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (2009): 321–67; translated and reprinted in Spanish and Portuguese.

**REPRESENTATIVE PAPERS GIVEN (INVITED SPEAKER)**

“The Impact of International Assistance to TJ on Civil Society Networks,” at Operationalizing Reconciliation for Research and Practice: An Inter-Disciplinary Workshop for Researchers, Policy Makers and Practitioners, United States Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C., September 2015.

“Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination,” at OHCHR Expert Seminar on Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples, New York, NY, February 2013.

“Indigenous Self-Determination and Political Rights: Practical Recommendations for Truth Commissions,” at ICTJ Strengthening Indigenous Rights through Truth Commissions workshop, July 2011.

“Identities in Transition: Developing Better Transitional Justice Initiatives in Divided Societies,” seminar for the Office of the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, New York, NY, July 2010.

“The View from Inside: Leading an Agency’s First Initiative to Integrate Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E),” at American Evaluation Association Conference, Orlando, Florida, November 2009.

- “Identity and Reconciliation: Challenges for Transitional Justice in Divided Societies,” at Learning from Comparing Conflicts and Reconciliation Processes Conference, hosted by the PRIO Cyprus Center, Nicosia, Cyprus, June 2009.
- “Reconciliation: An International Perspective,” at Breaking the Silence: International Conference on the Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission, hosted by the University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada, September 2008.
- “Justice, Anti-Discrimination, and the Rule of Law,” at High-Level Seminar on Minority Rights and Conflict Prevention, hosted by Minority Rights Group, New York, NY, November 2006.

### REPRESENTATIVE WORKSHOPS AND TRAININGS GIVEN

- “Project Design and Evaluation” (5-hour training given), Alliance for Historical Dialogue and Accountability, Columbia University, New York, NY, Nov/Dec 2015.
- “Project Design and Evaluation” (6-hour training given), Alliance for Historical Dialogue and Accountability, Columbia University, New York, NY, Sep. 2012.
- “Introduction to Project Design” (12-hour training given), internal seminar, Bali, Indonesia, November 2009.
- “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding” (9-hour workshop given with co-facilitators), ICTJ internal seminar, New York, NY, August–September, 2009.
- “Transitional Justice: An Overview” (6-hour workshop given), ICTJ Cape Town Fellowship Course, Cape Town, South Africa, November 2008.
- “Transitional Justice Workshop” (14-hour workshop given with co-facilitators), hosted by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Erbil, Iraq, September 2008.

### EDUCATION

#### University of California, Berkeley

Ph.D., Department of History—2004

Concentrations: contemporary European history (1945–present); decolonization of Africa/Asia; sociology

Dissertation: *Unfinished Projects: Decolonization and the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*; published by Verso Books (2010)

#### The Johns Hopkins University

B.A., International Relations—1993

### LANGUAGES

**French:** professional level in speaking and reading, proficient in writing.

**German:** proficient in reading, basic level in speaking.

**Arabic:** four years of graduate school study, including summer courses in Fez, Morocco.

## Annex 16: Evaluation Terms of Reference

### FINAL PROJECT EVALUATION:

“Securing Accountability for Gender-based Violence through Transitional Justice”

### TERMS OF REFERENCE

#### 1. Background and Context

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The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) seeks the services of a Consultant to conduct a final evaluation of a multi-country project called, “Securing Accountability for Gender-based Violence through Transitional Justice.”

ICTJ works to redress and prevent the most severe violations of human rights by confronting legacies of mass abuse. It seeks holistic solutions to promote accountability and create just and peaceful societies emerging from repressive rule or armed conflict, as well as in other societies where legacies of abuse remain unresolved.

To fulfill that mission, ICTJ links experience from its many field programs with its research in TJ. This allows ICTJ to develop, test and refine field practices and remain a research leader. Committed to the vindication of victims’ rights and the promotion of gender justice, ICTJ provides expert technical advice, policy analysis, and comparative research on transitional justice approaches, including criminal prosecutions, reparations initiatives, truth seeking and memory, and institutional reform to governments, civil society and other stakeholders working on behalf of victims.

The project timeframe is from November 1, 2012 through October 31, 2015. Its primary target beneficiaries are women’s victims groups (women/girls survivors of violence) and its secondary targeted beneficiaries are civil society organizations (CSOs), community-based groups, government officials (i.e. decision-makers and policy implementers) and other transitional justice practitioners.

The overall goal of this project is to ensure that transitional justice (TJ) mechanisms in Tunisia, Nepal, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya and Uganda are designed and implemented in ways that provide redress for victims of gender-based violence and contribute to the prevention of recurrence of gender-based violations.

In order to reach that goal, the project will achieve three main outcomes:

1. Women victims groups in target countries strategically engage in ongoing transitional justice processes;
2. Policymakers take concrete steps to make TJ policies gender-sensitive and to ensure they address women victims' specific justice needs; and
3. Participating women’s groups, policymakers and program staff have enhanced and up-to-date comparative knowledge on strategies on how TJ measures can better address gender-based human rights abuses.

The first outcome focuses on empowering women’s groups to actively participate in TJ processes. This goes beyond ensuring they are consulted in the development of TJ policies, to include their capacity to raise awareness of women victims’ challenges and needs, and to articulate and effectively advocate for their own recommendations. The project approach to support this change is to:

1. Equip women’s groups with general knowledge in TJ and specific knowledge on gender justice issues, including around relevant TJ mechanisms;

2. Help women's groups identify practical strategies to advocate for their constituency specific needs, formulate and submit recommendations and plan other forms of engagement with TJ processes; and
3. Facilitate initial collaboration between policymakers and women's groups on TJ policy design.

Secondly, the work with policymakers and TJ practitioners is critical not only to provide them with the technical tools and analysis to take into account the needs of women and create gender-responsive TJ measures, but also to change their attitudes towards the participation of women's groups in the design of TJ policies. The project seeks to expose policymakers and TJ practitioners to the realities of gender-based violence and the importance of addressing its consequences so that they prioritize the incorporation of gender justice principles in TJ mechanisms.

Finally, the project aims at ensuring that actors in each of these TJ contexts can learn from each other's experiences and develop shared strategies for advancing the ability of the TJ field to address gender-based violence and enhance women's participation in TJ measures. This will be done through informal exchanges and the sharing of case studies.

The strategy adopted to achieve the above outcomes was to conduct training workshops to build the capacity of relevant policymakers, TJ practitioners and women's groups.

The total resources allocated for the 3-year project was \$1,371,004, of which the UNTF contributed \$966,496.00 and ICTJ contributed \$404,508.00.

While the project has no co-implementing partners, ICTJ worked with numerous institutions and organizations. They include:

1. In Colombia: The Special Administrative Unit for Attention and Comprehensive Reparations to Victims; the Direccion Nacional de Analisis y Contexto; Casa de la Mujer; Corporacion Mujer Sigue mis Pasos; and UN Women
2. In Cote d'Ivoire: The Commission de Dialogue, Vérité et Réconciliation (CDVR); CDVR Sub-Commission on Gender ; the Cellule Speciale d'Enquete (CSE); Le Groupe d'Initiative des Femmes Pour la Justice Transitionnelle (GIFTJ), Femmes Debout pour le Progrès en Côte d'Ivoire
3. In Kenya: The Implementation Mechanism to the KTJRC recommendations; Ministry of Justice, Truth Be Told Network, Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), Mt. Kenya Human Rights Network, Internal Displaced Persons Network, Civil Society Organizations Network, and Centre of Violence Against Women (COVAW); Grace Agenda; National Police Service Commission; Gender-Based Violence Working Group (GBV WG); Police Reform Working Group (PR WG); the National Victims and Survivors Network (NVSN); and the Administration Police Service
4. In Nepal: National policymakers in the Constituent Assembly, Nepali Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MOPR), National Women's Commission, SAATHI
5. In Tunisia: Ministry on Human Rights and TJ, the Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC); the Women's Committee of the TDC (WC); Justice & Rehabilitation; Tounissiet; Tunisian Women; Tunisian Association for Development Law; Development Without Borders association; Women Challenging the Bars; The Tunisian Association for the Unemployed; Tarahom; Women & progress association; Nisaa Assilet; Association for the Promotion of the Arab Woman; Association Tunissienne des Femmes Démocrates
6. In Uganda: Justice and Reconciliation Project; Women's Advocacy Network; Greater North Women's Peace Network and Women's Peace Initiatives in Lira/Kitgum; Uganda Human Rights Commission; and the Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS).

## **2. Purpose of the Evaluation**

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The final evaluation meets the mandatory requirements of the UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women and ICTJ's need to understand the project's effectiveness. Results, lessons, and recommendations derived from the evaluation will inform future programming for both organizations.

The final evaluation will also include an endline evaluation that will enable a comparison of data with our baseline study, conducted at the start of the project.

ICTJ requires that programs develop "Management Evaluation Responses" that summarize and reflect on the findings of projects, and develop operational plans to respond to recommendations and address weaknesses that have been identified.

### **3. Evaluation Objectives and Scope**

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The evaluation will examine the entire project (November 1, 2012 to October 31, 2015) and cover the following target groups in Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nepal, Tunisia, and Uganda.

1. Women victims groups (Primary)
2. CSOs (Secondary)
3. Government officials and state institutions (decision-makers and policy implementers) (Secondary); and
4. Other TJ practitioners (Secondary)

In general, the evaluation's overall objectives are to:

1. Evaluate the entire project in terms of effectiveness, relevance, efficiency, sustainability and impact, with a strong focus on assessing the results at the outcome and project goal levels; and
2. Generate key lessons and identify promising practices for learning.

The endline study, which is a crucial component of the final evaluation will, specifically, provide terminal comparison data for key program indicators. An appraisal of difference between baseline and endline results will be the basis for determining the extent to which project objectives and desired changes had been achieved. The following data points will be investigated:

1. Level of TJ knowledge/capacity among women victims groups
2. Purpose and activities of women victims groups
3. Women victims groups' strategies toward and monitoring of TJ institutions
4. Women victims groups' priorities for TJ and for gender justice
5. Policymakers' awareness of and attitudes toward women victims' needs
6. A qualitative assessment of TJ institutions' current level of addressing GBV (i.e., whether that level is satisfactory)
7. A qualitative assessment of policymakers' awareness of and attitudes toward the needs of women victims

For practical reasons, the endline study will rely on data collected in two of the six target countries and additional data will be collected in the four other countries through phone/online technologies. Given the limited budget, this methodology was used for the baseline study and proved to be successful. However, as noted in our approved modifications at the end of year 2, the two countries selected for the endline fieldwork are Tunisia and Kenya. The baseline study had focused on what

had seemed to be the most active TJ countries at the start of the project – Cote d’Ivoire and Tunisia; however, as noted in all of our reports, the truth commission and special chambers in Cote d’Ivoire proved to lack credibility and transparency, and for these reasons, ICTJ chose to disengage with the processes. Over the course of the project, developments in Kenya around vetting of the police and reparations resulted in a greater investment under this grant in programming.

The external consultant will recruit and supervise a local consultant in Kenya to undertake the data collection there. The consultant will coordinate with ICTJ country office staff for the preparation work and in particular to help arranging local accommodation and meetings with stakeholders.

#### 4. Evaluation Questions

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The evaluation is expected to address the key evaluation questions below and provide recommendations for improving project relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and impact going forward.<sup>9</sup>

##### *Effectiveness:*

1. To what extent were the intended project goal, outcomes and outputs achieved and how?
2. To what extent did the project reach the targeted beneficiaries at the project goal and outcome levels? How many beneficiaries have been reached?
3. To what extent has this project generated positive changes in the lives of targeted (and untargeted) women and girls in relation to the specific forms of violence addressed by this project? Why? What are the key changes in the lives of those women and/or girls? Please describe those changes.
4. What internal and external factors contributed to the achievement and/or failure of the intended project goal, outcomes and outputs? How?
5. To what extent was the project successful in advocating for legal or policy change? If it was not successful, explain why. In case the project was successful in setting up new policies and/or laws, is the legal or policy change likely to be institutionalized and sustained?
6. To what extent was the project successful in ensuring policymakers consulted women’s groups? How is this explained?
7. To what extent was the project successful in ensuring gender considerations were incorporated in the design and implementation of TJ mechanisms? How is this explained?

##### *Relevance:*

1. To what extent was the project strategy and activities implemented relevant in responding to the needs of women and girls?
2. To what extent do achieved results (project goal, outcomes and outputs) continue to be relevant to the needs of women and girls?

##### *Efficiency:*

1. How efficiently and timely has this project been implemented and managed in accordance with the Project Document?
2. What are the internal and external factors that affected implementation and management? How were these responded to?
3. To what extent were the outputs achieved with the lowest possible use of resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, administrative costs, etc.)?

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<sup>9</sup> The following evaluation criteria correspond to the traditional practice of evaluation of development aid formalized by the OECD Guidelines for project and program evaluation.

*Sustainability:*

1. How are the achieved results, especially the positive changes generated by the project in the lives of women and girls at the project goal level, going to be sustained after this project ends?

*Impact:*

1. What are the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by the project, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended on (but not limited to) the following?
  - a. the participation of women victims groups in the TJ process;
  - b. policy actions, changes or debates

*Knowledge Generation:*

1. What are the key lessons learned that can be shared with other practitioners on Ending Violence against Women and Girls?
2. Are there promising practices? If yes, what are they and how can these promising practices be replicated in other projects and/or in other countries that have similar interventions?

## 5. Evaluation Methodology

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The final evaluation will be qualitative in design and employ a mixed-method approach. The evaluation will include at a minimum the following approaches:

- Desk review of all relevant project documents (e.g. project proposals, strategy reviews, progress and activities reports, etc.);
- Methods described in the logframe or results framework to measure key indicators; and

Alternative methods for collecting data and information on certain indicators should the ones originally contemplated prove to be unfeasible or unreasonable in light of the information, time and resources available.

Given the qualitative nature of the evaluation, sampling of informants will be purposive and will be based on the availability of project participants to engage in various types of data collection.

The evaluator will be expected to travel to at least two countries (e.g. Kenya and Tunisia) in October 2015 to conduct field work with project staff and partners. During the data collection period, the evaluator will also have access to ICTJ headquarters staff in New York City, as well as relevant project documents and other programmatic materials and resources.

## 6. Evaluation Ethics

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The evaluation must be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation' <http://www.unevaluation.org/ethicalguidelines>.

It is imperative for the evaluator(s) to:

- Guarantee the safety of respondents and the research team.
- Apply protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of respondents.

- Select and train the research team on ethical issues.
- Provide referrals to local services and sources of support for women that might ask for them.
- Ensure compliance with legal codes governing areas such as provisions to collect and report data, particularly permissions needed to interview or obtain information about children and youth.
- Store securely the collected information.

The evaluator(s) must consult with the relevant documents as appropriate prior to development and finalization of data collection methods and instruments. The key documents include (but are not limited to) the following:

- World Health Organization (2003). *Putting Women First: Ethical and Safety Recommendations for Research on Domestic Violence Against Women*. [www.who.int/gender/documents/violence/who\\_fch\\_gwh\\_01.1/en/index.html](http://www.who.int/gender/documents/violence/who_fch_gwh_01.1/en/index.html)
- Jewkes, R., E. Dartnall and Y. Sikweyiya (2012). *Ethical and Safety Recommendations for Research on the Perpetration of Sexual Violence*. Sexual Violence Research Initiative. Pretoria, South Africa, Medical Research Council. Available from [www.svri.org/EthicalRecommendations.pdf](http://www.svri.org/EthicalRecommendations.pdf)
- Researching violence against women: A practical guide for researchers and activists  
November 2005
- [http://www.path.org/publications/files/GBV\\_rvaw\\_complete.pdf](http://www.path.org/publications/files/GBV_rvaw_complete.pdf)
- World Health Organization (WHO), 'Ethical and safety recommendations for researching documenting and monitoring sexual violence in emergencies' 2007, [http://www.who.int/gender/documents/OMS\\_Ethics&Safety10Aug07.pdf](http://www.who.int/gender/documents/OMS_Ethics&Safety10Aug07.pdf)

## 7. Key Deliverables of Evaluator and Timeframe Evaluation

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	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>Description of Expected Deliverables</b>	<b>Timeline of each deliverable (date/month/year)</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Evaluation inception report</b> (language of report: English)	<p>The inception report provides the grantee organization and the evaluators with an opportunity to verify that they share the same understanding about the evaluation and clarify any misunderstanding at the outset.</p> <p>An inception report must be prepared by the evaluator/s <u>before</u> going into the technical mission and full data collection stage. It must detail the evaluators' understanding of what is being evaluated and why, showing how each evaluation question will be answered by way of: proposed methods, proposed sources of data and data collection/analysis procedures.</p> <p>The inception report must include a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables, designating a team member with the lead responsibility for each task or</p>	28/09/2015



	Deliverables	Description of Expected Deliverables	Timeline of each deliverable (date/month/year)
		product. The structure must be in line with the suggested structure of the annex of TOR.	
2	<b>Draft evaluation report</b> (language of report: English)	The evaluator/s must submit draft report for review and comments by all parties involved. The report needs to meet the minimum requirements specified in the annex of TOR.  The grantee and key stakeholders in the evaluation must review the draft evaluation report to ensure that the evaluation meets the required quality criteria.	30/11/2015
3	<b>Final evaluation report</b> (language of report: English)	Relevant comments from key stakeholders must be well integrated in the final version, and the final report must meet the minimum requirements specified in the annex of TOR. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The final report shall include the following sections: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Executive summary: a paragraph describing the project; a paragraph summarizing the methodological approaches used; key findings including a summary of targets and intended outcomes, to extent relevant and feasible; a conclusion of the project relevance and its contribution towards the final goal.</li> <li>○ Methodology: a description of each method used and target groups involved. Methodological constraints, challenges and limitations should be also discussed in this section.</li> <li>○ Findings: a section addressing the evaluation questions. The findings can be presented under evaluation criteria or by domains of impact. <b>IMPORTANT:</b> Findings must be supported by evidence. Relevant project indicators which were agreed to be measured must be used in the analysis under this section. When evidence relies on perception or feedback of stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation, the consultant must illustrate key findings with selected quotes or careful summaries/translation of statements made by key informants.</li> <li>○ Recommendations and Lessons Learned</li> <li>○ Annexes: final terms of reference, evaluation schedule, table of project</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	16/12/2015

	<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>Description of Expected Deliverables</b>	<b>Timeline of each deliverable (date/month/year)</b>
		<p>indicators measured, list of people interviewed, list of documents reviewed, acronyms and abbreviations used, and operational definition of terms, etc.</p> <p>○</p> <p>The final report should not exceed 40 pages (without annexes).</p>	

## 8. Evaluation Team Composition and Required Competencies

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There will only be one evaluator who will be recruited internationally.

S/he will be responsible for undertaking the evaluation from start to finish, under the supervision of ICTJ's Senior Specialist for Design, Monitoring and Evaluation, for the data collection and analysis, as well as report drafting and finalization in English.

The following competencies are required for fulfilling the assignment successfully:

- Evaluation experience: At least 10 years in conducting external evaluations, with mixed-methods evaluation skills and in using non-traditional and innovative evaluation methods
- Expertise in gender and human-rights based approaches to evaluation and issues of violence against women and girls
- Specific evaluation experience in the areas of ending violence against women and girls
- Specific evaluation experience within the field of transitional justice strongly preferred
- Experience in collecting and analysing quantitative and qualitative data
- In-depth knowledge of gender equality and women's empowerment
- A strong commitment to delivering timely and high-quality results, i.e. a credible evaluation and a constructive report
- A strong team leadership and management track record, as well as interpersonal and communication skills to help ensure that the evaluation is understood and used.
- Good communication skills and ability to communicate with various stakeholders and to express concisely and clearly ideas and concepts
- Regional/Country experience and knowledge: in-depth field experience in at least one of the target countries is preferred.
- Language proficiency: fluency in English is mandatory; good command of French and/or Spanish is desirable.

## 9. Management Arrangement of the Evaluation

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<b>Name of Group</b>	<b>Role and Responsibilities</b>	<b>Actual Name of Staff Responsible</b>
<b>External Evaluator</b>	External evaluators/consultants to conduct an external evaluation based on the contractual agreement and the Terms of Reference, and under the day-to-day supervision of the	TBD

Name of Group	Role and Responsibilities	Actual Name of Staff Responsible
	Evaluation Task Manager.	
<b>Evaluation Task Manager</b>	<p>ICTJ's Senior Specialist for DME will provide overall guidance of the senior management, to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• lead the development and finalization of the evaluation TOR in consultation with key stakeholders and the senior management;</li> <li>• manage the recruitment of the external evaluator;</li> <li>• lead the collection of the key documents and data to be share with the evaluators at the beginning of the inception stage;</li> <li>• liaise and coordinate with the evaluation team, the reference group, the commissioning organization and the advisory group throughout the process to ensure effective communication and collaboration;</li> <li>• provide administrative and substantive technical support to the evaluation team and work closely with the evaluation team throughout the evaluation;</li> <li>• lead the dissemination of the report and follow-up activities after finalization of the report</li> </ul>	Julius Dasmariñas
<b>Commissioning Organization</b>	Senior program management of ICTJ will be responsible for: 1) allocating adequate human and financial resources for the evaluation; 2) guiding the evaluation manager; 3) preparing responses to the recommendations generated by the evaluation.	Senior Program Management of ICTJ
<b>Reference Group</b>	Include primary and secondary beneficiaries, partners and stakeholders of the project who provide necessary information to the evaluation team and to reviews the draft report for quality assurance	<p>Corporación Mujer Sigue mis Pasos, Colombia</p> <p>ICTJ Colombia</p> <p>ICTJ Cote d'Ivoire</p> <p>Grace Agenda, Kenya</p> <p>ICTJ Kenya</p> <p>NPSC, Kenya</p> <p>ICTJ Nepal</p> <p>ICTJ Tunisia</p> <p>TDC Women's Committee, Tunisia</p> <p>TJ is Also for Women Network, Tunisia</p>

Name of Group	Role and Responsibilities	Actual Name of Staff Responsible
		ICTJ Uganda Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP)/Women's Advocacy Network (subsidiary of JRP), Uganda
<b>Advisory Group</b>	Must include a focal point from the UN Women Regional Office and the UN Trust Fund Portfolio Manager to review and comment on <u>the draft TOR and the draft report</u> for quality assurance and provide technical support if needed.	Kelli Muddell, Director of ICTJ Gender Justice Program  Anna Theresia Thylin, UNTF Portfolio Manager  Nahla Valji, Policy Adviser and Officer in Charge, Peace and Security Section, UN Women

## 10. Timeline of the Entire Evaluation Process

It is estimated that the evaluation will take approximately 35 working days; including approximately two weeks in the field plus 3 days required travel time. These numbers are a guideline only, intended to provide a sense of the scale of the effort as it will depend on the experience of the consultant to determine exact needs that fit within the budget.

The consultant will arrange international transportation, and ICTJ will arrange local transportation in the targeted evaluation countries. ICTJ will also arrange accommodation and interviews with the selected stakeholders. ICTJ will provide support to address other logistical needs to collect data as needed.

Stage of Evaluation	Key Task	Responsible	Number of working days required	Timeframe (dd/mm/yyyy - dd/mm/yyyy)
<b>Preparation stage</b>	Prepare and finalize the TOR with key stakeholders	Evaluation Task Manager	Inputs required by Grantee	16/07/2015-31/07/2015

Stage of Evaluation	Key Task	Responsible	Number of working days required	Timeframe (dd/mm/yyyy - dd/mm/yyyy)
	Compiling key documents and existing data	ICTJ Gender Justice Project Associates		17/08/2015-30/08/2015
	Recruitment of external evaluator(s)			19/08/2015-30/08/2015
		ICTJ Human Resource Specialist		
<b>Inception stage</b>	Briefing and orientation of the evaluator	Evaluation Task Manager		31/08/2015
	Desk review of key documents	Evaluator		01/09/2015-10/09/2015
	Finalizing the evaluation design and methods	Evaluator		07/09/2015-14/09/2015
	Preparing an inception report	Evaluator		15/09/2015-22/09/2015
	Review Inception Report and provide feedback	Evaluation Task Manager, Reference Group and Advisory Group		23/09/2015-25/09/2015
	Submitting final version of inception report	Evaluator		28/09/2015
<b>Data collection and analysis stage</b>	Desk research	Evaluator		01/10/2015-13/10/2015
	In-country technical mission for data collection (visits to the field, interviews, questionnaires, etc.)	Evaluator		15/10/2015-30/10/2015
<b>Synthesis and reporting stage</b>	Analysis and interpretation of findings	Evaluator		01/11/2015-10/11/2015

Stage of Evaluation	Key Task	Responsible	Number of working days required	Timeframe (dd/mm/yyyy - dd/mm/yyyy)
	Preparing a draft report	Evaluation Team		11/11/2015-29/11/2015
	Review of the draft report with key stakeholders for quality assurance	Evaluation Task Manager, Reference Group, Commissioning Organization Senior Management, and Advisory Group		30/11/2015-04/12/2015
	Consolidate comments from all the groups and submit the consolidated comments to evaluation team	Evaluation Task Manger		07/12/2015-08/12/2015
	Incorporating comments and revising the evaluation report	Evaluator		09/12/2015-13/12/2015
	Submission of the final report	Evaluator		14/12/2015
	Final review and approval of report	Evaluation Task Manager, Reference Group, Commissioning Organization Senior Management, and Advisory Group		14/12/2015-16/12/2015
	<b>Dissemination and follow-up</b>	Publishing and distributing the final report	Commissioning organization led by evaluation manager	
Prepare management responses to the key recommendations of the report		Senior Management of commissioning organization		TBD
Organize learning events (to discuss key findings and recommendations, use the finding for planning of		Commissioning organization		TBD

Stage of Evaluation	Key Task	Responsible	Number of working days required	Timeframe (dd/mm/yyyy - dd/mm/yyyy)
	following year, etc.)			

### 11. Budget

The total budget for the evaluation is \$32,000 USD. **This budget includes all the costs incurred by the evaluator** (e.g. consultant fees and per diem, accommodation, international and local transportation, communication costs, insurance costs, etc.). The ICTJ Country Offices will use best efforts to make an ICTJ vehicle available to the consultant for meetings, but in the absence of such availability on specific occasions, the costs of transport, including taxi costs, shall be paid by consultant as part of the budgeted amount. Consultant will be able to use the photocopy machine in the relevant ICTJ country offices to make copies of documents s/he deems necessary and s/he will not be charged for this cost.

### 12. Annexes

1. List of Potential Stakeholders to be Consulted
2. Results Framework
3. List of Outcomes, Outputs, Activities and Indicators
4. Baseline Report 2013
5. Progress Report Year 1
6. Annual Report Year 1
7. Progress Report Year 2
8. Annual Report Year 2
9. Progress Report Year 3
10. Project Modification 1
11. Project Modification 2
12. Required Structure for Inception Report
13. Required Structure for Evaluation Report

## Annex 17: Comparison of Activities in Original Program Document to Activities in Final Program Document

Changes are highlighted in blue.

Program Document: Original, Program Mod 1, Program Mod 2	Implemented? Y/N/Partial	Country	Activity
O	Y	CDI	Key Project Activity 1.1.1: Two strategy workshops with women's groups on truth-seeking and operations of the Commission Dialogue, Verite etreconciliation (CDVR).
O	Y	Tunisia	Key Project Activity 1.1.2: Two workshops with women victims and rights groups in Tunisia on skills and strategies.
O	Y	Tunisia	Key Project Activity 1.2.1: Technical assistance sessions to women's group in Tunisia on strategies and approach of engaging truth seeking process.
O	N	Tunisia	Key Project Activity 1.2.2: [CANCELLED MOD 2] Consultations with Tunisian women victims and groups on reparative needs of victims of gender-based violence.
O	N	Kenya	Key Project Activity 1.2.3: Meetings with women's groups in Kenya to develop strategies to influence implementation of the KJTRC recommendations and empower them to engage with the vetting process.
O	N	Nepal	Key Project Activity 1.2.4: [CANCELLED MOD 2] Technical Assistance to Gender and TJ networks on engaging in future TJ measures in Nepal.
O	Y	CDI	Key Project Activity 1.3.1: Workshops with women's groups in CDI to develop reparations strategies, including those in marginalized communities.
O	Y	Kenya	Key Project Activity 1.3.2: Two consultation workshops with women's group in Kenya on access to reparations, to be fed back to policymakers.



Program Document: Original, Program Mod 1, Program Mod 2	Implemented? Y/N/Partial	Country	Activity
O	N	CDI	Key Project Activity 1.3.3: [CANCELLED] Consultation with CDI women victims and groups on access to reparations.
O	Y	Uganda (originally CDI)	Key Project Activity 2.1.1: [CHANGED] Training workshops for government institution in Uganda on reparations and gender justice. <b>ORIGINALLY:</b> <a href="#">Training workshops for government institution in CDI on reparations and gender justice</a>
O	Y	Tunisia	Key Project Activity 2.1.2: 2 workshops with TC staff in Tunisia (to be established) on addressing gender-based violence.
O	Y	Tunisia	Key Project Activity 2.1.3: Training with Ministry of TJ and HR in Tunisia on gender justice issues within a TJ context.
O	N	Tunisia	Key Project Activity 2.1.4: [CANCELLED] Two workshops on how truth commissions can address gender-based violence with regional Commission staff in
PM2	N	Kenya	Key Project Activity 2.1.5: [NEW] Training workshop with police vetting panels on gender-sensitive vetting procedures and police reform.
O	N	Nepal	Key Project Activity 2.2.1: [CANCELLED] Technical assistance to staff of future TJ measures in Nepal.
O	Y W/CHANGE	Uganda (originally CDI)	Key Project Activity 2.2.2: [EDITED MOD 2] Technical Assistance to Ugandan Human Rights Commission staff on documenting gender-based human rights violations, including for the purposes of identifying beneficiaries of reparations. <b>ORIGINAL:</b> <a href="#">Technical consultation with the Commission Speciale d'Enquete (CSE) in Cote d'Ivoire on their capacity to investigate and prosecute serious gender crimes</a>
O	Y W/CHANGE	Colombia (originally CDI)	Key Project Activity 2.2.3: [EDITED MOD 2] In Colombia, technical assistance sessions on removing barriers to women's access to reparations and on prosecuting sexual violence crimes on investigating

Program Document: Original, Program Mod 1, Program Mod 2	Implemented? Y/N/Partial	Country	Activity
			and prosecuting serious gender crimes based on consultation. <b>ORIGINAL: Targeted technical assistance to Cellule Speciale d'Enquete (CSE) on investigating and prosecuting serious gender crimes based on consultation</b>
O	N	Kenya	Key Project Activity 2.2.4: Technical assistance meetings in Kenya with members of Ministries in charge of implementing reparations, on gender-based violence and related issues.
O	N	Tunisia	Key Project Activity 2.2.5: <b>[CANCELLED MOD 2]</b> Technical assistance sessions with staff of future TJ measures in Tunisia.
O	Y	CDI	Key Project Activity 2.3.1: Technical assistance sessions to CDVR members on operational aspects of their work related to violence against women.
O	Y BUT COMBINED / 2.2.3	Colombia	Key Project Activity 2.3.2: In Colombia, technical assistance sessions on removing barriers to women's access to reparations and on prosecuting sexual violence crimes.
O	Y	Tunisia	Key Project Activity 2.3.3: Technical assistance mission for Ministry of Women Affairs in Tunisia on how to facilitate participation of women.
O	Y	All	Key Project Activity 2.4.1: Make the case for women victims situation, make the policymakers understand the role the government needs to play in addressing and the necessity to adjust TJ process to take into account their specific justice needs.
O	P	Colombia, Uganda	Key Project Activity 2.4.2: <b>[CHANGED]</b> Translation and printing of assessment of women's participation in reparations in Colombia & assessment; policy-maker roundtable and validation workshop on FAYM in Uganda. <b>ORIGINAL: Assessment of obstacles and good practices to women's participation in reparations in Colombia.</b>

Program Document: Original, Program Mod 1, Program Mod 2	Implemented? Y/N/Partial	Country	Activity
O	N	Nepal	Key Project Activity 2.4.3: [CANCELLED MOD 2] In Nepal, field research and victim friendly report of the impact of relief measures for victims and study on psychosocial support services for women victims. ORIGINAL: Field research on the impact of relief measures for victims in Nepal.
O	Y	Uganda	Key Project Activity 2.4.4: 3 - 1 day consultations with womens groups in Uganda on development of TJ framework.
O	Y	Uganda	Key Project Activity 2.4.5: [CHANGE] Validation workshop with women's groups on gender-sensitive concerns with TJ measures and printing and translation of briefing paper and summary in 3 languages. ORIGINAL: 3 - day consultations with women's groups in Uganda on the implementation of TJ framework
O	N	Colombia	Key Project Activity 3.1.1: [CANCELLED MOD 2] Impact study of TJ integrated approach on conflict-related violence against women in Colombia.
O	N	All	Key Project Activity 3.1.2: [CANCELLED MOD 2] Paper on cross-regional lessons learned from six countries on using TJ measures to address violence gender-